SAS Trooper Andrew Russell

John Howard today refused to explain to Parliament the “oversight” which saw the widow of Trooper Andrew Russell left off the guest list to hear George Bush speak, meet him at Howard’s barbecue or even watch him lay a wreath for fallen soldiers at the War Memorial.

He also refused to say whether or not he had investigated the cause of the failure.

Asked to explain how the oversight could occur, Mr Howard said that “whatever the circumstances of it” he took responsibility “as the head of the government … as inevitably in these things the head of government must”. Mr Howard thus avoided saying whether he was or was not personally responsible for the failure to invite Mrs Russell.

Kylie Russell’s MP, Western Australian Labor MP Graham Edwards, asked the first question of the week:

My question is to the Prime Minister. I refer to what he described as ‘an oversight’ in not inviting the widow of Sergeant Russell to the wreath-laying service at the War Memorial where a wreath was laid in Sergeant Russell’s honour. How does the Prime Minister respond to the statement made by Mrs Russell, in referring to his action, when she said:

“I hope he can live with himself after denying me and my daughter an opportunity to be a part of something we would have remembered forever.”

Has this oversight been investigated and can he advise the people of Australia how such an oversight could possibly occur?

Mr Howard

I say to the member for Cowan and to the House that I am indeed very upset that the oversight did occur. I want to renew to this House the apology that I have extended in writing to Mrs Russell. I want to take the opportunity of saying that, whatever the circumstances of it, as the head of government I accept responsibility as inevitably in these things the head of government must. I also take the opportunity of saying to the honourable gentleman that suggestions made in some newspaper articles – and, indeed, contained in a letter that he wrote to me – that the failure to invite her might have been in some way due to the fact that she had been critical of government policy in relation to benefits for the families of deceased Defence personnel have no substance of any kind – no substance at all. I can only say that I am profoundly sorry that it occurred. I apologise to the lady concerned. It was an inexcusable oversight, and I can assure the honourable member that, whatever the lead-up to it was, it was not malicious. It was a mistake and, as the head of government, I accept responsibility.

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Mrs Russell has not released a copy of Howard’s letter of apology. Edwards has seen a copy, and told me it was in almost precisely similar terms as the PM’s letter to him, published in Howard’s letter to Kylie’s MP. In that letter, Mr Howard referred to “a most regrettable oversight”.

If that is correct, Mr Howard has apologised far more profusely to the Parliament than to Trooper Russell’s widow, to whom he said he wrote last Monday. He’s got something to hide, that’s for sure.

It was a shame Labor didn’t follow up Mr Howard’s non-answer to either of Edwards’ questions, but it was determined to quickly nail the government’s latest scare campaign on security. Most questions were taken up proving that Mr Ruddocks’s demand for even more power for ASIO to detain people not suspected of a crime without charge in the light of the Brigitte matter was bogus. It was important to Labor to try to nip the next Tampa play in the bud, and to do so Labor dared to state the facts to give the public a chance to assess the merits of Ruddock’s case. It’s rather unimaginative of Howard to cast the same leading man for both tricks, and this time Labor did not follow the scare but stood firm on its principles and challenged Ruddock’s insupportable spin.

The next step in trying to force Howard to be accountable to the Australian people on his failure to invite Kylie Russell to Canberra on Thursday, October 23, is the questioning of Howard’s department – which made the arrangements for the Bush visit – by the Senate Estimates committee. Questions could begin tomorrow, led by Labor Senator John Faulkner.

My Sun Herald column is at No invite, dismissed as an ‘oversight’ and today’s Moir’ cartoon is at cartoon.

Here is an essay on Trooper Russell’s legacy by Robert Sadleir.

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Remembering Trooper Russell,

by Robert Sadleir

Robert Sadleir served with United Nations Agencies in Ethiopia, Nepal, Bosnia Herzegovina and Afghanistan. He was in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance Representative in Tehran at the time of Sgt. Russell’s death. He currently works as a consultant in Canberra.

Andrew Russell died a year ago on February 16 2001. He was 33. He died in the most unforgiving spot on earth where the howling sands of Dasht-e-Margo (Desert of Death) engulf the Dasht-e-Jehanum (Desert of Hell): southern Afghanistan.

And if you can escape nature’s perils here then perverse man has engineered another vile fate. The southern region of Afghanistan is, as the Essential Field Guide to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones warns, “the most heavily mined in the country with numerous anti-tank minefields”. In this the heaviest of mined lands. SAS sergeant Andrew Russell died when his Land Rover struck an anti-tank mine.

Like warriors since time immemorial, his country mourned his death in fullness but paid his widow and daughter a pitiful sum for his sacrifice. As the lone Australian soldier killed in action during the Afghanistan phase of the ‘War on Terrorism’, secular institutions are likely to afford a sacred revalorization of Russell’s life, but the fullness of that legacy needs to be conveyed.”

Andrew Russell died prior to the United Nations launching the largest repatriation of refugees in over three decades – bringing the Afghans back home. Russell’s death, though unfortunate, occurred at a time to shape the voluntary repatriation program and ensured only a small number of returnees from Iran were exposed to a hazardous route home.

On March 1 2002, a United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) organised repatriation of Afghans began in Pakistan. The proximity of refugee camps to major roads and to Kabul meant the repatriation was expected to go relatively smoothly. It proved to be the case. By the end of 2002 over 1.5 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan had returned home. However, returning Afghan refugees from Iran was far more problematic.

When the ‘War against Terrorism’ began in November2001, Iran closed its 950 km border with Afghanistan to prevent a refugee influx. Tehran claimed that with over a million Afghan refugees within its borders, the boat was full.

Unlike Pakistan, most refugees in Iran were not accommodated in camps. Twenty years had allowed Afghans to integrate relatively well into the Iranian economy, helped by the two nations sharing a similar tongue, Farsi and Dari, and cultural ties. The highly educated Afghans became lawyers and doctors and their children attended local schools. The uneducated found employment easily for their willingness to labour hard on building sites or do menial tasks beneath the dignity of Iranian urban dwellers.

But like refugees the world over, Afghans were scapegoats for modern social ills in Iran, from crime to unemployment. Moreover, both the reformists and theocrats – at loggerheads with one another over everything else in Iran – coalesced around this issue. The Afghans had to return home and the government appointed a hardliner, Ahmad Hosseini, director-general of the country’s Bureau of Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs Office (BAFIA), to ensure repatriation occurred. The plan drawn up under a tripartite agreement signed between Tehran, Kabul and UNHCR was to voluntarily repatriate a target figure of 400,000 Afghans through two border crossing points into Afghanistan.

One border crossing was at Dogharoun in Iran’s northeastern Khorasan province, and the other at Milak in Iran’s impoverished southeastern Sistan-Baluchestan province. On the surface this made logistical sense, as both frontier provinces had large refugee populations. Moreover, Dogharoun was a major commercial artery linked by a secure highway to the western Afghanistan city of Herat. From there roads linked to other parts of the country including Kabul.

On the other hand, Milak was not an ideal. Zaranj, the nearest Afghan town, was just across the border, but had little infrastructure to cope with a transiting population. Nestled by a parched lakebed in the Dasht-e-Margo, Zaranj suffocated from howling sandstorms that rendered day into night and reduced visibility to nil. Zaranj was a treacherous 200-odd kilometer drive to nearest major highway. To the northwest in Farah province a former mujahideen commander was feuding with Ismail Khan, the governor of Herat Ismail Khan, over Pashtun rights. And to the east in Hellmand were minefields and bandits eager to prey on returnees carrying with them their life’s possessions.

Yet Milak was chosen for several reasons. Most pressingly, perhaps, refugees had sheltered in this isolated part of Afghanistan for protection and had to be moved to a healthier location.

Also, the UN wished to avoid overburdening the strained infrastructure of Herat which already housed some 300000 internally displaced people in living in appalling conditions in Maslakh camp. The international community had correctly surmised returnees who had lived the past twenty years in urban environment would no longer be attracted to rural life and thus would concentrate in the large urban centres like Kabul and Herat. By routing them halfway between the two cities there might be chance that the returnees would choose other locations.

This was the backdrop in which Andrew Russell died. The exact location of his death was never disclosed, but the international community knew Australian troops were operating in the broad swathes of southern Afghanistan desert. His airlift to Kandahar confirmed the southern location of the incident.

His death became a catalyst for reappraisal of the repatriation plan by international agencies. Why? Trooper Russell’s death was concrete proof – broadcast throughout the region on BBC – of the dangers of travelling in the region, even for the best informed. What fate would returnees face at the whim of truck and bus drivers tempted to spontaneously carve short cuts in the desert to save fuel? Little was known of the location of minefields in the region for the mujihadeen had little bothered to map them in the Soviet era.

The whole repatriation process was called into question. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) felt the voluntary repatriation program was too premature – returning people to a war ravaged economy with little means to earn a livelihood made no sense. Afterall, wasn’t UNHCR responsible for protecting refugees? Political pressure came to the fore. The bellicose Hosseini was calling for an increase in the target repatriation to 600000.

The repatriation commenced in April with Milak crossing point closed. It opened briefly and was closed for manifold reasons during the course of 2002: fighting between Ismail Khan and Amanullah Khan; the belligerent behaviour of Iranian border guards; weather, illness of staff;

But behind these reasons too was the face of a young South Australian who migrated to Perth seeking adventure. By the end of 2002, the number of Afghan returnees crossing at Doghroun was 248 890. The number returning via the Milak, was only 12 413.

The official statement by Minister of Defence Robert Hill upon Andrew Russell’s death included the words: “This soldier has given his life in the service of his country as part of the global effort to make the world a safer place from the threat of terrorism.”

They are heartfelt and true, but do not capture the extraordinary legacy of Andrew Russell’s death.