Tony Kevin is the former Australian diplomat who was intrumental in forcing the defence force to explain its failure to find SIEV-X before it sank during the federal election, drowning 353 asylum seekers.
The story of Australia�s initiation of secret illegal preemptive combat in Iraq from 18 to 20 March 2003, which I have been exploring since January 2004, got a re-start in the media after the release of Bob Woodward�s new book on the Iraq War, Plan of Attack. John Howard and Australia are minor players in Woodward�s book, but interesting new material in revealed.
First, the stories themselves (my highlightinh) then my analysis.
1. Marian Wilkinson, Book reveals Howard�s early commitment to overthrow of Saddam, Sydney Morning Herald:
“On March 16 [Washington time � 17 March Canberra time] Bush phoned Howard from Air Force One as he flew from the Azores summit with Blair and Aznar. Bush explained that he would deliver a speech the next day in which he would issue a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam.
“Apparently concerned, Howard asked Bush whether this was going to be the declaration of war speech. “No,” Bush assured him. “It’s an ultimatum speech”.
“Howard then told Bush he needed “one last official word” before the war started. “Otherwise, it would look to the Australian people like Bush just started the war without even telling his biggest allies.”
“No, no,” Bush assured him. “This isn’t the last call you’re going to get from me.”
Louise Dodson writes from Canberra:
“A spokesman for John Howard said yesterday: ‘As the Prime Minister indicated at the time, he was in regular contact with President Bush on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities. The Prime Minister made it very plain to President Bush that there would need to be cabinet authorisation before Australian troops could be taken to war.'”
2. Phillip Coorey, Bush’s call to Howard from 39,000 feet (used by various News Limited papers on 21 April):
“THREE days before the war began in Iraq, Prime Minister John Howard told US President George W.Bush he was worried about public opinion in Australia and urged that he be informed in advance when the war would start. Details of conversations between Mr Howard and Mr Bush are chronicled in the new book Plan of Attack by veteran Washington Post journalist, Bob Woodward.
“The book also reveals how Australian commandos began secret operations in Iraq before the war officially started.”
Mr Woodward has pieced together the blow by blow account of the march to war.
Mr Bush rang Mr Howard on the night of Sunday, March 16, while flying back to Washington. He told him that the next day – Monday in America – the US was likely to withdraw a UN resolution authorising war because of the threat of veto from France. He said he would instead give Saddam Hussein an ultimatum. “Is this going to be a declaration of war speech?” Mr Howard is quoted as asking. “No, it’s an ultimatum speech,” Mr Bush replied.
“Woodward writes: ‘Howard was worried about Australian public opinion and said he needed one last official word from Bush before the war started.’ “Otherwise it would look to the Australian people like Bush just started the war without even telling his biggest allies,” Mr Howard is quoted as telling Mr Bush. “No, no, this isn’t the last call you’re going to get from me”.
“At 2pm on Monday, March 17, Mr Bush rang Mr Howard again to tell him he was going to give a speech that night issuing a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam. “George, if it comes to this, I pledge to you that Australian troops will fight if necessary”, Mr Howard said.
Special forces troops from Australia, the US, Britain and Poland used the 48-hour delay to slip into Iraq and secure key infrastructure sites like oil wells, scud missile launchers and dams.
At 9am on Wednesday, March 19, about 12 hours before the ultimatum expired, 31 special forces groups were in the country. “The Aussies are in,” the White House chief of staff reported to Mr Bush at 2pm that day…“The Aussies are in,” the White House chief of staff reported to Mr Bush at 2pm that day�.. 3. Roy Eccleston, Bush’s war call to Howard, Washington correspondent, The Australian:
“… On March 19, the first of Australia’s 2000 troops entered Iraq. By 1pm Washington time, nine hours before Mr Bush announced that the opening stages of the war had begun with an attempted strike on a Saddam hideout, 31 US special forces teams had entered Iraq secretly. The Australian SAS was not far behind.
Some time after 2pm, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card told Mr Bush: “The Aussies are in.” Australian commandos had moved into the west, heading for a dam (presumably to prevent it being blown up by Hussein’s forces, although this is not explained)…”
4. John Howard was asked about this on Melbourne Radio 3AW yesterday morning and the ABC program The World Today at 12 noon carried this radio story:
MATT BROWN: On Melbourne radio 3AW the Prime Minister has confirmed this morning that Australian troops entered Iraq before the deadline George W. Bush set for Saddam Hussein to surrender expired.
JOHN HOWARD: I think Senator Hill has indicated that that did happen.
INTERVIEWER: But it was denied at the time.
JOHN HOWARD: Well, I think what we said at the time was that we did the right…that we went in, in…
INTERVIEWER: I remember asking you whether troops went in, after we’d been told they were, and you said no.
JOHN HOWARD: Did I say that?
INTERVIEWER: Not to your knowledge, yeah.
JOHN HOWARD: Not to my knowledge. Well, that could well have been the case at the time.
INTERVIEWER: How early did they go in?
JOHN HOWARD: Well, certainly after the ultimatum was rejected.
INTERVIEWER: No, but did they not go in before the deadline expired?
JOHN HOWARD: Yes, but once an ultimatum is rejected the deadline is irrelevant.
MATT BROWN: Mr Howard says the invasion was legal, and the decision to invade was not taken before the proper processes had been followed in Australia.
JOHN HOWARD: I certainly made it very plain to Bush that we needed to have a Cabinet meeting for a final authorisation, that I could not commit my forces, the Australian military forces to action in Iraq until such time as that Cabinet meeting had taken place.
And it did take place. He did ring me two or three times that week to inform me what had happened, and that’s what transpired. But I was certainly diplomatically very supportive, we did pre-deploy. And we made it very clear that we were putting ourselves in a position to be involved, but the final decision to be involved was not taken until after those conversations.
***
Howard was obviously floundering in the 3AW interview. This interview is the best public confirmation so far that this story is real and important, and yet to be fully admitted.
Meanwhile, the key sources are my three website pieces, the Defence Department briefing by Colonel Mansell on 9 May 2003, and the Defence Report on the Iraq War issued in February 2004 (pages 15 and 22 in particular).
Woodward�s book has the timelines too short by a full day. These are the correct timelines for Australian SAS action, give or take an hour or so:
The Bush ultimatum was given at 8pm on 17 March Washington time which is 4 am Iraq time on 18 March , close enough to 12 noon on 18 March Canberra time. The ultimatum expired 48 hours later, at 8 pm Washington time 19 March, ie 4 am Iraq time 20 March, close enough to 12 noon on 20 March Canberra time.
The SAS according to Mansell (9 May 2003 Defence briefing) went into Iraq in the first darkness hours after Howard’s “commitment” [ie his speech at 2 pm on 18 March in Parliament] . This suggests they went in about 1900 hours on 18 March Iraq time, or 0300 hours Canberra time on 19 March. That is 33 hours before the expiry of the Bush ultimatum. � not 9 or 12 hours. There is a big difference.
It appears that our SAS was the first coalition force to take up arms inside Iraq, in the evening of 18 March 2003 Iraq time (refer Mansell briefing). They went in around the same time � maybe a couple of hours after � Saddam announced he was rejecting the Bush ultimatum. (This is actually irrelevant � ultimatums are supposed to run their course because people often do change their minds, and obviously the insertion had been planned well beforehand.)
We have known since Robert Hill�s letters to the Age and SMH in January 2004 (after my first articles on this) that Cabinet NSC authorised those military actions on the morning of 18 March 2003 in Canberra, i.e., around the time Bush�s ultimatum was issued. Howard confirms this in his 3AW interview.
The issues now are:
1. Whether these substantial Australian military combat operations inside Iraq 18-20 March 2003 were preemptive acts of war initiated by Australian forces 33 hours before the expiry of a conditional coalition ultimatum? Were these operations contrary to the laws of war, as these are commonly understood by governments and military forces around the world?
2. That John Howard clearly misled the Australian Parliament and people on 18 and 20 March 2003 as to what his government had decided to do. He led us to believe that 18 March 2003 was a declaration of Australian readiness for “possible future action” in support of the Bush 48-hour ultimatum, and that 20 March 2003 was “the first public indication” of actual engagement of Australian forces in combat in Iraq. Howard knew from the beginning that his Cabinet had taken a dubious decision ordering Australian military action starting on 18 March, and he was trying from the beginning to hide this knowledge from the Parliament and people. It seems from the 3AW interview yesterday that he still is.
Careful press euphemisms about coalition special forces troops that “used the 48-hour delay to slip into Iraq and secure key infrastructure sites like oil wells, scud missile launchers and dams” blur the real truth about the major military combat character of these preemptive engagements by Australian military forces in Iraq. And this does matter.