The so-called “glib aim” of regime change is not about human rights. Improved human rights will be an outcome, but it is not the motivation for the intervention. The aim is not glib. It is a simple statement of fact. The regime will be changed.
Jim Nolan in Take a risk for human rights: Back Bush (webdiary17Jan) argues in favour of a regime change based on Human Rights (HR). Jim is right to remind people of the HR aspects but that is not the core aim of the change. Jack Robertson then set out the pitfalls of this approach in Time for a question change on Iraq (Jack20Jan), and described why he and his ilk own HR more than others who have recently discovered it.
Jack also talks of “dated monster tales about Saddam”. Now I have heard everything. A sort of one-upmanship, “I knew about the monster tales before you did”. The tales are not tales, they are documented facts. Nor are they dated. Such crimes do not date easily. There is a certain timelessness about them in fact. We have seen it before. It’s insulting to call past crimes dated monster tales.
Sometimes it is probably hard to see the wood for the trees. On the days following September 11, there would have been discussions in the US administration about the monumental foul up and how they didn’t see it coming. What do you think would have been said frankly behind closed doors? It would have been a lot of four letter words, anger and an “OK so what do we do now” approach.
This would have led to the conclusion that they need to do everything in their power to prevent even more horrific attacks. It would have taken 5 minutes to come up with the conclusion, “You know we really have to get rid of Saddam Hussein”. The driving force behind this conclusion was the well known fact that he was or is seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. It also follows that he would make such weapons available to terrorists.
It’s kind of like Clinton knew Osama bin Laden was a threat. He even ordered air strikes to try and kill him. In the end it was all put to the side for another day. That other day arrived on September 11. I am certainly not holding Clinton responsible, but the point is sometimes a threat is much larger than you may anticipate. The question then becomes “On which side should we err?”
After September 11, the answer became clear. Let’s not leave much room for error.
This is not about human rights (although that will be a good outcome), it is not about oil (although that too will be a good outcome) and it’s not about a previous war. It is about the situation we face this year. The situation of 2003. It is about the bleeding obvious – the weapons and how to stop them or control them. The doctrine of pre-emption started on September 11, 2001 when the world changed. No one likes the change but it is reality.
People cried that the US was taking a different approach to North Korea over Iraq. Gee, I wonder why? Could it be the fact that North Korea already has the ability to destroy cities in an instant? That relationship is a little more like the Cold War one. It’s not Iraq and it has to be managed differently. It is ridiculously naive to say all threats should be treated alike.
There are a lot of side issues, a lot of theories and some interesting discussion to be had. We can talk about conspiracies, alternative motivation and all sorts of things. I am reminded of Lisa Simpson. In Episode 2F07 “Gampa vs Sexual Inadequacy” Lisa uttered the immortal words referred to as Occam’s Razor. There was a fight in the treehouse as Bart and Milhouse tried to figure out what was going on around them. As usual, Lisa was the only character who spoke any sense:
Bart: OK, it’s not painfully clear the adults are definitely paving the way for an invasion by the saucer people.
Milhouse: You fool! Can’t you see it’s a massive government conspiracy? Or have they gotten to you too? [he and Bart start wrestling]
Lisa: Hey! Hey, hey, stop it! Stop it! Why are you guys jumping to such ridiculous conclusions? Haven’t you ever heard of Occam’s Razor? “The simplest explanation is probably the correct one.”
Yes, it really is about getting the weapons. It may sound glib, it may sound simple but it really is the primary motivation. The side motivations may be interesting fireside talk but they don’t drive the orders.
Jack asks a heap of questions that no one can easily answer. That’s the nature of it. I don’t know anything more than anyone else knows. I’m just a schmuck with a column in Web Diary. My responses to his points are as follows:
1. Roughly how many total casualties – enemy and friendly, military (regular, conscript, militia) and civilian – could an invasion to remove Saddam in the name of Human Rights be reasonably allowed to ‘cost’ before the HR ‘net balance sheet’ moves into negative territory? If this is an unreasonable mode of assessment, define a ‘successful’ invasion outcome.
I do not know how many casualties there will be. The number could be substantial and this is the scariest part. There is no such thing as an HR balance sheet as that is not the reason for the intervention. Success will be measured in terms of regime change (as much as you hate the statement of the “glib” obvious). Regime change will bring about transparency on weapons of mass destruction. If people do not like the language they should suggest alternatives. If they prefer, it is quite easy to replace “regime change” with “violent overthrow of enemy”. The result is the same. Regime change is not a euphemism, it is a stark statement of reality.
2. In describing the invasion’s primary aim as ‘regime change’, what exactly is meant by Saddam’s ‘regime’, and how will the invading forces delineate it? No totalitarian tyrant rules alone; the Iraqi political, social and military system is a network of mini-Saddams, each with commensurate degrees of HR blood on their hands. How will frontline invading forces simultaneously optimise the opportunities for a majority of Iraqi forces to surrender quickly, while applying maximum combat power to those Iraqis, at all command levels, who decide that their historical complicity in the ‘regime that must be changed’ affords them no option but to fight to the death? What worst case percentage of the Iraq population might regard themselves as irredeemably complicit in this way?
Regime is meant in its traditional sense. There was a Nazi regime. All its key elements collapsed and after the war no one was a Nazi. Similarly in East Germany, no one was a former Stasi Agent after 1990. In South Africa, no white admitted to supporting Apartheid after its collapse. When the regime changes, it is amazing how many people sort of forget what they used to be. Most will get off scott free and morph into some other identity afterwards. There will be no total justice. No one says that will happen. Nazi Germany was ruled by “chaos and consent” (as one TV doco coined it). If we were to re-visit that era, no one would suggest those other than at the very top be dealt with. It is impossible to do otherwise. It is not intellectually correct, just practical.
3. Much of the Iraqi civilian population, including women and children, has now been armed and primed for defensive jihad. Will the ROE of the invading forces make any formal distinction between an Iraqi soldier filling a military defensive role and an armed Iraqi civilian who considers herself to be defending her home and her children from a rapacious foreign invader, or will any such distinction be a matter of individual tactical judgement?
I assume we will only find out the ROE afterwards. I am not sure what is meant either by a “formal distinction”. An armed individual who appears threatening to allied forces will be approached as such. I don’t know how else it could work, no matter how painful this reality may seem. Even civilian police forces act this way. Unpalatable but true.
4. What will the ROE be? On what legal basis will this ROE rest? In the case of a non-UN authorised invasion, can the invasion authority indemnify all invading combatants from any subsequent HR-based legal action arising from errors of operational judgement?
Most of the invading combatants will be American. On what grounds can there be HR based legal action against Americans? I mean other than American processes? At this stage anyway I am not so sure a non-UN authorised invasion can take place. American public opinion is against this and a President acts against public opinion in such grave matters at his peril. I think this lesson has been learned. My feeling is that in one way or another the invasion will become authorised.
5. Will the invading force categorically rule out any use of its own weapons of mass destruction, regardless of how the invasion unfolds?
No. This is well known.
6. Which members – at what level – of ‘Saddam’s regime’ suspected of HR abuses will be investigated (and charged, tried and sentenced, etc), and by whom, and how, and when, and within what legal framework? Which members of it will be granted indemnity, and by whom, and within what legal framework?
Top level only. There will be no formal indemnity. Look at what has happened in other HR abuse scenarios. They get the top people (sometimes) and that is about the extent of it. Many or most will go free. There may be a show trial if you are lucky. Another unpalatable reality of the entire process.
7. Is there any time or outcome-based limitation on the presence of the invading/occupying force in a post-Saddam Iraq? Against what HR criteria will eventual military withdrawal be assessed?
HR will not be the criteria for withdrawal as HR is not the intent of intervention. The main criteria is the security of the US and its interests. HR will be taken into account but it is not the decision driver. As soon as security is to an acceptable level, there will be a withdrawal. You have to remember that the global media will monitor every minute of the post conflict aftermath. It is also worth remembering that US interest has a wide definition.
8. Are we now absolutely sure we can only change Saddam’s regime/HR behaviour with a full-scale military invasion?
No, but suggestions would be welcome. It seems the anti-war opinion is just that. Anti. There is no statement of what the anti lobby favours as an alternative. Is the alternative to war, peace? Perhaps. It would be very reassuring if that were true. The fear is that alternative to war and regime change in Iraq is a catastrophic attack on an American or European city brought about by weapons produced in Iraq. The odds of that outcome should be seriously weighed before conclusively stating that nothing should be done other than inspections of dubious value. Before 9-11, much was considered unthinkable. After 9-11, unthinkable outcomes become sadly more believable. It may seem simple and it may seem glib but I don’t think those responsible for planning this really feel that way.
It is easy and healthy to express doubts and ask questions. In the end though, some are called upon to take decisions amidst uncertainty. That’s the nature of it.
Only a soldier could answer Jack’s military questions and a lawyer the legal ones.