You’d think the Maritime Commander of the Royal Australian Navy, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Smith, would have stopped writing letters on SIEV-X.
After all, it was his letter to the Canberra Times repeating his false evidence to the unthrown children inquiry that he’d not heard of SIEV-X until after it sank that alerted Coastwatch chief Rear Admiral Marcus Bonser to Smith’s problem.
But he’s at it again, this time in a letter to the Herald published on Monday. Today, his letter and my reply, and my piece last week on last Thursday’s hearings of the SIEV-X inquiry. Ironically enough, his letter is dated the same day as a defence witness blew away his story at the inquiry.
The SBS Dateline program puts its second SIEV-X report to air tonight. The transcript of reporter Geoff Parish’s first report is in my first SIEV-X Webdiary entry Cover up or stuff up. I’ll put the transcript for tonight’s program up after it’s gone to air.
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Navy didn’t turn its back on SIEV-X
I have read with considerable concern articles written by Margo Kingston about the loss of SIEV-X. In “Navy did all it could to find doomed ship: PM” (Herald, July 1) I was accused of giving false evidence to the Senate committee and retracting it to avoid contradicting with evidence from Coastwatch. This is untrue, and I take personal offence at the accusation.
Hansard records my words on April 4: “We had some information that a boat might have been being prepared in the vicinity of Sunda Strait but we had no real fixed information as to when it was going to sail. Indeed, the first time that the navy knew [it] had sailed was when we were advised through the search and rescue organisation in Canberra that [it] may have foundered in the vicinity of Sunda Strait.”
Ms Kingston has given distorting emphasis to the latter part of my statement, portraying it as a denial that the navy had any information about SIEV-X. In my evidence I explained that unconfirmed intelligence had been received, and later added a letter of clarification that she absurdly labelled a “retraction”.
The letter made the essential point that our intelligence reports come from sources of greatly varying reliability. Often these reports conflict, and cannot be solely relied upon to determine air surveillance patterns or the stationing of ships. This was the case with SIEV-X.
Those of us charged with the responsibility of sending Australians into harm’s way are prepared to weather criticism of our decisions. But Ms Kingston’s allegations about ordinary sailors (“Mass drowning case could sink Navy’s reputation once and for all”, Herald, June 4) are unjustified. She accused them of deliberately turning their backs upon people in peril, which is unfair.
The Royal Australian Navy is a highly professional service which places the highest importance on the safety of life at sea and, whenever we are able, we will always respond to those in distress.
G.F. Smith, Rear Admiral, RAN Maritime Commander Australia, Potts Point, July 11.
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Dear Rear-Admiral Smith,
Your letter makes two points, both of which I strongly dispute.
1. You did not give false evidence to the inquiry
I am accused of distorting your evidence. I am in good company. When the head of Coastwatch,. Admiral Marcus Bonser, read your letter to The Canberra Times he took immediate action to correct the record. He told your chief of staff your evidence was inconsistent with the facts, particularly on “the first time that notification of SIEV-X occurred, which was not consistent with the flow of information as I knew it.”
When he heard nothing, he advised the head of the Defence force task force set up to assist the inquiry, Vice-Admiral Raydon Gates, at a face-to-face meeting. With the date when he would give evidence fast approaching and still no response by you, Bonser told the navy chief Admiral David Shackleton that “there would be inconsistencies between Admiral Smith’s evidence and mine when I appeared at the Senate committee, and he should be aware of that”.
You might also wish to explain your evidence on April 11 that, “We had no knowledge of that boat having sailed.”
Let’s go through your April 4 evidence as cited in your letter.
A. “We had some information that a boat might have been being prepared…’‘.
In fact, you had known for months through detailed intelligence reports that SIEV-X was being prepared by people smuggler Abu Qussey, a top-priority target of Australian intelligence operations, and had intelligence on October 18 and 19 that it was reported to have sailed. On October 20, your own intelligence group, the Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre received a report from Australian Federal Police intelligence through Coastwatch that SIEV-X had sailed and was overcrowded. The head of ATJIC, Colonel Patrick Gallagher, gave evidence that “We took that report … to be confirmation that departure had occurred,” and immediately issued an urgent intelligence report to that effect as “the way to get people’s attention on a weekend”.
Colonel Gallagher could not explain why you did not accept that SIEV-X had departed for another two days. “Those sort of decisions would have been taken in Canberra,” he said.
B. “We had no real fixed information as to when it was going to sail.”
See above. Not only did you have fixed information that it had sailed, you had information of when it was expected to arrive if nothing went wrong. You knew the boat was overcrowded, yet you took no action to search for SIEV-X.
The day after SIEV-X sank, when survivors were still in the water hoping for rescue, your Northern Command issued an intelligence report to you that it was expected to arrive the next day unless its overcrowding slowed it down. NORCOM assessed “a high probability of the vessel arriving vic Christmas Island from 21 Oct 01, and that due to its overcrowding and need to maintain stability it may be limited to a slow passage, and therefore a later time of arrival could be expected.”
C. “The first time that the navy knew [it] had sailed was when we were advised (on October 23) that [it] may have foundered…”
See above. On October 22 Coastwatch issued an overdue notice on SIEV-X. A defence representative was at the meeting of the PM’s task force where this was discussed, along with the ‘fact’ (proved incorrect) that you were looking for SIEV-X.
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Why did you give false evidence? The closest I’ve got to an answer is in a Mike Carlton piece. Mike has defended the navy over SIEV-X in three pieces in the Herald, in which he openly acknowledges that he relies for his information on navy bosses at the highest levels. He is a mate of former navy chief David Shackleton, for instance, and has spoken with you.
Here’s his explanation of your evidence in ‘Navy ‘plot’ doesn’t hold water’ (June 22).
“Undeterred, the theorists then claim a conflict between the director of Coastwatch, Rear Admiral Marc Bonser, and the navy’s maritime commander, Rear Admiral Geoff Smith. Again, not true. Bonser told the Senate committee of some early SIEV-X intelligence reports which Smith had believed were classified secret. He informed Smith he would do so. Smith then clarified that apparent difference in a letter to the committee.
Why did you believe the reports were ‘secret’? Why did you deny knowledge of SIEV-X instead of refusing to answer questions on it?
2. My unjustified allegations about ordinary sailors, accusing them of “deliberately turning their backs upon people in peril, which is unfair”.
This allegation verges on malicious obfuscation. At no time in the piece you mention, or any other, have I accused ordinary sailors or their immediate commanders of doing anything inappropriate in this affair. I have suggested that “the top brass” have lots of questions to answer, as they did over the ‘children overboard” lie.
Can you point to any part of the piece which makes “allegations about ordinary sailors” or that they turned their backs upon people in peril? (See the text of the piece you rely on below). It seems to me you are appealing to our pride in the navy to save yourself. This is a political letter, not one addressing the merits of this matter.
M.L. Kingston, journalist, Sydney Morning Herald
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Patsy not so easily deceived
By Margo Kingston
Defence Minister Robert Hill offered up Colonel Patrick Gallagher as a witness on Monday. The colonel first knew he was the patsy next morning when he read about it in The Canberra Times.
He hadn’t been a member of the Australian Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre (ATJIC) when the SIEV-X intelligence reports were analysed and sent to Operation Relex for action.
Now head of the centre, he raced to Canberra, read all the reports on Tuesday and all the SIEV-X evidence on Wednesday.
He couldn’t answer most questions how could he? Hill had substituted him for Admiral Raydon Gates, who he has banned from giving evidence.
Gates heads the defence force task force set up specifically to help the inquiry. He also wrote the defence force SIEV-X submission and reviewed all intelligence on SIEV-X received by defence. He’s got a power-point presentation ready and he wants to give evidence.
Hill won’t oblige because he doesn’t want Gates to give evidence on the alleged witness tampering of Commander Stefan King by Dr Brendon Hammer of the PM’s department.
What doesn’t Hill want Gates to reveal? It’s bound to be something embarrassing to the Government, and, like his predecessor Peter Reith, he doesn’t care what damage is done to defence to achieve that aim.
Yesterday the damage was excruciating. Gallagher was asked when ATJIC first reported that SIEV-X was grossly overcrowded. Task force officers passed him an answer. “The first report that up to 400 people were aboard the vessel and that it was overcrowded” was on October 22, Gallagher read.
His brow creased. “I have to say I’ve some concerns about that, because my recollection is the report on the morning of the 20th of October actually mentioned a large number of people …”
The latest defence force story is crumbling.
Hill has learned that Gallagher is no patsy.
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Mass drowning case could sink navy’s reputation
By Margo Kingston, June 4 2002
The new-look Defence Force’s handling of the fallout from the mysterious SIEV-X may well decide whether the navy’s culture, and its reputation, survives, writes Margo Kingston.
The incoming Defence Force chief, Lieutenant-General Peter Cosgrove, and the navy chief, Rear-Admiral Chris Ritchie, do not have the luxury of turning the page on the children overboard scandal which sullied their predecessors, Admiral Chris Barrie and Vice-Admiral David Shackleton, and called into question the political independence of our top brass.
They have to handle a potentially more damaging inquiry into the death by drowning of 353 people – including 150 children – during the federal election campaign.
The new-look Defence Force’s handling of the fallout from the mysterious SIEV-X – which the navy swore it knew nothing of before the drownings, then recanted in sensational circumstances – may well decide whether the navy’s culture, and its reputation, survives.
A former Australian ambassador to Cambodia, Tony Kevin, first suggested the Government knew about SIEV-X before its sinking when he made a private submission to the children overboard inquiry. But senators on both sides were hostile to his evidence and Admiral Geoffrey Smith, the head of the post-Tampa boat people assault code-named Operation Relex, buried the matter with unequivocal evidence.
Why was the nearest navy vessel so far away when the boat sank? Did the daily surveillance plane flyovers spot it? Were there warnings of its likely departure? “At no time under the auspices of Operation Relex were we aware of the sailing of that vessel until we were told that it had in fact foundered,” Smith said.
The only unanswered question: how did SIEV-X slip through what Coastwatch chief, Rear-Admiral Mark Bonser, called “a comprehensive surveillance pattern [in place] doing nothing but looking for these boats”? Senators became interested in the results of the navy’s investigation into what went wrong.
But before they got to that, Bonser threw a bomb into this minor inquiry footnote, revealing in evidence that the navy had extensive prior knowledge about SIEV-X from Australian Federal Police intelligence reports and Coastwatch analysis, including the identity of the people smuggler concerned. In particular, the day before the sinking it was told that SIEV-X had reportedly sailed and was a possible arrival at Christmas Island soon. Smith had agreed in evidence that it was normal practice to move a navy vessel in the direction of a target once a report was made of its departure.
Bonser also revealed that the navy had conducted no investigation into why SIEV-X had not been spotted and monitored as required by the Government’s forward defence interception and return strategy, or even asked any questions about it.
And his bombshells didn’t stop there. Bonser had taken extraordinary measures to warn the navy that his evidence would be inconsistent with that of Smith, yet it did not correct the record for more than a month. On April 16, when Smith was overseas, Bonser informed Smith’s chief of staff that his evidence was inconsistent “with the flow of information as I knew it”.
He heard nothing back, and on April 22 told the head of the Defence Force’s people-smuggling taskforce, Admiral R.W. Gates, about the problem. Gates said he would speak to Smith. Still nothing.
On May 10 Bonser went to the top, advising the then navy chief, David Shackleton, that “there would be inconsistencies between Admiral Smith’s evidence and mine [and] he should be aware of that”.
Six days later Smith rang Bonser to advise he would “clarify” his evidence, then got copies of the intelligence documents Coastwatch had given the navy at the time. Smith finally wrote to the inquiry correcting his evidence after his letter was cleared by the defence taskforce. But just before Bonser took the stand the navy demanded the letter back on the ground that it was confidential.
Bonser’s evidence and Smith’s letter have ignited inquiry interest. The Australian Federal Police and Admiral Gates will give evidence on June 21. Labor’s Senate leader, John Faulkner, told the Herald that SIEV-X was now his top inquiry priority.
What is going on in the navy? Has its core ethos mutated under the political stresses of Operation Relex? Has it got something terrible to hide, or is it so incompetent that it needs a shake-up much bigger than a change of leaders at the top? Stay tuned.