Mark Latham’s decision to pull Australian troops out of Iraq after June 30 would defy international law, according to a senior Australian academic at the United Nations University.

An author of the new international bible on humanitarian intervention law and vice-rector of the UN University, Professor Ramesh Thakur, said today that as an occupying power after invasion, Australia had strict responsibilities to the people of Iraq.

He said Australia could lawfully withdraw from Iraq only after sovereignty was given back to the people of Iraq and “sustainable peace” was achieved.

By invading Iraq, Australia had confiscated its sovereignty, and became legally, politically and morally responsible for security, services, welfare and all other responsibilities of government until sovereignty was returned to the Iraqi people.

The planned June 30 transitional handover of sovereignty did not abrogate Australia’s responsibilities, he said. This is because the interim constitution had not been drawn up by the people of Iraq, but by the occupiers and their appointees. For a handover of sovereignty to occur, an election would have had to have been held.

Professor Thakur said there were even higher international obligation imposed on nations claiming they invaded for reasons “other than imperial aggression”. This was the obligation to ensure “a sustainable democracy” by embedding a functioning Parliament and an independent judicial system.

He also said Australia had “a moral and political obligation to the people of Iraq” to “stay the course and get the job completed”.

The comments expose one difficulty of Mark Latham’s policy to get Australian troops home by Christmas, despite the continuing guerilla war and the lack of elections. Labor based its opposition to invading Iraq without UN authority because of its professed respect for and belief in international law and the UN. Yet now, after opposing the invasion as illegal, Labour faces the prospect of breaching that same set of laws by pulling out.

Professor Thakur spoke at a Parliamentary Library seminar called “the duty to protect” hosted by Labor foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd, who praised Professor Thakur�s work and international standing.

Professor Thakur said the United States had now learned that while the UN might not be needed to invade a nation, “you do need UN blessing for the peace”. “Winning in war is meaningless without a secure peace.”

He said the US had failed to get UN endorsement for war on Iraq because most of the UN member states believed that the invasion of Iraq was not justified.

The stakes were so high that the UN Security Council had to say no because “it will be less relevant if it has no capacity to say no to the US on matters of principle when we knew it was wrong”.

“Going along to get along doesn�t make good policy,” he said, for the UN, or “the US allies”.

There�s strong disagreement in Canberra on whether Latham�s troops recall plan is smart or dumb in terms of his standing with the Australian people and Labor�s election chances. Most agree, for all sorts of reasons, that Latham�s policy is wrong.

 

On the politics, some say he�s ensured that Howard won�t pull a welcome home parade for the troops in Iraq during the election, and that�s got to be a plus. They also say Latham is following the �you�ve got to be in it to win it principle� � and that a vigorous debate on bringing the troops home will help neutralise national security as a positive for Howard and allow Labor to fight the election on domestic issues.

For me, stopping a Howard welcome home parade is not worth the cost. And why neutralise an issue when � before this debacle � Latham had a bloody good chance of winning it! (See Latham’s Iraq indiscretion ends honeymoon). Not only that, but he�s undermined Labor�s long-time support for international law and the United Nations (see Latham joins Howard in trashing international law on Iraq).

Does Latham really believe we need to recall 850 troops �to defend Australia�? Has he behaved impulsively on a matter of core national importance? Is he joining Howard in playing politics with the nation�s safety at a time when Howard is (or was) under the gun for the same reason?

Can Latham be trusted to lead the nation?

Webdiarists are as divided as the Labor Party and political journalists on whether Latham�s on a winner or is taking unnecessary risks. So let�s hear the arguments.

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NOTICEBOARD

Hugh Halloran recommends roadtosurfdom for in depth discussion of Richard Clarke�s book and developments in Washington on Clarke�s revelations on Bush and Iraq.

Brian McKinlay adds his recommendation to many others, including me, of juancole for must-read coverage of developments in Iraq.

Antony Loewenstein recommends Counterpunch for details of where the September 11 inquiry is at in the US and Misleader, a daily chronicle of Bush administration distortion.

Richard Tonkin recommends the Defence Ministry media release of March 10, “which states that our new Abrams tanks are units of a much larger global force. The last paragraph regarding rail transport and cranes in Darwin is also worthy of your attention. An implication of the creation of a covert unit of the U.S. Army could easily be drawn.”

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Dave Green

Re the poll result that 60%-ish of Australians want our defence personnel to remain in Iraq “until the job is done”, it should be noted that this is a view held by persons on roughly both sides of politics.

It�s by far the dominant view of the 40%-or-so Australians that still support the Howard government. However, it is also a significant view held by some at the small-l liberal end of the progressive spectrum.

The important point, however, is that there are radically different bases to these positions.

Deployment-supporting Conservatives appear, in general to support continued Australian involvement in Iraq for two main reasons:

1. It is government policy and they don’t want Labor to get an edge over their “team”.

2. They fear that removing our forces will signal weakness to terrorist groups.

There is a minority on this side of politics, which also support the U.S. neo-conservative empire-building exercise, and this obviously influences their opinion. But I suspect that our home grown neo-con movement is confined mostly to the elite conservative establishment (radio talk hosts, Murdoch columnists, some in the Federal Government).

Deployment-supporting progressives have a very different basis for supporting the continued deployment of Australian troops. Their position has two sources:

1. Respect for the notion of an international rule of law generally, and specifically, the provisions under the Geneva convention on the responsibilities of occupying powers.

2. Humanitarian concerns for the plight of ordinary Iraqis caught in a failed, ideologically driven attempt at nation building.

I don’t think Mark Latham should be too worried about the latest poll because deployment-supporting progressives won’t vote for the government regardless of the Labor position on Iraq. Howard�s continual politicisation of foreign policy, disregard for international law, and disastrous record on human rights for refugees precludes this possibility.

This looks to be another in a series of blunders by Howard – he is hammering this issue, but there isn’t much in it for him while it is framed by concerns for international law and human rights.

The issue can easily be neutralised for deployment-supporting progressives. Labor has already stated its intention to at least remain until the hand over of sovereignty to the Iraqis (showing a concern for international legalities) – and that half the troops would remain anyway. Add to that a substitution of aid to Iraq for deployment costs, and the 60% of support to Howard’s “position” would become at most 40% (and falling).

***

Simon Mansfield

Latham demolished Howard’s argument on bringing the troops home yesterday. We have done our job in Iraq; it’s time to get out before it all goes to shit. Why would be want our troops there in the middle of a civil war.

Howard wants the troops home as soon as he can get a political hit out of it. The real story is how Howard has had senior Foreign affairs officials and ADF officers out there engaging in the political debate.

***

Nick White

Well Margo, I must give it you: finally I read one of your articles that makes me smile, not fume. Unlike Alan Ramsey at least you have the balls to publish the fact that Latham made a policy on the run and a bad one at that. You were also the first to make a valid point when you state that it was crazy to demand the withdrawal of 850 troops to defend Australia when our armed forces total 51,000.

***

David Palmer in Adelaide

Margo, regardless of what you think of Latham’s tactics, his statement about pulling Australian troops out of Iraq was completely realistic.

It’s public knowledge that Australian troops presently play no significant role in Iraq. There are more Polish troops than Australian troops there at the moment. We’re quite fortunate that no Australian soldiers have been killed there yet.

Labor’s problem when Crean was in the Opposition leadership is that he failed to clearly oppose the U.S. led invasion – and Howard’s tailing behind anything that Bush said on the issue. Including the now discredited “Weapons of Mass Destruction” claim.

Howard is again deceiving the Australian public – and basically lying to them about the “importance” of our troops in that region. The problem is not Latham – it is Howard. I’m disgusted by Howard, not Latham.

***

Harry Heidelberg

Thanks for including the original Latham transcript in Latham’s Iraq indiscretion ends honeymoon. If you read all his caveats, what he says seems fine. (Margo: That�s what the Australian newspaper thought on the day � the paper did not report the first comments). All I had seen to that point was the screaming headlines, including from the Herald “Latham: Troops Home by Christmas” and similar. Yes, Latham should have taken Robert Bosler’s advice. If he had done so perhaps people would have focused on his original words.

Normally I can’t be bothered reading long things from Howard. I read that speech you printed and am stumped. I have been saying for a long time that he is the living dead, but that speech has me wondering again. Perhaps he can pull the rabbit out of the hat one more time. Surely not?

One thing I like to do is put myself inside the head of the average Australian. Not over analyse, not over intellectualise, but taking things on face value. I don�t find it hard to think like an ordinary person because I am. That speech hit every sweet spot. Howard HASN�T lost it. The wily old fox is back.

The basic pitch becomes hard to resist. In times of trouble, what do you want? A loose canon or a tried, proven and competent leader surrounded by people of similar ilk. I didn�t include “trusted” because he has lost that – but it is a relative thing (unfortunately). Do you put up with being conned from time to time if everything else works out OK?

In such an uncertain environment, it mightn�t seem right to turf out the old guy who knows what he’s doing in favour of the young guy who increasingly seems to have no idea. Perhaps this is just another flash in the pan but I think it is significant. We’re not America. We haven�t lost hundreds of our troops. We haven’t spent US$109 billion on this thing. Bush is in much more trouble than Howard.

I have a feeling the last day of the honeymoon has arrived. The suitcases are on the bed; there was a fight the night before and there is a long trip home to a reality filled with tense silences and doubts. Hey taxi, take me to the airport. We’ve gotta get out of this place! The Howard speech is the equivalent of arriving back home from the honeymoon and finding a letter from your old lover in the post box. You realise the fleeting quality of the new has become grating and the old, if you still had it, would have fit like comfy slippers on a winter’s night. Everyone needs security and Howard remains convincing.

***

Mick Stojcevski

I write in relation to the beat up over Mark Latham’s promise to withdraw our troops from Iraq. I believe everyone, nearly everyone, has misread the purpose of Latham’s promise. I believe he has wedged Howard.

The way Howard and most of the media have reacted, they have missed Mark Latham’s wedging of Howard. Latham has forced Howard to fight on the Iraq War again, forcing him to justify his position on that war in order for the troops to remain there.

Maybe there were sufficient gullible people 12 months ago willing to swallow Howard’s line, but how many do you believe are willing to swallow it now? Only the sycophants and the fools. And they are a sufficiently small minority that they won’t win the election for Howard, and he knows it. I agree with you that Howard is still out there fishing for a wedge, but he either isn’t aware that Latham has perhaps wedged him or he truly believes he can win by fighting on the Iraq War again.

If I am correct then we will see further erosion of Howard’s credibility.

Maybe Peter Costello will garner the courage to challenge, but I doubt it. Costello was right last June, and it’s a pity for him that John and Janette weren’t as wise. But, then, one could argue that they never were and have had three lucky strikes; anyone could’ve beaten Keating in 1996, he was lucky to win with 48.5% of the vote in 1998 and lucky that the Tampa and September 11 came just before the 2001 election. He should’ve trounced the ALP in 2001 but he couldn’t. The electorate doesn’t love him and as soon as the ALP offered a decent alternative, they have flocked to him in droves.

He won’t have such luck with Mark Latham. Not in a million years. Bye bye Johnny.

***

Mike Lyvers in Queensland

If Latham is serious about bringing the troops home and making Australians safer from terrorist threats, then he should be calling for immediately withdrawal of all Australian forces from East Timor.

The Australian role in the liberation of East Timor unequivocally increased Australians’ risk of being victimized by terrorists, as the Bali bombers and Osama bin Laden justified the Bali attack by citing Australia’s role in East Timor as a “crusader nation” stealing land from a Muslim nation, Indonesia. (And East Timor’s oil reserves are every bit as likely to have been a major motivating factor in that involvement as in Iraq).

But there is silence from Latham, the Greens and the Left in general about this. Why? All those who advocated Australian involvement in East Timor must accept that such action clearly and unequivocally increased the risk of a terrorist attack against Australians – Bali being the proof.

***

Jaye Newland in Copacabana, NSW

Being an election year there are lots of attacks on individuals, notably Mark Latham, from Howard and the media – including Web Diary.

Let�s get real. Howard has blood on his hands, and Mark Latham does not, so that makes them different for starters. Mark Latham is younger, and I am sure that he will learn more in a short time than Howard has over decades.

Howard has taken taxpayer�s money away from health and education and put it into his war chest for his self serving political ambitions, Defence, “the war on terror” and Security. Howard cancelled reconciliation with indigenous Australians and depleted essential services.

Mark Latham’s mentor is Gough Whitlam and I�m sure that he will improve services and cultural support for our indigenous peoples. Mark Latham deserves all the support he can get from thinking Australians.

***

Clive Astle in Banksia Beach, Queensland

Margo, Howard’s government claims Oz troops can’t be brought home because they are needed to protect Australian diplomats in Iraq. Silly me – I thought the war was supposed to be over. And yet the UK does not use its defence forces to protect its diplomats – the UK contracts private security guards.

Similarly, why should Australian defence forces perform air traffic control or other civilian tasks? For example, if the war is really over, re-employ the Iraqi air traffic controllers that ran Baghdad airport before the war.

***

Iain Todd

As I understand the logic of Howard’s justification of war in Iraq, the removal of Saddam was necessary because he was a despotic leader with WMDs and the capability of furthering terrorism. That our presence was necessary appears to be because of our strategic alliance with the USA.

There is an echo of this sentiment in our commitment to the Vietnam War. Replace terrorism with communism, and the two wars appear eerily similar.

It’s instructive to see the film “The Fog of War”, where Robert McNamara explains the involvement of the US in what he now acknowledges was a misguided use of US military power. It was particularly galling to hear the former Secretary of Defence state that none of their allies participated in that conflict.

That our involvement in Iraq is more to do with domestic politics than any other consideration seems clear; apart from the duplicity of the Howard government, what angers me most is that we continue to learn nothing from history. If we had learnt those lessons, perhaps the Government of the day, of any persuasion, would not find us so easy to delude.

It seems to me that the mainstream media are largely in denial about the blogosphere, often taking opportunities to run it down and dismiss it as a place where only crazies hang out. They do this while reading it religiously and, I’ll warrant, using it as a way of keeping tabs on how various stories are playing, especially at the grass-roots level. Now don’t get me wrong, there are plenty of crazies out there in blogland, but you’recrazy if you think that’s all there is to it.

 

So it was interesting to see two major newspapers dealing with the role of blogs over the last few weeks, first in an article by Trevor Cook in the Fin Review payment required) and also in a piece by Julia Baird in theSMH.

The Cook piece sought to deal with the issue of quality in the blogosphere by comparing the approaches of two bloggers, John Quiggin and Tim Blair, saying:

Blair and Quiggin represent two strands of commentary blogging. Blair is tabloid and provocative, something more akin to a blogging shock jock, while Quiggin, though not dull, tends to stick more strictly to his academic and policy orientations.”

Elsewhere, Rob Schaap has been contemplating the lifeworld, while Geelong journalist Bernard Slattery is saying I told you so about the Spanish elections and also about some recent anti-war demonstrations. Steve Edwards loves coups, and Zem is disturbed by the new terrorist laws.

Rob Corr is is your one-stop shop for Labor logos, and Yobbo is not going to be applying for a job at ASIO. Gary Sauer-Thompson notes that his blog is “becoming the site of conflicting opinion about international affairs” but I think he means it in a good way. Tony the Teacher is showing his age. Oh yeah, go check out John Abercrombie’s new Powerup site and see what you make of it.

The Catallaxy blog has a new home, but they still think markets rule. William Burrough’s Baboon is having an unusually busy period and I notice Wogblog is asking to be nominated for Blogjam. Hasn’t happened, but here’s a link anyway to what she thinks of Mark Latham. James on L’affaire Thorpe.

Three quickies from overseas: Randy on the other hemisphere; you’ve-got-mail syndrome; and you’re hit-pick of the week.

Over here in the capital city of the hegemon du jour, all the political talk has been about former counterterrorism supremo Richard Clarke, his new book and his testimony at the 9/11 Commission. Kerryn Higgs’ piece isa good summary, while Bargarz collects links and offers opinions about why Clarke is not to be trusted. If you want to read some extracts from the book, as well as some comments, I’ve been doing a rolling review at my place. More next week, including bias in the blogosphere.

On Monday, March 22, Mark Latham made the war on Iraq and what it showed about the John Howard�s fitness for lead on national security a front line election issue. (See A rotten lousy disgrace.)

 

His speech seeking to censure Howard for not allowing AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty to tell us the truth about the increased danger we faced from terrorism due to our invasion of Iraq was a triumph. Howard was on the ropes with nowhere to go but down for the count (see Could Howard be gone before we vote?)

Better still for Latham, Bush�s former top counter terrorism adviser Richard Clarke � the man Bush trusted to lead the September 11 reaction team in the White House, was systematically exposing Bush lying over the bodies of his people to persuade them to support a war which helped the terrorists� cause. (See Bush before September 11: the awful truth.)

Perhaps buoyed by strong polls in last Tuesday�s Australian newspaper, Latham told Sydney radio 2UE he wanted our troops home for Christmas. There were lots of ifs and buts:

Mark Latham: We believe we have a responsibility to rebuild [Iraq] and as soon as that responsibility is discharged they should be back here. Hopefully, that will be before the end of the year. Under a Labor government our strategy is to get them back as soon as that responsibility is discharged and you have got a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government.

Mike Carlton: Well, theoretically, there is going to be a hand over in June.

ML: Yes, that is theoretically, but we have to look at the timetable. Things can go wrong and it might be delayed. I am hoping that by the end of the year the Australian troops will be back here for the defence of Australia, having discharged their international responsibilities, and back on Australian soil for the good protection our country.

MC: But how do you decide? You are being a bit wishy-washy there, leaving a lot of room to move. How do you decide when they have discharged their responsibilities and to bring them back?

ML: Well, at the point of a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government. As you say, there is a timetable – a very tentative timetable – for the middle of the year. Things can go wrong, things can get pushed back a while, but our intention is to ensure that once the responsibility is discharged – and that is at the time of the hand over to the new sovereign government in Iraq – then Australian troops will come back under a Labor government.

MC: And you would hope they would be home by Christmas?

ML: Yes, if that timetable of midyear is adhered to then that would be the case. If a federal election is held this year, say the election was in September and there was a change in government, we would be hoping to have them back by Christmas, certainly. (See A question of timing.)

Howard pounced, beating up the comments to insist that Latham had made a definitive announcement that he�d �cut and run�, not simply stating a goal to work towards.

I reckon Latham made two mistakes. First, he was scheduled to give a major foreign policy speech next week setting out the major differences between the two parties. This is the way to announce national security policy, not a throwaway line on talkback.

Still, his 2UE comments were open ended enough to allow for unforseen circumstances to intervene, like a civil war in Iraq upon the transfer of authority to the Iraqis on June 30. They also allowed a change of heart if � as most of the world wants � the Americans handed control of the transition to democracy to the UN and asked Australia to stay.

The story should have been a one-day wonder, or even turned into a positive for Labor. I mean, when does Howard intend to bring the troops home? When the U.S. says it�s OK, as usual?

But Latham�s got a lot of Keating – another hard-yards Sydney westie – in him. Instead of hosing Howard�s beat up down, he�s led with his chin ever since, giving Howard a rung on his comeback ladder of opportunity.

I don�t know about you, but when I saw Latham say we had to bring our 850 troops home after June 30 �to defend Australia� I was disgusted. Pure populism it was, and I thought Australians would see through it big time, which they have.

It was painful to see Latham�s foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd on Lateline last night having to dodge and weave to avoid stating the obvious � that he did not agree with Latham�s hard and fast timetable for exit. Latham has neutralised Kevin Rudd with this decision, damaging one of his best assets on national security.

Is Latham really saying the danger to Australia is so acute that we need 850 troops to join the 51,0000 troops stationed in Australia? That�s scare mongering at its worst.

As Howard rightly said speaking to his motion in the House of Representatives today that troops should not be withdrawn before the job is done, that would mean hauling back our troops from East Timor and the Solomons too. Stupid.

What�s worse, however, is the fact that Latham�s decision to go in harder when challenged by Howard now makes the American alliance central to the Iraq/national security debate, and that suits Howard, not Latham.

In dangerous times, many Australians want good relations with the U.S. Other Australians are appalled at the Bush administration, but fear the U.S. response to a unilateral pullout. �With us or against us�, remember? And remember 1975, when, according to some, the CIA played a part in ousting Gough Whitlam?

It�s now obvious Howard did the wrong thing by Australia and the West by invading Iraq without the support of the majority of Australians for reasons he would not disclose under cover of Iraq�s alleged WMDs.

But we did invade, and we�re there now trying to secure the peace, a vital task for the West to stop Iraq being over run by al Qaeda and company.

As invaders, Australia also has a legal and moral responsibility to stay the course. We also have a responsibility to add our voice to the growing calls for Bush to abandon his imperialist dream of owning Iraq and looting it and over authority to the UN. That�s powerful, coming from an ally on the ground in Iraq.

I reckon Latham disobeyed Webdiarist Robert Bosler�s good advice for when the shit hits the fan. In An artist’s blueprint for a Latham win he wrote:

What does he do when the mountainous screaming whirlwind is just too much for now? Absolutely, he must say nothing. This crashes against the screaming mass and all hell will break loose. His minders will be screaming at him: “you must speak to the media or they will tear you apart”. He must let the media do just that.

Let’s say that again. He must ignore the exhortations to comment under those circumstances and if the media tears him apart, he must let them.

This is a standout point. It only lives successfully under these conditions: little time to go coupled with uncertainty, which is where we are now before the next election. It works because it creates a vacuum. A vacuum is powerful. It sucks things into it. During times when Mark is uncertain, if he ignores the screaming mass he then gives himself time to centre his spirit and get on top of it again.

Let the media tear him apart – because they will have nothing from him to tear apart. The media will be tearing apart only the substance that the media itself throws at it. Mark is silent. He, then in good time, has regathered within himself, he has created the vacuum, there is greater intensity of interest in what he has to say, and when he speaks again he speaks with incisiveness and strength and fills the vacuum with substance of his own choosing.

The net result: Mark has reset the agenda. He is back on top of it all, and the game plays out under his renewed terms and conditions. This point is crucial to his winning. Failure to do so, by listening to the exhortations to speak under duress, will show only a man not yet ready to lead.

Richard Clarke is in the process of destroying the presidency of George Bush. He�s proving that Bush gave al Qaeda a low priority before S11 despite strong contrary advice, and that after S11 he put invading Iraq above fighting al Qaeda. Again, this was contrary to advice from his most senior experts that there was no connection between Saddam and S11 and that invading Iraq would strengthen, not weaken, the real enemy.

There are questions Howard needs to be asked. What was our intelligence agencies� and foreign affairs advice on whether the invasion would make the world safer or more dangerous? What was our analysis of the real reasons for the invasion? Why did Howard not accept the advice of the head of the Defence Intelligence Organisation Frank Lewincamp that the WMD intelligence on Iraq did not justify an invasion? (See Mark Forbes story below). Why did Howard not tell the Australian people before the war that it risked making a us a bigger terrorist target? Why didn�t Howard tell the Americans that we�d focus on our region, where al Qaeda affiliates are active, and leave a region we had clean hands on to others?

Instead, the focus is on Latham, and it�s hurting. It�s allowing Howard to sound almost convincing when he accuses Latham of �blatant anti-Americanism�.

Latham moved too fast and too recklessly after his triumph early last week. He�s made his first big mistake after beginning to build a compelling case that Howard was a danger to our national security, not the man to trust with it in dangerous times.

A senior member of the press gallery told me early last week that Latham�s honeymoon would end soon, citing an �amateur hour� Latham backroom team running around like headless chooks.

Latham needs to settle down and stay cool. For Australia�s sake.

***

The spy, the reporter and that war seminar

by Mark Forbes

23/02/2004, The Age

A spy chief says he was a source of an Age report. Mark Forbes responds. `Were we led by the nose?” asked Frank Lewincamp. The director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Australia’s top military intelligence agency, was considering the accuracy of intelligence reports in the lead-up to last year’s Iraq war.

Standing before senior students, public servants and military officers from Australia and overseas at an Australian National University lecture in Canberra, the normally discreet intelligence chief answered the question with a series of startling statements, given the political maelstrom brewing over the allies’ failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Lewincamp, speaking under the “Chatham House rule”, clearly believed he would not be reported. The rule states that information from such meetings may be used, but neither the speaker nor the meeting can be identified.

Asked about the use of material aired in this fashion, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer this week said: “They tell you when you go to Chatham House, which is in London, they tell you when you make a speech there that your speech is under Chatham House rules.

“And apparently under Chatham House rules, that means nobody can report who you are by name, or your position. But they can report that a particular opinion was expressed.”

Only after both Mr Lewincamp and the organisers of the lecture had identified it as the primary source of a report in The Age on February 14 – and contested its accuracy – have I confirmed this. In the months since the lecture I have tried to persuade Mr Lewincamp and other intelligence figures to be quoted by name.

With intensifying debate over what the Government was told about Iraq’s WMD and how it used intelligence to justify war, and being told that a parliamentary committee had been unable to get to the bottom of the issue, The Age decided to publish on Saturday the 14th, citing unnamed sources.

In his confession to the Senate last Tuesday night, Mr Lewincamp outed himself as the source and stated he had had four subsequent conversations with me. I can recall five conversations, culminating in a phone call the Friday before The Age published its report. I remain bound to respect the confidentiality of any private conversations with him and those I have had with several other intelligence and Government officials.

“I believe that I am, at least in part, the official to whom Mark Forbes refers in his article,” Mr Lewincamp told his inquisitors, then added: “I have never made, nor would I make, a number of statements attributed to that official.

“I have never said that the Bush Administration’s claims justifying an invasion were exaggerated, nor have I said that the Government was told that Iraqi WMD did not pose an immediate threat. Overall, the article characterises these issues in ways in which I do not.”

At the lecture, last September, Mr Lewincamp discussed a range of less sensitive intelligence issues before moving on to Iraq.

He said the Australian intelligence support to the fighting itself was very good, but its support to policy and decision makers was mixed, particularly in predicting the response of the Iraqi leadership.

On WMD, “we have always told a consistent and reasonable story”, he said. “We had said Iraq had a WMD program, but to a large part it represented a latent capability. We said the degree of weaponisation of chemical and biological material in Iraq was unknown.”

Chemical and biological weapons could be produced in a short time, Mr Lewincamp reported, and the prospect of Iraq having weapons could not be discounted.

“We had to prepare the military for the worst-case scenario and the possibility they could be operating in a chemical and biological weapons environment.”

As a student at the seminar, I led a series of questions.

Asked if the intelligence was exaggerated and if Iraq presented a clear and present danger, Mr Lewincamp said: “We were less forward leaning than US agencies.”

Surprised, I asked: “Was the magnitude of the threat enough to justify the invasion of Iraq?”

“No,” was his blunt reply.

“Do you mean before the war?” “Yes,” Mr Lewincamp said, adding: “Some ministers may wish they hadn’t concentrated so strongly on WMD.”

In January 2003, Defence Minister Robert Hill had asked him “why US agencies were more gung-ho”, Mr Lewincamp said. “He now acknowledges we were closer to the truth.”

Questioned about the claim this week, Senator Hill said: “I do not know about the gung-ho, but if I saw difference in assessments about an issue as serious as this one then it would not be unusual for me to be asking for an explanation.”

Mr Lewincamp also revealed, under questioning at the ANU, that his agency identified deficiencies in US intelligence claims, citing US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s plea last February to the UN for it to act against Iraq. “We reported at the time (that) Colin Powell exaggerated in one or two of his statements. He went beyond the available evidence.”

However, Mr Lewincamp told the seminar, “there was pressure brought to bear on us because we were different and standing out more”.

In future the DIO staff should have more faith in their instincts, he said. In the US, the State Department “now believes it should have stood up more and questioned more”.

Mr Lewincamp said the comments he made at the lecture were consistent with evidence, also revealed by The Age last week, to a Senate committee last November 5.

He said then that any weapons Iraq held would be limited in number and “likely to be fragile or degraded and in a relatively poor state” after being left over from the 1990-91 Gulf War.

“There is a range of intelligence information that Iraq was engaged in the destruction of its capabilities,” he said.

The revelations have caused immense discomfort for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU. That an official of Mr Lewincamp’s stature would attend was due to the close links between those running the course and the defence and intelligence community.

The head of the centre, Ross Babbage, and the lecturer of the intelligence course, Ross Thomas, have come from senior positions in the Department of Defence and intelligence agencies.

Senator Hill has already suggested that intelligence officials should no longer deliver such lectures, but he and the intelligence community are likely to face further questioning in the near future.

Last week’s controversy makes an independent judicial inquiry into WMD intelligence essential, the Opposition has claimed, and even a Government-dominated parliamentary committee report is set to recommend a further investigation when it is tabled on March 1.

This report first appeared in Saturday’s Age, distribution of which was severely disrupted by an industrial dispute.

***

Director rejects claims

The Defence Department secretary yesterday issued a response on behalf of the Defence Intelligence Organisation’s director, Frank Lewincamp, to an article entitled “The spy, the reporter and that seminar”, published last Saturday and today.

“The article repeats claims made by Mr Forbes in an earlier article in relation to a presentation given by the director of the DIO, Lewincamp, to a seminar at the Australian National University,” the secretary, Ric Smith, said. “Mr Lewincamp has already given evidence to the Senate Defence Estimates Committee in which he rejected claims made in the original article.

“Following publication of (Saturday’s) article, Mr Lewincamp has again confirmed to me that his statement to the Senate Committee was correct. He has also rejected the new claim in (Saturday’s) article that pressure was brought to bear on DIO over its assessments.”

Joo-Cheong Tham is an Associate Law Lecturer at La Trobe University and has appeared as a witness before parliamentary committees inquiring into anti-terrorism legislation. He writes for Webdiary on anti-terrorism and political donation disclosure laws

 

Two and half years after September 11, it is clear that the Coalition government has developed a distinctive modus operandi when proposing new anti-terrorism laws. Its formula rests on five key strategies.

First, capitalise on terrorist incidents by proposing new anti-terrorism measures in the wake of such events and justifying them on the basis of being �tough on terror�. So a raft of anti-terror legislation was proposed shortly after the September 11 attacks. Similarly, the Brigitte affair prompted far-reaching offences which have the effect of cloaking much of ASIO�s activities in secrecy. The Madrid bombings provide the justification for the latest tranche of changes.

Second, propose changes which have nothing or very little to do with these terrorist incidents. It is hard, for example, to see the link between the Brigitte affair and making secret the exercise of ASIO�s powers to compulsorily question and detain without trial when these powers could but were not used against Willie Brigitte. What the proposal to ban persons who have trained with terrorist organisations from publishing their memoirs has to do with the Madrid bombings is equally a mystery.

Third, fetishise proposed anti-terrorism measures by depicting them as imperative in the �War on Terror�. Imply that failure to adopt such measures will mean, in the extreme case, the murder of innocents. Insinuate that those who fail to support such measures are, at best, unintentional allies of terrorists. In December 2002, for instance, the Coalition government strongly hinted that the ALP�s delay in supporting a detention without trial regime would result in further terrorist attacks and that blood would be on the ALP�s hands if these attacks occurred in the ensuing summer.

Fourth, ignore the existing panoply of anti-terrorism powers. Imply that measures are needed because a gap exists. Hence, the present proposal to extend the detention/interrogation time of persons suspected of �terrorism� offences to 24 hours is made without any public acknowledgment of ASIO�s extensive powers. These are powers which can result in a person not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing being detained incommunicado for rolling periods of seven-days and interrogated for up to 24 hours with no right to silence and only a heavily circumscribed right to legal representation.

Fifth, pretend that the proposals only target persons engaged in extreme acts of political/religious violence. Ignore the fact that the proposals and current laws impose guilt by association by making illegal conduct peripherally connected with acts like bombing and hijackings. Obscure the fact that these laws draw in their net certain acts of industrial action and political activity.

The current proposal to extend the detention/interrogation period, for example, is portrayed as if it only targeted terrorist suspects when it, in fact, catches persons suspected of committing a �terrorism� offence; an offence that can be committed merely by possessing a thing related to a �terrorist act�. �Terrorist act�, in turn, embraces certain acts of industrial action. Thus, a person holding a leaflet promoting picketing by nurses is, arguably, committing a �terrorism� offence.

We have, in sum, a formula based on opportunism, exaggerations and misrepresentations. It is these elements that lend substance to the charge that the Coalition government is exploiting the real fears that the Australian public has of terrorism and taking advantage of community perception that it is better at handling security issues than the ALP. It is this formula that makes up the politics of fear in the �War on Terror�.

Such politics might prove to be an electoral winner for the Coalition but there will be clear losers. The health of Australia�s democracy will be eroded by the acidic effect of fear and misrepresentations. Laws that trench upon established rights and liberties and do very little in preventing extreme acts of political violence will be on the statute books. Most of all, there will be the sharp irony of Australians being no less safe from extreme acts of political violence but, in fact, all the more vulnerable to the arbitrary state power.

Noel Hadjimichael is Webdiary’s conservative columnist. See also Antony Green’s analysis of the Sydney local government election results results at crikey.com.au.

 

I was surprised by the local government elections. I always campaign for a candidate of my choice and spent the day at the polling station handing out. This time work and personal commitments made me a pre-poll person: all the routine without any of the excitement of finding my candidate�s poster and how to vote. But what a day!

What happened may indicate a shift that will re-shape Australian politics.

Two significant cities swung away from Labor: metropolitan Brisbane (to the Liberals) and the City of Sydney (to community progressive Clover Moore).

To say that inner city types have gone Green is not an exaggeration. However, the real pain is that Greens have made headway in places like Latham-heartland Campbelltown, where voters are saying to Labor they are no longer prepared to be preference fodder.

The Greens appear to be the voice of dissent and progressive opinion. They’re not likely to be the main player, but very likely to be what the Country Party was to the Menzies Liberals: a voice for other interests more opposed to the enemy than friendly to their partner.

This is where the Labor/Green dance comes to a halt.

Labor appears to desire Green help to get into federal government but no role for their junior partner in government. Is there going to be a Lib/Lab alliance such as there was for Blair and the Liberal Democrats? I doubt it. Australian Labor is too arrogant, too distrustful and too used to power to countenance any coalition effort.

If the Greens continue to punish Labor in its inner city heartland and pick up dissenters in the suburbs over the next electoral cycle, they will become the radical left party of protest, economic protection, social policy adventure and foreign policy independence. This is a result that Labor will hate. It will steal Labor�s mantle of �Aussie blokey support for the underdog.�

The end of the Cold War has made the old left/right spectrum redundant. We now have a multi-layer diversity of electoral choices. Some fashionable and others traditional. Hansonism and the virtual self-destruction of the Democrats has seen to that.

The new Liberals are the defenders of conservative (small c) suburban values that offer comfort to the battlers and the aspirationals.

The fresh Greens are the movement of dissent and social reform.

The old Labor �two for the price of one� deal (mostly dependable right wing social democrats seeking power and patronage tempered by some left-wing idealists) appears very tacky indeed. This product, once shown up for what it is, is not going to sell.

In Germany it took many barren years of the Greens being punished by their social democratic colleagues on the broad Left before the two left of centre parties respected each other. I don�t see this happening in Australia.

Labor�s amazing backflips on indigenous issues (we’ll say ‘sorry’ but get rid of ATSIC too) points to a troubled identity. Is Labor pitching for Howard�s battlers (no champions of ATSIC) or the Greens� preferences (trust us and we will say sorry when we win office)?

Grass-roots disappointment and opposition to �modern Labor� has seen two major cities and many Councillor positions swap allegiance.

If Labor is happy with not much more than one third of the primary vote in Mark Latham�s backyard on Saturday they must have very low expectations from both local government and their own voters.

This is the text of John Howard’s speech to Parliament today on our troops in Iraq.

 

I now move that this House:

(1) expresses its continued support for and confidence in the 850 Australian Defence Force personnel currently deployed in or around Iraq and records its deep appreciation for the outstanding professionalism they have displayed in carrying out their duties; and

(2) is of the opinion that no elements of this contingent of Australian Defence Force personnel should be withdrawn until their respective tasks have been completed and that no arbitrary times should be set for such withdrawal.

In commending this motion to the House, I want to say immediately that this motion is very much about the present challenges facing Australia and facing the world, and it is also about the future.

We can spend a good deal of time during this debate debating the merits or otherwise of Australia�s military commitment as part of the coalition of the willing just over 12 months ago in Iraq. On behalf of the government I say that we remain steadfast in our view that that was the right decision, taken in the long-term national interests of this country, and a decision that has contributed, in my view, to already some very significant improvements, including the decision of the Gaddafi regime in Libya to give up its weapons of mass destruction.

What I am asking the House to do in relation to this motion is a very simple thing: to put aside for a moment whether or not you supported the commitment to Iraq and to ask yourself whether the continuation of the deployment of these forces in and around Iraq until their task is completed is in the long-term best interests of Australia, because that is our proposition.

I invite those who sit opposite, including the Leader of the Opposition, who strongly opposed our commitment to Iraq, to accept that it is possible, in good conscience and with great consistency, to have been an opponent of the commitment to Iraq but equally to believe that the Australian Defence Force personnel should stay there until their job is done.

The world faces, at the present time, a unique challenge to its safety, its stability and its security. The threat of terrorism is unlike any other threat the world has seen. This is not the threat of invading armies poised on borders, ready to roll over those borders and to capture civilian populations and devastate towns, cities and villages; this is a different kind of threat, and it is a threat that requires a different kind of response.

If the world at the present time trembles and shows any kind of equivocation in the face of the threat posed by terrorism, I believe that the world�of which Australia is inextricably a part�will pay a very heavy price in the future. The decision we take on how we deport ourselves over the months ahead will go very much to the reputation and standing of this country in the councils of the world. If we choose to cut and run, if we choose to abandon our friends, if we choose to give the wrong signal to the terrorists, that will not only make the world a less safe place but also damage the reputation of this country around the world.

It has always been the Australian way to stay there, to go the distance, to see it through and to do what is right in the long-term interests of this country and the interests of the people with whom we have aligned ourselves. We currently have something in the order of 850 Defence Force personnel in and around Iraq. They are carrying out a series of duties. We have a security detachment which is protecting the headquarters element of our presence in Iraq; we have military trainers; we have coalition provisional authority staff; we have air traffic controllers at Baghdad Airport; we have C130s stationed in Qatar; we have a headquarters and a headquarters liaison in Kuwait; we have the HMAS Stuart, which is performing valuable duties in the gulf; and we have P3C Orions, which are carrying out very necessary surveillance duties.

People may well argue that that is not a large number and ask: what would it matter if we pulled our 835 out? It would matter a great deal because we would be the very first to unconditionally break ranks if we pulled our people out. We have to understand that the Leader of the Opposition�s policy is that those forces should come out on 30 June if that is when the handover occurs. It may in practice only be possible for a Labor government to implement that in order to bring them home by Christmas because by definition we are not going to have an election until towards the end of the year. But in reality what the Leader of the Opposition is arguing is that we should bring them home on 30 June if that is when the transfer occurs.

What I put to the House is that that is a greater retreat from our obligations than proposed by any other government. Even the socialist government of Spain acknowledges that if there is a new UN resolution then they might well allow their 1,300 troops to stay in Iraq under that resolution. What the Leader of the Opposition is therefore proposing is a measure of retreat that would take us beyond any of the other 35 countries that comprise the coalition forces that are in Iraq.

The saga which has overtaken this debate over the past week has indeed been very strange. A week ago my understanding of the opposition�s policy was that articulated very consistently by the member for Griffith. That policy basically was that if they were to win the next election they would get advice � they would talk to DFAT; they would talk to Defence � and they would basically then make up their mind based on that advice as to what they were going to do, obviously having a preference for bringing the troops home as soon as possible.

But at no stage did I imagine that the opposition was going to place an arbitrary date on the withdrawal of those troops � that is, until last Tuesday morning when the Leader of the Opposition changed the policy. I do not know why: perhaps he was a bit seduced by the two opinion polls in the Australian last Tuesday morning; I do not know. Maybe he will give us the benefit � maybe it his deep-seated, latent anti-Americanism. I do not know what it is. But � whatever the explanation � we had, after a bit of questioning, the assertion by the Leader of the Opposition that they were going to come home by Christmas. As a result he completely altered the whole complexion of this debate.

I could understand the Labor Party maintained its opposition to our original involvement. But I had been beguiled by the member for Griffith into believing that despite their reservations about what we had done last year their argument was, �You may have been wrong to go in but now you�re there you�ve got to stay there until you finish the job.� That was basically what the member for Griffith said. When he wrote to me on 17 November last year he said that we should send more trainers to help the Iraqi army and to help the Iraqi police.

I actually agreed with him and we have sent some more trainers and there are some more going by way of rotation in May. Yet according to the policy of the Leader of the Opposition those people who go in May have to be withdrawn on 30 June, if in fact the handover takes place on 30 June.

I thought that was the policy. That policy is a cut and run policy. It says, �We�re going to bring them out as soon as we get elected�and that will be by Christmas�irrespective of the impact on the Americans, irrespective of the impact on the Iraqis, irrespective of the impact on our other allies.� That policy takes him further away from not only us�I can understand that�but the Labour Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair; the Democrat candidate in the United States, John Kerry; the Leader of the British conservative party, Michael Howard; and indeed further, as I said a moment ago, than the socialist government which has just been elected in Spain.

His excuses then began to change. He said originally, �I want them all out by Christmas.�

By Thursday, he was implying that on the way home they should go to Afghanistan, despite the fact that our task there�according to all the military advice we had in relation to Afghanistan�had been completed. Let me say to the House that our forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan on military advice�on the advice of the Chief of the Defence Force�that their task had been completed.

But that lasted for a day because by Friday these forces, these 850 personnel, were needed not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan, but for the defence of Australia�despite the fact that we have in Australia 51,000 ADF personnel looking after the defence of this country and despite the fact that even on the most pessimistic scenario in the conventional sense this country does not face any military threat.

In making that remark and in invoking the expression �the defence of Australia� in the context of the war against terrorism the Leader of the Opposition betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the challenge that this country faces. The war against terrorism is a war that overwhelmingly will be won through diplomatic, strategic and intelligence operations. Military operations are part of it. And you will do more damage in the war against terrorism if you betray a nervousness in the face of terrorists than you will by having 950 people out of Australia.

The real message that will come from what the Leader of the Opposition has suggested, if he was allowed to implement it, will be that terrorist intimidation will bring the results the terrorists want. The terrorists want division among free people. The terrorists want governments and oppositions and leaders and political groupings around the world to react to what the terrorists do. This is the worst time in the world for this country to cut and run. This is the worst time in the world for this country to be divided from its traditional friends and allies.

Like or dislike our alliance with the United States, like or dislike the current administrations in the United States or in the United Kingdom, the reality stands that it is a very dangerous time to be giving the impression that we are no longer rock solid with our traditional allies and friends.

This is a time for this country to send a clear and unambiguous signal to the rest of the world that we are united not only with our allies in the coalition of the willing but we are united with our allies in our region in the fight against terrorism. The proposition that in some way�with 51,000 Defence Force personnel in Australia and given the character of the war against terrorism�we needed these 850 for the defence of Australia and that in some way I, as Prime Minister, was endangering the security of this country by having those 850 personnel in Iraq was absolutely and fundamentally absurd.

If he wanted to be consistent, why didn�t he say we had to bring home our 450 from East Timor? Why didn�t we have to bring home our 500 from Solomon Islands? But then, by Saturday, the situation had changed again. By Saturday his office was briefing the press that really he did not mean the lot; he meant only those inside the borders of Iraq. He has not actually said that himself, I do not think�maybe he has and I have missed it�but that is what was being briefed to the media. Then of course we have the member for Lyons�s version, which is what I might call the Spanish-Australian Labor version�that is, if you get a UN resolution, if you get a blue-helmet operation, then the member for Lyons thinks that Australia should be part of that operation.

It represents a very sorry saga of not only policy on the run but also policy confusion, and, worst of all, a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the threat this country faces. It is not a traditional military threat. The signals you send by your action, by your indecision, by your reacting to events which are designed to divide and confound the free nations of the world, if they are the wrong signals, will do great long-term damage to this country.

We have an obligation � I state it in broad political, moral and strategic terms � as a nation, having gone into Iraq, to finish the job. It is as simple as that, and that was a proposition that was put to me, dare I say eloquently, by the member for Griffith.

He put it with passion. He put it with a great economy of words. He put it very deliberately. He said, �I don�t agree with what you�ve done, but I think, having done it, you�ve got to make sure that you finish the task.�

That has always, in my view, been the Australian way. It has never been the Australian way to cut and run. It has never been the Australian way to take the easy option. It has never been the Australian way to look as though you are influenced by or intimidated by the actions of terrorists.

The world did change forever on September 11, and this country had a terrible reminder of how the world changed on September 11 with the events of 12 October 2002 in Bali. The world changed somewhat further again with the attack which occurred in Madrid, because what that showed was the determination of a terrorist group, again, to wreak civilian havoc and murder on the mainland of Europe. It is still not precisely known who was responsible for that attack, although the strong suspicion must be that it was the work of Islamic extremists and people who undoubtedly have some association with al-Qaeda.

As to their motives and the causation�the events leading up to that attack�unless you can get into the minds of the terrorists, it is not possible to know. But this we do know, and that is that the terrorists who committed that attack and those who are their allies around the world are watching how the world reacts.

If the world reacts wrongly, if the world shows confusion and disarray, if the world looks as though it can be knocked off course and be diverted from its resolve in fighting terrorism, not only will those terrorists have murdered almost 200 Spanish citizens but they will have sown a degree of confusion and disorder within the political ranks of the free world. That is why this is not the time to look as though you are influenced by what occurred in Spain, whether that is your motive or not.

This is a time to say to the people responsible for that: �We stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies. We stand shoulder to shoulder with the people of Iraq. Although as a nation we differed and quarrelled as to whether we should be in Iraq, we believe that having gone into Iraq we�re going to stand there and we�re going to finish the job.� That is what this motion is about; it is about sending that signal and demonstrating that.

It is also an opportunity for this House, in expressing support for this motion, to recognise the many things that have been done by this government�most of them, let me say, readily and immediately with the support of the opposition�since September 11 to strengthen our defence forces, to strengthen the Australian Federal Police and to strengthen our intelligence services.

We have more than doubled the provision for our intelligence services. When the latest recruitment by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is completed, the capacity of that organisation will be at a higher level than it was at the height of the Cold War. We have almost doubled the capacity of the Australian Federal Police. We have put more resources into the Australian Defence Force.

All of these things have been necessary, and may I say again that the great bulk of them have enjoyed � and I record my gratitude for this � bipartisan support. That is why I find it distressing, in the national interest, that the Australian Labor Party has broken ranks. I happen to regard bipartisanship on these issues, if it can be achieved, as being very important. I say to those who sit opposite that, in a way, the view of another group of people as to whether or not bipartisanship is a good thing is more important than my view or the view of the Leader of the Opposition, and that is the view of the Australian people. The Australian people expect a level of bipartisanship in relation to certain matters.

I am not asking for a moment the Australian Labor Party to alter its view about our deployment to Iraq, but I am asking the Australian Labor Party even at this late hour to reconsider the commitment, if the Labor Party wins the next election, to bring our forces home by Christmas.

We will have an election some time towards the end of this year. The Australian people will make their decision. If the Labor Party wins, obviously the Labor Party can then choose to do as a government what it likes, but I am asking it, in the name and the standing of this country at the present time, to reconsider its position. It is one thing to oppose our deployment to Iraq; it is another thing to try and prevent this country doing the job and seeing it through to the end, which has always been the Australian way.

Can I say to the Leader of the Opposition again�and this was what I said to him a week ago when he first announced this rather strange and capricious policy�that I think he should reconsider and that, if he did reconsider, he would show a strength of leadership and he would show a longer view, a broader view and a view that would capture the support of the Australian people. You do not have to agree with the government on the coalition of the willing in Iraq to agree with the government that the Australians should stay there and finish the job.

People opposing what we did in Iraq would support the troops finishing the job. What I am asking the Leader of the Opposition to do today is to consider the implications and consider the impact on the standing and reputation of this country. Out of today, we could send to the rest of the world, and very particularly to our 34 coalition allies, a united message that�notwithstanding the fact that the opposition and the government disagreed with each other over the original deployment � we do not disagree, particularly in the wake of Madrid, about the need to stay and finish the job.

If we were to cut and run, if we were to take the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, which is to pull our troops out on 30 June, we would not only let down the reputation of this country�and that would be the saddest thing of all�but also let down the Iraqi people. We would let down our allies and friends at the worst possible time in the worldwide struggle against terrorism and, worst of all in the immediate context, we would send the wrong signal to the terrorists not only in Iraq but around the world.

I simply conclude by saying that this motion is about sending a message not only to the Australian people but to the world that it is never the Australian way to cut and run, it is never the Australian way to look as though you might have been intimidated by terrorists, it is never the Australian way to allow our foreign policy to be influenced by terrorists and it will never be the Australian way to let down our close friends and allies. In those circumstances and in that spirit I commend the motion to the House.

On Monday, March 22, Mark Latham made the war on Iraq and what it showed about the John Howard�s fitness for lead on national security a front line election issue. (See A rotten lousy disgrace.)

 

His speech seeking to censure Howard for not allowing AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty to tell us the truth about the increased danger we faced from terrorism due to our invasion of Iraq was a triumph. Howard was on the ropes with nowhere to go but down for the count (see Could Howard be gone before we vote?)

Better still for Latham, Bush�s former top counter terrorism adviser Richard Clarke � the man Bush trusted to lead the September 11 reaction team in the White House, was systematically exposing Bush lying over the bodies of his people to persuade them to support a war which helped the terrorists� cause. (See Bush before September 11: the awful truth.)

Perhaps buoyed by strong polls in last Tuesday�s Australian newspaper, Latham told Sydney radio 2UE he wanted our troops home for Christmas. There were lots of ifs and buts:

Mark Latham: We believe we have a responsibility to rebuild [Iraq] and as soon as that responsibility is discharged they should be back here. Hopefully, that will be before the end of the year. Under a Labor government our strategy is to get them back as soon as that responsibility is discharged and you have got a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government.

Mike Carlton: Well, theoretically, there is going to be a hand over in June.

ML: Yes, that is theoretically, but we have to look at the timetable. Things can go wrong and it might be delayed. I am hoping that by the end of the year the Australian troops will be back here for the defence of Australia, having discharged their international responsibilities, and back on Australian soil for the good protection our country.

MC: But how do you decide? You are being a bit wishy-washy there, leaving a lot of room to move. How do you decide when they have discharged their responsibilities and to bring them back?

ML: Well, at the point of a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government. As you say, there is a timetable – a very tentative timetable – for the middle of the year. Things can go wrong, things can get pushed back a while, but our intention is to ensure that once the responsibility is discharged – and that is at the time of the hand over to the new sovereign government in Iraq – then Australian troops will come back under a Labor government.

MC: And you would hope they would be home by Christmas?

ML: Yes, if that timetable of midyear is adhered to then that would be the case. If a federal election is held this year, say the election was in September and there was a change in government, we would be hoping to have them back by Christmas, certainly. (See A question of timing.)

Howard pounced, beating up the comments to insist that Latham had made a definitive announcement that he�d �cut and run�, not simply stating a goal to work towards.

I reckon Latham made two mistakes. First, he was scheduled to give a major foreign policy speech next week setting out the major differences between the two parties. This is the way to announce national security policy, not a throwaway line on talkback.

Still, his 2UE comments were open ended enough to allow for unforseen circumstances to intervene, like a civil war in Iraq upon the transfer of authority to the Iraqis on June 30. They also allowed a change of heart if � as most of the world wants � the Americans handed control of the transition to democracy to the UN and asked Australia to stay.

The story should have been a one-day wonder, or even turned into a positive for Labor. I mean, when does Howard intend to bring the troops home? When the U.S. says it�s OK, as usual?

But Latham�s got a lot of Keating – another hard-yards Sydney westie – in him. Instead of hosing Howard�s beat up down, he�s led with his chin ever since, giving Howard a rung on his comeback ladder of opportunity.

I don�t know about you, but when I saw Latham say we had to bring our 850 troops home after June 30 �to defend Australia� I was disgusted. Pure populism it was, and I thought Australians would see through it big time, which they have.

It was painful to see Latham�s foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd on Lateline last night having to dodge and weave to avoid stating the obvious � that he did not agree with Latham�s hard and fast timetable for exit. Latham has neutralised Kevin Rudd with this decision, damaging one of his best assets on national security.

Is Latham really saying the danger to Australia is so acute that we need 850 troops to join the 51,0000 troops stationed in Australia? That�s scare mongering at its worst.

As Howard rightly said speaking to his motion in the House of Representatives today that troops should not be withdrawn before the job is done, that would mean hauling back our troops from East Timor and the Solomons too. Stupid.

What�s worse, however, is the fact that Latham�s decision to go in harder when challenged by Howard now makes the American alliance central to the Iraq/national security debate, and that suits Howard, not Latham.

In dangerous times, many Australians want good relations with the U.S. Other Australians are appalled at the Bush administration, but fear the U.S. response to a unilateral pullout. �With us or against us�, remember? And remember 1975, when, according to some, the CIA played a part in ousting Gough Whitlam?

It�s now obvious Howard did the wrong thing by Australia and the West by invading Iraq without the support of the majority of Australians for reasons he would not disclose under cover of Iraq�s alleged WMDs.

But we did invade, and we�re there now trying to secure the peace, a vital task for the West to stop Iraq being over run by al Qaeda and company.

As invaders, Australia also has a legal and moral responsibility to stay the course. We also have a responsibility to add our voice to the growing calls for Bush to abandon his imperialist dream of owning Iraq and looting it and over authority to the UN. That�s powerful, coming from an ally on the ground in Iraq.

I reckon Latham disobeyed Webdiarist Robert Bosler�s good advice for when the shit hits the fan. In An artist’s blueprint for a Latham win he wrote:

What does he do when the mountainous screaming whirlwind is just too much for now? Absolutely, he must say nothing. This crashes against the screaming mass and all hell will break loose. His minders will be screaming at him: “you must speak to the media or they will tear you apart”. He must let the media do just that.

Let’s say that again. He must ignore the exhortations to comment under those circumstances and if the media tears him apart, he must let them.

This is a standout point. It only lives successfully under these conditions: little time to go coupled with uncertainty, which is where we are now before the next election. It works because it creates a vacuum. A vacuum is powerful. It sucks things into it. During times when Mark is uncertain, if he ignores the screaming mass he then gives himself time to centre his spirit and get on top of it again.

Let the media tear him apart – because they will have nothing from him to tear apart. The media will be tearing apart only the substance that the media itself throws at it. Mark is silent. He, then in good time, has regathered within himself, he has created the vacuum, there is greater intensity of interest in what he has to say, and when he speaks again he speaks with incisiveness and strength and fills the vacuum with substance of his own choosing.

The net result: Mark has reset the agenda. He is back on top of it all, and the game plays out under his renewed terms and conditions. This point is crucial to his winning. Failure to do so, by listening to the exhortations to speak under duress, will show only a man not yet ready to lead.

Richard Clarke is in the process of destroying the presidency of George Bush. He�s proving that Bush gave al Qaeda a low priority before S11 despite strong contrary advice, and that after S11 he put invading Iraq above fighting al Qaeda. Again, this was contrary to advice from his most senior experts that there was no connection between Saddam and S11 and that invading Iraq would strengthen, not weaken, the real enemy.

There are questions Howard needs to be asked. What was our intelligence agencies� and foreign affairs advice on whether the invasion would make the world safer or more dangerous? What was our analysis of the real reasons for the invasion? Why did Howard not accept the advice of the head of the Defence Intelligence Organisation Frank Lewincamp that the WMD intelligence on Iraq did not justify an invasion? (See Mark Forbes story below). Why did Howard not tell the Australian people before the war that it risked making a us a bigger terrorist target? Why didn�t Howard tell the Americans that we�d focus on our region, where al Qaeda affiliates are active, and leave a region we had clean hands on to others?

Instead, the focus is on Latham, and it�s hurting. It�s allowing Howard to sound almost convincing when he accuses Latham of �blatant anti-Americanism�.

Latham moved too fast and too recklessly after his triumph early last week. He�s made his first big mistake after beginning to build a compelling case that Howard was a danger to our national security, not the man to trust with it in dangerous times.

A senior member of the press gallery told me early last week that Latham�s honeymoon would end soon, citing an �amateur hour� Latham backroom team running around like headless chooks.

Latham needs to settle down and stay cool. For Australia�s sake.

***

The spy, the reporter and that war seminar

by Mark Forbes

23/02/2004, The Age

A spy chief says he was a source of an Age report. Mark Forbes responds. `Were we led by the nose?” asked Frank Lewincamp. The director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Australia’s top military intelligence agency, was considering the accuracy of intelligence reports in the lead-up to last year’s Iraq war.

Standing before senior students, public servants and military officers from Australia and overseas at an Australian National University lecture in Canberra, the normally discreet intelligence chief answered the question with a series of startling statements, given the political maelstrom brewing over the allies’ failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Lewincamp, speaking under the “Chatham House rule”, clearly believed he would not be reported. The rule states that information from such meetings may be used, but neither the speaker nor the meeting can be identified.

Asked about the use of material aired in this fashion, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer this week said: “They tell you when you go to Chatham House, which is in London, they tell you when you make a speech there that your speech is under Chatham House rules.

“And apparently under Chatham House rules, that means nobody can report who you are by name, or your position. But they can report that a particular opinion was expressed.”

Only after both Mr Lewincamp and the organisers of the lecture had identified it as the primary source of a report in The Age on February 14 – and contested its accuracy – have I confirmed this. In the months since the lecture I have tried to persuade Mr Lewincamp and other intelligence figures to be quoted by name.

With intensifying debate over what the Government was told about Iraq’s WMD and how it used intelligence to justify war, and being told that a parliamentary committee had been unable to get to the bottom of the issue, The Age decided to publish on Saturday the 14th, citing unnamed sources.

In his confession to the Senate last Tuesday night, Mr Lewincamp outed himself as the source and stated he had had four subsequent conversations with me. I can recall five conversations, culminating in a phone call the Friday before The Age published its report. I remain bound to respect the confidentiality of any private conversations with him and those I have had with several other intelligence and Government officials.

“I believe that I am, at least in part, the official to whom Mark Forbes refers in his article,” Mr Lewincamp told his inquisitors, then added: “I have never made, nor would I make, a number of statements attributed to that official.

“I have never said that the Bush Administration’s claims justifying an invasion were exaggerated, nor have I said that the Government was told that Iraqi WMD did not pose an immediate threat. Overall, the article characterises these issues in ways in which I do not.”

At the lecture, last September, Mr Lewincamp discussed a range of less sensitive intelligence issues before moving on to Iraq.

He said the Australian intelligence support to the fighting itself was very good, but its support to policy and decision makers was mixed, particularly in predicting the response of the Iraqi leadership.

On WMD, “we have always told a consistent and reasonable story”, he said. “We had said Iraq had a WMD program, but to a large part it represented a latent capability. We said the degree of weaponisation of chemical and biological material in Iraq was unknown.”

Chemical and biological weapons could be produced in a short time, Mr Lewincamp reported, and the prospect of Iraq having weapons could not be discounted.

“We had to prepare the military for the worst-case scenario and the possibility they could be operating in a chemical and biological weapons environment.”

As a student at the seminar, I led a series of questions.

Asked if the intelligence was exaggerated and if Iraq presented a clear and present danger, Mr Lewincamp said: “We were less forward leaning than US agencies.”

Surprised, I asked: “Was the magnitude of the threat enough to justify the invasion of Iraq?”

“No,” was his blunt reply.

“Do you mean before the war?” “Yes,” Mr Lewincamp said, adding: “Some ministers may wish they hadn’t concentrated so strongly on WMD.”

In January 2003, Defence Minister Robert Hill had asked him “why US agencies were more gung-ho”, Mr Lewincamp said. “He now acknowledges we were closer to the truth.”

Questioned about the claim this week, Senator Hill said: “I do not know about the gung-ho, but if I saw difference in assessments about an issue as serious as this one then it would not be unusual for me to be asking for an explanation.”

Mr Lewincamp also revealed, under questioning at the ANU, that his agency identified deficiencies in US intelligence claims, citing US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s plea last February to the UN for it to act against Iraq. “We reported at the time (that) Colin Powell exaggerated in one or two of his statements. He went beyond the available evidence.”

However, Mr Lewincamp told the seminar, “there was pressure brought to bear on us because we were different and standing out more”.

In future the DIO staff should have more faith in their instincts, he said. In the US, the State Department “now believes it should have stood up more and questioned more”.

Mr Lewincamp said the comments he made at the lecture were consistent with evidence, also revealed by The Age last week, to a Senate committee last November 5.

He said then that any weapons Iraq held would be limited in number and “likely to be fragile or degraded and in a relatively poor state” after being left over from the 1990-91 Gulf War.

“There is a range of intelligence information that Iraq was engaged in the destruction of its capabilities,” he said.

The revelations have caused immense discomfort for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU. That an official of Mr Lewincamp’s stature would attend was due to the close links between those running the course and the defence and intelligence community.

The head of the centre, Ross Babbage, and the lecturer of the intelligence course, Ross Thomas, have come from senior positions in the Department of Defence and intelligence agencies.

Senator Hill has already suggested that intelligence officials should no longer deliver such lectures, but he and the intelligence community are likely to face further questioning in the near future.

Last week’s controversy makes an independent judicial inquiry into WMD intelligence essential, the Opposition has claimed, and even a Government-dominated parliamentary committee report is set to recommend a further investigation when it is tabled on March 1.

This report first appeared in Saturday’s Age, distribution of which was severely disrupted by an industrial dispute.

***

Director rejects claims

The Defence Department secretary yesterday issued a response on behalf of the Defence Intelligence Organisation’s director, Frank Lewincamp, to an article entitled “The spy, the reporter and that seminar”, published last Saturday and today.

“The article repeats claims made by Mr Forbes in an earlier article in relation to a presentation given by the director of the DIO, Lewincamp, to a seminar at the Australian National University,” the secretary, Ric Smith, said. “Mr Lewincamp has already given evidence to the Senate Defence Estimates Committee in which he rejected claims made in the original article.

“Following publication of (Saturday’s) article, Mr Lewincamp has again confirmed to me that his statement to the Senate Committee was correct. He has also rejected the new claim in (Saturday’s) article that pressure was brought to bear on DIO over its assessments.”

Revelations last week by Richard Clarke – Bush’s counter-terrorism guru until just before the Iraq invasion – could destroy the Bush presidency. I asked Webdiarist Kerryn Higgs, a Australian living in New York who’s been glued to live TV coverage of Clarke’s evidence to the Sepetmber 11 inquiry, to report the controversy.

 

Her first report is on what Bush did and didn’t do before September 11. She’s working on a report on Clarke’s revelations of what happened on September 11 and immediately afterwards.

The failure to prevent 9/11: Clarke’s story

by Kerryn Higgs

Richard Clarke, the U.S. counterterror co-ordinator under every administration since Reagan, began his session in front of the 9/11 Commission on Wednesday with the only apology anyone has yet offered to the families of those who died:

“To the loved ones of the victims of 9/11� here in the room� watching on television, your government failed you. Those entrusted with protecting you failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that doesn’t matter, because we failed. And for that failure, I would ask, once all the facts are out, for your understanding and for your forgiveness.”

Though critics of Clarke have charged him with self-serving theatricality, he looked and sounded absolutely sincere to me. Dozens of the family members who sat behind him applauded, and gathered at the end of his testimony to hug him.

***

It�s been quite a week in the USA, as a whole lot more evidence came into focus about the role of Iraq in George W Bush�s agenda. Clarke has raised yet more questions about the failure to prevent the catastrophic events of 9/11 and the push for war on Iraq.

Clarke�s book, Against all Enemies: Inside America�s War on Terror, hit the bookshops on Monday, March 22. The night before, most of 60 Minutes was devoted to Clarke.

On Wednesday afternoon, he appeared before the Commission of inquiry into the September 11 attacks. A dedicated career public servant and a registered Republican who was appointed by Reagan and served all governments up to his resignation last year, Richard Clarke is not easily brushed aside � though there�s been a sustained government effort to undermine his credibility.

Daniel Shaw, commentator for National Public Radio (NPR), was asked at the end of the week whether Bush�s neglect of Al Qaeda had anything to do with a reflexive rejection of Clinton�s foreign policy priorities. Shaw thought maybe more than reflexive, and told this story. When the two Presidents met, as is traditional, just hours before Bush�s inauguration, Clinton gave Bush his five top priorities:1. Israel-Palestine; 2. Terrorist threat from al Qaeda; 3. North Korea; 4. India-Pakistan; 5. Iraq. �I would take the fifth one first,� Bush answered, according to Shaw.

The thrust of Clarke�s criticism of the Bush people is that they were living in the past. He told 60 Minutes:

“I blame the entire Bush leadership for continuing to work on Cold War issues when they got back in power in 2001. It was as though they were preserved in amber from when they left office eight years earlier. They came back. They wanted to work on the same issues right away: Iraq, Star Wars. Not new issues, the new threats that had developed over the preceding eight years.�

When it came to al Qaeda, Clarke was without doubt the most worried of Clinton�s staff and when he was retained by the new administration, soon discovered that his sense of urgency was marginalised:

�On January 24th of 2001, I wrote a memo to Condoleezza Rice asking for, urgently � underlined urgently � a cabinet level meeting to deal with the impending al Qaeda attack and that urgent memo wasn’t acted on.�

Instead he was asked to attend a meeting of the deputies, rather than the chiefs; and even that was put off until April:

�I began saying, ‘We have to deal with bin Laden. We have to deal with al Qaeda.’ Paul Wolfowitz the Deputy Sec’y of Defense said, ‘No, no, no. We don’t have to deal with al Qaeda. Why are we talking about that little guy? We have to talk about Iraqi terrorism against the United States.’ And I said, ‘Paul, there hasn’t been any Iraqi terrorism against the United States in eight years,’ and I turned to the Deputy Director of [the] CIA and said, ‘Isn’t that right?’ and he said, ‘Yeah, that’s right.��

The cabinet meeting on terrorism did not occur until September 4th. Meanwhile, in months of meetings with Wolfowitz and other deputies covering a range of issues related to terrorism, he could find no-one interested in addressing al Qaeda as a specific high-priority threat. In an interview with Terry Gross on National Public Radio program Fresh Air, Clarke said the administration was instead engrossed in a plan to �reshape the Middle East, by knocking off Saddam Hussein, going in and building democracy�.

�They had this sort of messianic view of the US as a great superpower that could just put its hand [in]� and rip out a regime and remould a country and then that would have ripple effects.�

When the policy Rice claims she had spent seven months �developing� was tabled on September 4th, it was virtually identical to the plan Clarke had handed her in January. He sent her a desperate memo on September 4th urging policy-makers to �imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead at home or abroad after a terrorist attack and ask themselves what else they could have done�. The attacks were seven days away.

September 11 Commissioner Roemer asked Clarke whether things could have been different. Clarke replied:

�All of the things we recommended back in January were those things on the table in September�They were done after September 11th. They were all done. I didn’t really understand why they couldn’t have been done in February.�

But like everyone else appearing here, he conceded that doing those things was not likely to have prevented the attacks – Clarke�s plan had to do with obliterating the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, getting the Predator drones armed and ready to strike or going after al Qaeda funding. By February 2001, the 9/11 plot was most likely finalised, and weakening bin Laden or the camps unlikely to affect the outcome.

A more likely avenue of action against the hijackers� plans lay in tightening the flawed domestic security system. This aspect was not really covered by last week�s hearings (there will be more), though Chairman Kean told CBS TV on Wednesday evening, that �a whole number of circumstances, had they been different, might have prevented 9/11� they involve everything from how people got into the country to failures in the intelligence system.�

These failures include demarcation issues between the CIA and the FBI and simple communications failure between and within the agencies. Newsweek of June 10th, 2002 recounted an unhappy series of errors and oversights that allowed two hijackers to function unimpeded.

In January 2000, the CIA tracked Alhazmi and Almihdhar (who flew with Atta on Flight 77) from a Malaysian meeting of terrorism suspects back to California. But the CIA did not pass this on to the FBI � which is solely responsible for security matters at home. The two men lived openly while they went to flight school, had driver�s licences and phone connections under their own names, travelled abroad, got new visas and periodically met up with other plotters.

In August, with the �chatter� spiking, CIA chief Tenet ordered a review of files and the FBI was finally told about them. They were not located, though it�s unclear whether the FBI tried the phone book, which might have done the trick. But it is clear that the suspects� names were not placed on intercept lists at domestic airports. Richard Clarke too, ostensible counterterror chief, was not informed.

Clarke had already told the Commission during many hours of closed testimony that he wished he had known. Asked by Commissioner Roemer what he would have done, he conceded he couldn�t say for sure but hoped he would have launched a manhunt using front-page pictures, World�s Most Wanted, whatever it took, to track them down.

That same summer, two separate FBI agencies tried to pass warnings up the line to their bosses. An agent in Phoenix warned his headquarters in July 2001 that Osama bin Laden’s followers might be studying at flight schools in preparation for terrorist attacks (see New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/auth/login?URI=http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/03/national/03TERR.html – registration required). The FBI didn�t yet know about Almihdhar and Alhazmi doing flight training and the report was shelved.

FBI agents in Minnesota also arrested Zacarias Moussaoui in mid-August 2001. His lack of interest in taking off and landing and a preference for steering big jets in the flight simulator alerted instructors, who were aware that an airliner could be used as a missile. The FBI interviewed an associate, who revealed that Moussaoui was deeply anti-American and had links to extremist groups. One agent described him as the kind of guy who could �fly something into the World Trade Centre�. His colleague, Coleen Rowley, attempted to get search warrants to follow up the lead, but her submissions were rejected by superiors. The Minneapolis office became so frustrated with the obstacles put up by supervisors in Washington that they began to joke that FBI headquarters was in league with bin Laden.

Although these particular clues were buried, top officials did know in the summer of 2001 that something horrific was about to happen. The President�s Daily Brief (PDB) of August 6th was delivered to the Crawford ranch, where Bush was on holidays. Presumably he read it � but he did not interrupt his vacation. He has resisted disclosure of its contents ever since. Only two members of the Commission were finally allowed to see it and make notes � and the notes have been the subject of attempted suppression by Bush. There have, however, been various leaks, starting with the Los Angeles Times back in May 2002, which said the August 6th memo warned that al Qaeda might contemplate hijacking U.S. aircraft and that bin Laden wanted to conduct attacks in the United States, where al Qaeda members had been residing and travelling for years.

According to David Corn in the Nation, quoting House and Senate intelligence committees an intelligence warning in early July 2001, had noted:

“We believe that [bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against the U.S. and/or Israeli interests in coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.”

On July 26, 2001, cbsnews.com reported that John Ashcroft had stopped flying on commercial airlines. A coincidence? He was apparently advised to do so by the FBI, but the American public was not warned of any threat and airport security was not upgraded.

Almost everyone maintains that the attack was expected to occur overseas, though Clarke testified that Tenet did not rule out a strike at home. Condoleezza Rice has denied that the PDB of August 6th was specific, claiming it contained only a general warning about al Qaeda.

As for the July warning, Bush has never allowed the intelligence committees to reveal whether he and Rice saw it, only that �senior government officials� did. Rice said, in May 2002:

“I don’t think anybody could have predicted that those people could have taken an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center . . . that they would try to use an airplane as a missile.”

The Washington Post, however, now writes that Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste has revealed that Rice has been having second thoughts. She apparently wants to revise this 2-year-old statement, confessing that she �misspoke�. So far, she refuses to testify in public on oath and, as the administration�s attack on Clarke proceeds, there is a sense of something akin to panic, with officials contradicting each other on many aspects.

It�s clear that the administration remains anxious to suppress information on what they knew in the lead-up to 9/11. There are numerous signs that they had a lot more information about the nature of the threat than has been openly shared with the public. It was only concerted pressure from the families that forced Bush to convene the independent Commission, which he tried hard to avoid and has hindered whenever he could.

So if vital clues were buried in the system, and the CIA, knowing an attack was imminent, was issuing hair-raising warnings, it�s fair to ask: what could have stirred the system up in time and did the government do it?

Clarke contrasts Clinton�s handling of the spike in intelligence �chatter� of December 1999 in the lead-up to the millenium with how Bush handled the even bigger spike in the summer of 2001. Clinton chaired near-daily meetings with Justice, CIA, FBI, Defence and all relevant principals, including Clarke. Every day, they had to go back to their departments, �shake the trees� and return with whatever they could find.

During December 1999, the FBI shared its intelligence fully � rare for the FBI and something that ceased straight afterwards. Clarke believes that the successful interception of the LA international airport bomber was due in part to the extraordinary level of alert that Clinton put in place through this pressure on his agencies.

In the summer of 2001, when the �spectacular� attack was expected and CIA chief Tenet was described as �running around with his hair on fire�, this kind of process did not occur. Bush met with Tenet most days, but did not chair meetings of all chiefs as Clinton had done � or order Rice to do so.

Clarke also mentions that �there was a hiatus� in August � presumably because that�s when people go on holiday. Bush spent August at the ranch. Clues already existed and Clarke believes that intense pressure like Clinton�s might have brought some of the evidence to light.

It seems possible that the Bush people understood neither the source nor the nature of the threat. On April 30, 2001, CNN reported that the government’s annual terrorism report lacked the extensive coverage of bin Laden seen in previous years. Asked why the Administration had reduced the focus, “a senior Bush State Department official� told CNN the U.S. government made a mistake in focusing so much energy on bin Laden“.

The Detroit News reported that only 2 of about 100 national security meetings had dealt with terrorism in the months before 9/11 � and one of these was that of September 4th, impatiently awaited by Clarke.

Two veteran CIA counter-terrorism experts were so frustrated that summer that they considered resigning and making public the

Revelations last week by Richard Clarke – Bush’s counter-terrorism guru until just before the Iraq invasion – could destroy the Bush presidency. I asked Webdiarist Kerryn Higgs, a Australian living in New York who’s been glued to live TV coverage of Clarke’s evidence to the Sepetmber 11 inquiry, to report the controversy.

 

Her first report is on what Bush did and didn’t do before September 11. She’s working on a report on Clarke’s revelations of what happened on September 11 and immediately afterwards.

The failure to prevent 9/11: Clarke’s story

by Kerryn Higgs

Richard Clarke, the U.S. counterterror co-ordinator under every administration since Reagan, began his session in front of the 9/11 Commission on Wednesday with the only apology anyone has yet offered to the families of those who died:

“To the loved ones of the victims of 9/11� here in the room� watching on television, your government failed you. Those entrusted with protecting you failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that doesn’t matter, because we failed. And for that failure, I would ask, once all the facts are out, for your understanding and for your forgiveness.”

Though critics of Clarke have charged him with self-serving theatricality, he looked and sounded absolutely sincere to me. Dozens of the family members who sat behind him applauded, and gathered at the end of his testimony to hug him.

***

It�s been quite a week in the USA, as a whole lot more evidence came into focus about the role of Iraq in George W Bush�s agenda. Clarke has raised yet more questions about the failure to prevent the catastrophic events of 9/11 and the push for war on Iraq.

Clarke�s book, Against all Enemies: Inside America�s War on Terror, hit the bookshops on Monday, March 22. The night before, most of 60 Minutes was devoted to Clarke.

On Wednesday afternoon, he appeared before the Commission of inquiry into the September 11 attacks. A dedicated career public servant and a registered Republican who was appointed by Reagan and served all governments up to his resignation last year, Richard Clarke is not easily brushed aside � though there�s been a sustained government effort to undermine his credibility.

Daniel Shaw, commentator for National Public Radio (NPR), was asked at the end of the week whether Bush�s neglect of Al Qaeda had anything to do with a reflexive rejection of Clinton�s foreign policy priorities. Shaw thought maybe more than reflexive, and told this story. When the two Presidents met, as is traditional, just hours before Bush�s inauguration, Clinton gave Bush his five top priorities:1. Israel-Palestine; 2. Terrorist threat from al Qaeda; 3. North Korea; 4. India-Pakistan; 5. Iraq. �I would take the fifth one first,� Bush answered, according to Shaw.

The thrust of Clarke�s criticism of the Bush people is that they were living in the past. He told 60 Minutes:

“I blame the entire Bush leadership for continuing to work on Cold War issues when they got back in power in 2001. It was as though they were preserved in amber from when they left office eight years earlier. They came back. They wanted to work on the same issues right away: Iraq, Star Wars. Not new issues, the new threats that had developed over the preceding eight years.�

When it came to al Qaeda, Clarke was without doubt the most worried of Clinton�s staff and when he was retained by the new administration, soon discovered that his sense of urgency was marginalised:

�On January 24th of 2001, I wrote a memo to Condoleezza Rice asking for, urgently � underlined urgently � a cabinet level meeting to deal with the impending al Qaeda attack and that urgent memo wasn’t acted on.�

Instead he was asked to attend a meeting of the deputies, rather than the chiefs; and even that was put off until April:

�I began saying, ‘We have to deal with bin Laden. We have to deal with al Qaeda.’ Paul Wolfowitz the Deputy Sec’y of Defense said, ‘No, no, no. We don’t have to deal with al Qaeda. Why are we talking about that little guy? We have to talk about Iraqi terrorism against the United States.’ And I said, ‘Paul, there hasn’t been any Iraqi terrorism against the United States in eight years,’ and I turned to the Deputy Director of [the] CIA and said, ‘Isn’t that right?’ and he said, ‘Yeah, that’s right.��

The cabinet meeting on terrorism did not occur until September 4th. Meanwhile, in months of meetings with Wolfowitz and other deputies covering a range of issues related to terrorism, he could find no-one interested in addressing al Qaeda as a specific high-priority threat. In an interview with Terry Gross on National Public Radio program Fresh Air, Clarke said the administration was instead engrossed in a plan to �reshape the Middle East, by knocking off Saddam Hussein, going in and building democracy�.

�They had this sort of messianic view of the US as a great superpower that could just put its hand [in]� and rip out a regime and remould a country and then that would have ripple effects.�

When the policy Rice claims she had spent seven months �developing� was tabled on September 4th, it was virtually identical to the plan Clarke had handed her in January. He sent her a desperate memo on September 4th urging policy-makers to �imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead at home or abroad after a terrorist attack and ask themselves what else they could have done�. The attacks were seven days away.

September 11 Commissioner Roemer asked Clarke whether things could have been different. Clarke replied:

�All of the things we recommended back in January were those things on the table in September�They were done after September 11th. They were all done. I didn’t really understand why they couldn’t have been done in February.�

But like everyone else appearing here, he conceded that doing those things was not likely to have prevented the attacks – Clarke�s plan had to do with obliterating the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, getting the Predator drones armed and ready to strike or going after al Qaeda funding. By February 2001, the 9/11 plot was most likely finalised, and weakening bin Laden or the camps unlikely to affect the outcome.

A more likely avenue of action against the hijackers� plans lay in tightening the flawed domestic security system. This aspect was not really covered by last week�s hearings (there will be more), though Chairman Kean told CBS TV on Wednesday evening, that �a whole number of circumstances, had they been different, might have prevented 9/11� they involve everything from how people got into the country to failures in the intelligence system.�

These failures include demarcation issues between the CIA and the FBI and simple communications failure between and within the agencies. Newsweek of June 10th, 2002 recounted an unhappy series of errors and oversights that allowed two hijackers to function unimpeded.

In January 2000, the CIA tracked Alhazmi and Almihdhar (who flew with Atta on Flight 77) from a Malaysian meeting of terrorism suspects back to California. But the CIA did not pass this on to the FBI � which is solely responsible for security matters at home. The two men lived openly while they went to flight school, had driver�s licences and phone connections under their own names, travelled abroad, got new visas and periodically met up with other plotters.

In August, with the �chatter� spiking, CIA chief Tenet ordered a review of files and the FBI was finally told about them. They were not located, though it�s unclear whether the FBI tried the phone book, which might have done the trick. But it is clear that the suspects� names were not placed on intercept lists at domestic airports. Richard Clarke too, ostensible counterterror chief, was not informed.

Clarke had already told the Commission during many hours of closed testimony that he wished he had known. Asked by Commissioner Roemer what he would have done, he conceded he couldn�t say for sure but hoped he would have launched a manhunt using front-page pictures, World�s Most Wanted, whatever it took, to track them down.

That same summer, two separate FBI agencies tried to pass warnings up the line to their bosses. An agent in Phoenix warned his headquarters in July 2001 that Osama bin Laden’s followers might be studying at flight schools in preparation for terrorist attacks (see New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/auth/login?URI=http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/03/national/03TERR.html – registration required). The FBI didn�t yet know about Almihdhar and Alhazmi doing flight training and the report was shelved.

FBI agents in Minnesota also arrested Zacarias Moussaoui in mid-August 2001. His lack of interest in taking off and landing and a preference for steering big jets in the flight simulator alerted instructors, who were aware that an airliner could be used as a missile. The FBI interviewed an associate, who revealed that Moussaoui was deeply anti-American and had links to extremist groups. One agent described him as the kind of guy who could �fly something into the World Trade Centre�. His colleague, Coleen Rowley, attempted to get search warrants to follow up the lead, but her submissions were rejected by superiors. The Minneapolis office became so frustrated with the obstacles put up by supervisors in Washington that they began to joke that FBI headquarters was in league with bin Laden.

Although these particular clues were buried, top officials did know in the summer of 2001 that something horrific was about to happen. The President�s Daily Brief (PDB) of August 6th was delivered to the Crawford ranch, where Bush was on holidays. Presumably he read it � but he did not interrupt his vacation. He has resisted disclosure of its contents ever since. Only two members of the Commission were finally allowed to see it and make notes � and the notes have been the subject of attempted suppression by Bush. There have, however, been various leaks, starting with the Los Angeles Times back in May 2002, which said the August 6th memo warned that al Qaeda might contemplate hijacking U.S. aircraft and that bin Laden wanted to conduct attacks in the United States, where al Qaeda members had been residing and travelling for years.

According to David Corn in the Nation, quoting House and Senate intelligence committees an intelligence warning in early July 2001, had noted:

“We believe that [bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against the U.S. and/or Israeli interests in coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.”

On July 26, 2001, cbsnews.com reported that John Ashcroft had stopped flying on commercial airlines. A coincidence? He was apparently advised to do so by the FBI, but the American public was not warned of any threat and airport security was not upgraded.

Almost everyone maintains that the attack was expected to occur overseas, though Clarke testified that Tenet did not rule out a strike at home. Condoleezza Rice has denied that the PDB of August 6th was specific, claiming it contained only a general warning about al Qaeda.

As for the July warning, Bush has never allowed the intelligence committees to reveal whether he and Rice saw it, only that �senior government officials� did. Rice said, in May 2002:

“I don’t think anybody could have predicted that those people could have taken an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center . . . that they would try to use an airplane as a missile.”

The Washington Post, however, now writes that Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste has revealed that Rice has been having second thoughts. She apparently wants to revise this 2-year-old statement, confessing that she �misspoke�. So far, she refuses to testify in public on oath and, as the administration�s attack on Clarke proceeds, there is a sense of something akin to panic, with officials contradicting each other on many aspects.

It�s clear that the administration remains anxious to suppress information on what they knew in the lead-up to 9/11. There are numerous signs that they had a lot more information about the nature of the threat than has been openly shared with the public. It was only concerted pressure from the families that forced Bush to convene the independent Commission, which he tried hard to avoid and has hindered whenever he could.

So if vital clues were buried in the system, and the CIA, knowing an attack was imminent, was issuing hair-raising warnings, it�s fair to ask: what could have stirred the system up in time and did the government do it?

Clarke contrasts Clinton�s handling of the spike in intelligence �chatter� of December 1999 in the lead-up to the millenium with how Bush handled the even bigger spike in the summer of 2001. Clinton chaired near-daily meetings with Justice, CIA, FBI, Defence and all relevant principals, including Clarke. Every day, they had to go back to their departments, �shake the trees� and return with whatever they could find.

During December 1999, the FBI shared its intelligence fully � rare for the FBI and something that ceased straight afterwards. Clarke believes that the successful interception of the LA international airport bomber was due in part to the extraordinary level of alert that Clinton put in place through this pressure on his agencies.

In the summer of 2001, when the �spectacular� attack was expected and CIA chief Tenet was described as �running around with his hair on fire�, this kind of process did not occur. Bush met with Tenet most days, but did not chair meetings of all chiefs as Clinton had done � or order Rice to do so.

Clarke also mentions that �there was a hiatus� in August � presumably because that�s when people go on holiday. Bush spent August at the ranch. Clues already existed and Clarke believes that intense pressure like Clinton�s might have brought some of the evidence to light.

It seems possible that the Bush people understood neither the source nor the nature of the threat. On April 30, 2001, CNN reported that the government’s annual terrorism report lacked the extensive coverage of bin Laden seen in previous years. Asked why the Administration had reduced the focus, “a senior Bush State Department official� told CNN the U.S. government made a mistake in focusing so much energy on bin Laden“.

The Detroit News reported that only 2 of about 100 national security meetings had dealt with terrorism in the months before 9/11 � and one of these was that of September 4th, impatiently awaited by Clarke.

Two veteran CIA counter-terrorism experts were so frustrated that summer that they considered resigning and making public their fears about an imminent terrorist strike against US targets. Whether or not determined attention and aggressive �tree-shaking� could have prevented the attacks, we will never know, but it�s pretty clear that Bush and his team were otherwise occupied.

* Transcripts of both days� public hearings plus links to video and audio coverage can be found at the Washington Post.