Mark Latham’s decision to pull Australian troops out of Iraq after June 30 would defy international law, according to a senior Australian academic at the United Nations University.

An author of the new international bible on humanitarian intervention law and vice-rector of the UN University, Professor Ramesh Thakur, said today that as an occupying power after invasion, Australia had strict responsibilities to the people of Iraq.

He said Australia could lawfully withdraw from Iraq only after sovereignty was given back to the people of Iraq and “sustainable peace” was achieved.

By invading Iraq, Australia had confiscated its sovereignty, and became legally, politically and morally responsible for security, services, welfare and all other responsibilities of government until sovereignty was returned to the Iraqi people.

The planned June 30 transitional handover of sovereignty did not abrogate Australia’s responsibilities, he said. This is because the interim constitution had not been drawn up by the people of Iraq, but by the occupiers and their appointees. For a handover of sovereignty to occur, an election would have had to have been held.

Professor Thakur said there were even higher international obligation imposed on nations claiming they invaded for reasons “other than imperial aggression”. This was the obligation to ensure “a sustainable democracy” by embedding a functioning Parliament and an independent judicial system.

He also said Australia had “a moral and political obligation to the people of Iraq” to “stay the course and get the job completed”.

The comments expose one difficulty of Mark Latham’s policy to get Australian troops home by Christmas, despite the continuing guerilla war and the lack of elections. Labor based its opposition to invading Iraq without UN authority because of its professed respect for and belief in international law and the UN. Yet now, after opposing the invasion as illegal, Labour faces the prospect of breaching that same set of laws by pulling out.

Professor Thakur spoke at a Parliamentary Library seminar called “the duty to protect” hosted by Labor foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd, who praised Professor Thakur�s work and international standing.

Professor Thakur said the United States had now learned that while the UN might not be needed to invade a nation, “you do need UN blessing for the peace”. “Winning in war is meaningless without a secure peace.”

He said the US had failed to get UN endorsement for war on Iraq because most of the UN member states believed that the invasion of Iraq was not justified.

The stakes were so high that the UN Security Council had to say no because “it will be less relevant if it has no capacity to say no to the US on matters of principle when we knew it was wrong”.

“Going along to get along doesn�t make good policy,” he said, for the UN, or “the US allies”.

There�s strong disagreement in Canberra on whether Latham�s troops recall plan is smart or dumb in terms of his standing with the Australian people and Labor�s election chances. Most agree, for all sorts of reasons, that Latham�s policy is wrong.

 

On the politics, some say he�s ensured that Howard won�t pull a welcome home parade for the troops in Iraq during the election, and that�s got to be a plus. They also say Latham is following the �you�ve got to be in it to win it principle� � and that a vigorous debate on bringing the troops home will help neutralise national security as a positive for Howard and allow Labor to fight the election on domestic issues.

For me, stopping a Howard welcome home parade is not worth the cost. And why neutralise an issue when � before this debacle � Latham had a bloody good chance of winning it! (See Latham’s Iraq indiscretion ends honeymoon). Not only that, but he�s undermined Labor�s long-time support for international law and the United Nations (see Latham joins Howard in trashing international law on Iraq).

Does Latham really believe we need to recall 850 troops �to defend Australia�? Has he behaved impulsively on a matter of core national importance? Is he joining Howard in playing politics with the nation�s safety at a time when Howard is (or was) under the gun for the same reason?

Can Latham be trusted to lead the nation?

Webdiarists are as divided as the Labor Party and political journalists on whether Latham�s on a winner or is taking unnecessary risks. So let�s hear the arguments.

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NOTICEBOARD

Hugh Halloran recommends roadtosurfdom for in depth discussion of Richard Clarke�s book and developments in Washington on Clarke�s revelations on Bush and Iraq.

Brian McKinlay adds his recommendation to many others, including me, of juancole for must-read coverage of developments in Iraq.

Antony Loewenstein recommends Counterpunch for details of where the September 11 inquiry is at in the US and Misleader, a daily chronicle of Bush administration distortion.

Richard Tonkin recommends the Defence Ministry media release of March 10, “which states that our new Abrams tanks are units of a much larger global force. The last paragraph regarding rail transport and cranes in Darwin is also worthy of your attention. An implication of the creation of a covert unit of the U.S. Army could easily be drawn.”

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Dave Green

Re the poll result that 60%-ish of Australians want our defence personnel to remain in Iraq “until the job is done”, it should be noted that this is a view held by persons on roughly both sides of politics.

It�s by far the dominant view of the 40%-or-so Australians that still support the Howard government. However, it is also a significant view held by some at the small-l liberal end of the progressive spectrum.

The important point, however, is that there are radically different bases to these positions.

Deployment-supporting Conservatives appear, in general to support continued Australian involvement in Iraq for two main reasons:

1. It is government policy and they don’t want Labor to get an edge over their “team”.

2. They fear that removing our forces will signal weakness to terrorist groups.

There is a minority on this side of politics, which also support the U.S. neo-conservative empire-building exercise, and this obviously influences their opinion. But I suspect that our home grown neo-con movement is confined mostly to the elite conservative establishment (radio talk hosts, Murdoch columnists, some in the Federal Government).

Deployment-supporting progressives have a very different basis for supporting the continued deployment of Australian troops. Their position has two sources:

1. Respect for the notion of an international rule of law generally, and specifically, the provisions under the Geneva convention on the responsibilities of occupying powers.

2. Humanitarian concerns for the plight of ordinary Iraqis caught in a failed, ideologically driven attempt at nation building.

I don’t think Mark Latham should be too worried about the latest poll because deployment-supporting progressives won’t vote for the government regardless of the Labor position on Iraq. Howard�s continual politicisation of foreign policy, disregard for international law, and disastrous record on human rights for refugees precludes this possibility.

This looks to be another in a series of blunders by Howard – he is hammering this issue, but there isn’t much in it for him while it is framed by concerns for international law and human rights.

The issue can easily be neutralised for deployment-supporting progressives. Labor has already stated its intention to at least remain until the hand over of sovereignty to the Iraqis (showing a concern for international legalities) – and that half the troops would remain anyway. Add to that a substitution of aid to Iraq for deployment costs, and the 60% of support to Howard’s “position” would become at most 40% (and falling).

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Simon Mansfield

Latham demolished Howard’s argument on bringing the troops home yesterday. We have done our job in Iraq; it’s time to get out before it all goes to shit. Why would be want our troops there in the middle of a civil war.

Howard wants the troops home as soon as he can get a political hit out of it. The real story is how Howard has had senior Foreign affairs officials and ADF officers out there engaging in the political debate.

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Nick White

Well Margo, I must give it you: finally I read one of your articles that makes me smile, not fume. Unlike Alan Ramsey at least you have the balls to publish the fact that Latham made a policy on the run and a bad one at that. You were also the first to make a valid point when you state that it was crazy to demand the withdrawal of 850 troops to defend Australia when our armed forces total 51,000.

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David Palmer in Adelaide

Margo, regardless of what you think of Latham’s tactics, his statement about pulling Australian troops out of Iraq was completely realistic.

It’s public knowledge that Australian troops presently play no significant role in Iraq. There are more Polish troops than Australian troops there at the moment. We’re quite fortunate that no Australian soldiers have been killed there yet.

Labor’s problem when Crean was in the Opposition leadership is that he failed to clearly oppose the U.S. led invasion – and Howard’s tailing behind anything that Bush said on the issue. Including the now discredited “Weapons of Mass Destruction” claim.

Howard is again deceiving the Australian public – and basically lying to them about the “importance” of our troops in that region. The problem is not Latham – it is Howard. I’m disgusted by Howard, not Latham.

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Harry Heidelberg

Thanks for including the original Latham transcript in Latham’s Iraq indiscretion ends honeymoon. If you read all his caveats, what he says seems fine. (Margo: That�s what the Australian newspaper thought on the day � the paper did not report the first comments). All I had seen to that point was the screaming headlines, including from the Herald “Latham: Troops Home by Christmas” and similar. Yes, Latham should have taken Robert Bosler’s advice. If he had done so perhaps people would have focused on his original words.

Normally I can’t be bothered reading long things from Howard. I read that speech you printed and am stumped. I have been saying for a long time that he is the living dead, but that speech has me wondering again. Perhaps he can pull the rabbit out of the hat one more time. Surely not?

One thing I like to do is put myself inside the head of the average Australian. Not over analyse, not over intellectualise, but taking things on face value. I don�t find it hard to think like an ordinary person because I am. That speech hit every sweet spot. Howard HASN�T lost it. The wily old fox is back.

The basic pitch becomes hard to resist. In times of trouble, what do you want? A loose canon or a tried, proven and competent leader surrounded by people of similar ilk. I didn�t include “trusted” because he has lost that – but it is a relative thing (unfortunately). Do you put up with being conned from time to time if everything else works out OK?

In such an uncertain environment, it mightn�t seem right to turf out the old guy who knows what he’s doing in favour of the young guy who increasingly seems to have no idea. Perhaps this is just another flash in the pan but I think it is significant. We’re not America. We haven�t lost hundreds of our troops. We haven’t spent US$109 billion on this thing. Bush is in much more trouble than Howard.

I have a feeling the last day of the honeymoon has arrived. The suitcases are on the bed; there was a fight the night before and there is a long trip home to a reality filled with tense silences and doubts. Hey taxi, take me to the airport. We’ve gotta get out of this place! The Howard speech is the equivalent of arriving back home from the honeymoon and finding a letter from your old lover in the post box. You realise the fleeting quality of the new has become grating and the old, if you still had it, would have fit like comfy slippers on a winter’s night. Everyone needs security and Howard remains convincing.

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Mick Stojcevski

I write in relation to the beat up over Mark Latham’s promise to withdraw our troops from Iraq. I believe everyone, nearly everyone, has misread the purpose of Latham’s promise. I believe he has wedged Howard.

The way Howard and most of the media have reacted, they have missed Mark Latham’s wedging of Howard. Latham has forced Howard to fight on the Iraq War again, forcing him to justify his position on that war in order for the troops to remain there.

Maybe there were sufficient gullible people 12 months ago willing to swallow Howard’s line, but how many do you believe are willing to swallow it now? Only the sycophants and the fools. And they are a sufficiently small minority that they won’t win the election for Howard, and he knows it. I agree with you that Howard is still out there fishing for a wedge, but he either isn’t aware that Latham has perhaps wedged him or he truly believes he can win by fighting on the Iraq War again.

If I am correct then we will see further erosion of Howard’s credibility.

Maybe Peter Costello will garner the courage to challenge, but I doubt it. Costello was right last June, and it’s a pity for him that John and Janette weren’t as wise. But, then, one could argue that they never were and have had three lucky strikes; anyone could’ve beaten Keating in 1996, he was lucky to win with 48.5% of the vote in 1998 and lucky that the Tampa and September 11 came just before the 2001 election. He should’ve trounced the ALP in 2001 but he couldn’t. The electorate doesn’t love him and as soon as the ALP offered a decent alternative, they have flocked to him in droves.

He won’t have such luck with Mark Latham. Not in a million years. Bye bye Johnny.

***

Mike Lyvers in Queensland

If Latham is serious about bringing the troops home and making Australians safer from terrorist threats, then he should be calling for immediately withdrawal of all Australian forces from East Timor.

The Australian role in the liberation of East Timor unequivocally increased Australians’ risk of being victimized by terrorists, as the Bali bombers and Osama bin Laden justified the Bali attack by citing Australia’s role in East Timor as a “crusader nation” stealing land from a Muslim nation, Indonesia. (And East Timor’s oil reserves are every bit as likely to have been a major motivating factor in that involvement as in Iraq).

But there is silence from Latham, the Greens and the Left in general about this. Why? All those who advocated Australian involvement in East Timor must accept that such action clearly and unequivocally increased the risk of a terrorist attack against Australians – Bali being the proof.

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Jaye Newland in Copacabana, NSW

Being an election year there are lots of attacks on individuals, notably Mark Latham, from Howard and the media – including Web Diary.

Let�s get real. Howard has blood on his hands, and Mark Latham does not, so that makes them different for starters. Mark Latham is younger, and I am sure that he will learn more in a short time than Howard has over decades.

Howard has taken taxpayer�s money away from health and education and put it into his war chest for his self serving political ambitions, Defence, “the war on terror” and Security. Howard cancelled reconciliation with indigenous Australians and depleted essential services.

Mark Latham’s mentor is Gough Whitlam and I�m sure that he will improve services and cultural support for our indigenous peoples. Mark Latham deserves all the support he can get from thinking Australians.

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Clive Astle in Banksia Beach, Queensland

Margo, Howard’s government claims Oz troops can’t be brought home because they are needed to protect Australian diplomats in Iraq. Silly me – I thought the war was supposed to be over. And yet the UK does not use its defence forces to protect its diplomats – the UK contracts private security guards.

Similarly, why should Australian defence forces perform air traffic control or other civilian tasks? For example, if the war is really over, re-employ the Iraqi air traffic controllers that ran Baghdad airport before the war.

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Iain Todd

As I understand the logic of Howard’s justification of war in Iraq, the removal of Saddam was necessary because he was a despotic leader with WMDs and the capability of furthering terrorism. That our presence was necessary appears to be because of our strategic alliance with the USA.

There is an echo of this sentiment in our commitment to the Vietnam War. Replace terrorism with communism, and the two wars appear eerily similar.

It’s instructive to see the film “The Fog of War”, where Robert McNamara explains the involvement of the US in what he now acknowledges was a misguided use of US military power. It was particularly galling to hear the former Secretary of Defence state that none of their allies participated in that conflict.

That our involvement in Iraq is more to do with domestic politics than any other consideration seems clear; apart from the duplicity of the Howard government, what angers me most is that we continue to learn nothing from history. If we had learnt those lessons, perhaps the Government of the day, of any persuasion, would not find us so easy to delude.

On Monday, March 22, Mark Latham made the war on Iraq and what it showed about the John Howard�s fitness for lead on national security a front line election issue. (See A rotten lousy disgrace.)

 

His speech seeking to censure Howard for not allowing AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty to tell us the truth about the increased danger we faced from terrorism due to our invasion of Iraq was a triumph. Howard was on the ropes with nowhere to go but down for the count (see Could Howard be gone before we vote?)

Better still for Latham, Bush�s former top counter terrorism adviser Richard Clarke � the man Bush trusted to lead the September 11 reaction team in the White House, was systematically exposing Bush lying over the bodies of his people to persuade them to support a war which helped the terrorists� cause. (See Bush before September 11: the awful truth.)

Perhaps buoyed by strong polls in last Tuesday�s Australian newspaper, Latham told Sydney radio 2UE he wanted our troops home for Christmas. There were lots of ifs and buts:

Mark Latham: We believe we have a responsibility to rebuild [Iraq] and as soon as that responsibility is discharged they should be back here. Hopefully, that will be before the end of the year. Under a Labor government our strategy is to get them back as soon as that responsibility is discharged and you have got a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government.

Mike Carlton: Well, theoretically, there is going to be a hand over in June.

ML: Yes, that is theoretically, but we have to look at the timetable. Things can go wrong and it might be delayed. I am hoping that by the end of the year the Australian troops will be back here for the defence of Australia, having discharged their international responsibilities, and back on Australian soil for the good protection our country.

MC: But how do you decide? You are being a bit wishy-washy there, leaving a lot of room to move. How do you decide when they have discharged their responsibilities and to bring them back?

ML: Well, at the point of a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government. As you say, there is a timetable – a very tentative timetable – for the middle of the year. Things can go wrong, things can get pushed back a while, but our intention is to ensure that once the responsibility is discharged – and that is at the time of the hand over to the new sovereign government in Iraq – then Australian troops will come back under a Labor government.

MC: And you would hope they would be home by Christmas?

ML: Yes, if that timetable of midyear is adhered to then that would be the case. If a federal election is held this year, say the election was in September and there was a change in government, we would be hoping to have them back by Christmas, certainly. (See A question of timing.)

Howard pounced, beating up the comments to insist that Latham had made a definitive announcement that he�d �cut and run�, not simply stating a goal to work towards.

I reckon Latham made two mistakes. First, he was scheduled to give a major foreign policy speech next week setting out the major differences between the two parties. This is the way to announce national security policy, not a throwaway line on talkback.

Still, his 2UE comments were open ended enough to allow for unforseen circumstances to intervene, like a civil war in Iraq upon the transfer of authority to the Iraqis on June 30. They also allowed a change of heart if � as most of the world wants � the Americans handed control of the transition to democracy to the UN and asked Australia to stay.

The story should have been a one-day wonder, or even turned into a positive for Labor. I mean, when does Howard intend to bring the troops home? When the U.S. says it�s OK, as usual?

But Latham�s got a lot of Keating – another hard-yards Sydney westie – in him. Instead of hosing Howard�s beat up down, he�s led with his chin ever since, giving Howard a rung on his comeback ladder of opportunity.

I don�t know about you, but when I saw Latham say we had to bring our 850 troops home after June 30 �to defend Australia� I was disgusted. Pure populism it was, and I thought Australians would see through it big time, which they have.

It was painful to see Latham�s foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd on Lateline last night having to dodge and weave to avoid stating the obvious � that he did not agree with Latham�s hard and fast timetable for exit. Latham has neutralised Kevin Rudd with this decision, damaging one of his best assets on national security.

Is Latham really saying the danger to Australia is so acute that we need 850 troops to join the 51,0000 troops stationed in Australia? That�s scare mongering at its worst.

As Howard rightly said speaking to his motion in the House of Representatives today that troops should not be withdrawn before the job is done, that would mean hauling back our troops from East Timor and the Solomons too. Stupid.

What�s worse, however, is the fact that Latham�s decision to go in harder when challenged by Howard now makes the American alliance central to the Iraq/national security debate, and that suits Howard, not Latham.

In dangerous times, many Australians want good relations with the U.S. Other Australians are appalled at the Bush administration, but fear the U.S. response to a unilateral pullout. �With us or against us�, remember? And remember 1975, when, according to some, the CIA played a part in ousting Gough Whitlam?

It�s now obvious Howard did the wrong thing by Australia and the West by invading Iraq without the support of the majority of Australians for reasons he would not disclose under cover of Iraq�s alleged WMDs.

But we did invade, and we�re there now trying to secure the peace, a vital task for the West to stop Iraq being over run by al Qaeda and company.

As invaders, Australia also has a legal and moral responsibility to stay the course. We also have a responsibility to add our voice to the growing calls for Bush to abandon his imperialist dream of owning Iraq and looting it and over authority to the UN. That�s powerful, coming from an ally on the ground in Iraq.

I reckon Latham disobeyed Webdiarist Robert Bosler�s good advice for when the shit hits the fan. In An artist’s blueprint for a Latham win he wrote:

What does he do when the mountainous screaming whirlwind is just too much for now? Absolutely, he must say nothing. This crashes against the screaming mass and all hell will break loose. His minders will be screaming at him: “you must speak to the media or they will tear you apart”. He must let the media do just that.

Let’s say that again. He must ignore the exhortations to comment under those circumstances and if the media tears him apart, he must let them.

This is a standout point. It only lives successfully under these conditions: little time to go coupled with uncertainty, which is where we are now before the next election. It works because it creates a vacuum. A vacuum is powerful. It sucks things into it. During times when Mark is uncertain, if he ignores the screaming mass he then gives himself time to centre his spirit and get on top of it again.

Let the media tear him apart – because they will have nothing from him to tear apart. The media will be tearing apart only the substance that the media itself throws at it. Mark is silent. He, then in good time, has regathered within himself, he has created the vacuum, there is greater intensity of interest in what he has to say, and when he speaks again he speaks with incisiveness and strength and fills the vacuum with substance of his own choosing.

The net result: Mark has reset the agenda. He is back on top of it all, and the game plays out under his renewed terms and conditions. This point is crucial to his winning. Failure to do so, by listening to the exhortations to speak under duress, will show only a man not yet ready to lead.

Richard Clarke is in the process of destroying the presidency of George Bush. He�s proving that Bush gave al Qaeda a low priority before S11 despite strong contrary advice, and that after S11 he put invading Iraq above fighting al Qaeda. Again, this was contrary to advice from his most senior experts that there was no connection between Saddam and S11 and that invading Iraq would strengthen, not weaken, the real enemy.

There are questions Howard needs to be asked. What was our intelligence agencies� and foreign affairs advice on whether the invasion would make the world safer or more dangerous? What was our analysis of the real reasons for the invasion? Why did Howard not accept the advice of the head of the Defence Intelligence Organisation Frank Lewincamp that the WMD intelligence on Iraq did not justify an invasion? (See Mark Forbes story below). Why did Howard not tell the Australian people before the war that it risked making a us a bigger terrorist target? Why didn�t Howard tell the Americans that we�d focus on our region, where al Qaeda affiliates are active, and leave a region we had clean hands on to others?

Instead, the focus is on Latham, and it�s hurting. It�s allowing Howard to sound almost convincing when he accuses Latham of �blatant anti-Americanism�.

Latham moved too fast and too recklessly after his triumph early last week. He�s made his first big mistake after beginning to build a compelling case that Howard was a danger to our national security, not the man to trust with it in dangerous times.

A senior member of the press gallery told me early last week that Latham�s honeymoon would end soon, citing an �amateur hour� Latham backroom team running around like headless chooks.

Latham needs to settle down and stay cool. For Australia�s sake.

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The spy, the reporter and that war seminar

by Mark Forbes

23/02/2004, The Age

A spy chief says he was a source of an Age report. Mark Forbes responds. `Were we led by the nose?” asked Frank Lewincamp. The director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Australia’s top military intelligence agency, was considering the accuracy of intelligence reports in the lead-up to last year’s Iraq war.

Standing before senior students, public servants and military officers from Australia and overseas at an Australian National University lecture in Canberra, the normally discreet intelligence chief answered the question with a series of startling statements, given the political maelstrom brewing over the allies’ failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Lewincamp, speaking under the “Chatham House rule”, clearly believed he would not be reported. The rule states that information from such meetings may be used, but neither the speaker nor the meeting can be identified.

Asked about the use of material aired in this fashion, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer this week said: “They tell you when you go to Chatham House, which is in London, they tell you when you make a speech there that your speech is under Chatham House rules.

“And apparently under Chatham House rules, that means nobody can report who you are by name, or your position. But they can report that a particular opinion was expressed.”

Only after both Mr Lewincamp and the organisers of the lecture had identified it as the primary source of a report in The Age on February 14 – and contested its accuracy – have I confirmed this. In the months since the lecture I have tried to persuade Mr Lewincamp and other intelligence figures to be quoted by name.

With intensifying debate over what the Government was told about Iraq’s WMD and how it used intelligence to justify war, and being told that a parliamentary committee had been unable to get to the bottom of the issue, The Age decided to publish on Saturday the 14th, citing unnamed sources.

In his confession to the Senate last Tuesday night, Mr Lewincamp outed himself as the source and stated he had had four subsequent conversations with me. I can recall five conversations, culminating in a phone call the Friday before The Age published its report. I remain bound to respect the confidentiality of any private conversations with him and those I have had with several other intelligence and Government officials.

“I believe that I am, at least in part, the official to whom Mark Forbes refers in his article,” Mr Lewincamp told his inquisitors, then added: “I have never made, nor would I make, a number of statements attributed to that official.

“I have never said that the Bush Administration’s claims justifying an invasion were exaggerated, nor have I said that the Government was told that Iraqi WMD did not pose an immediate threat. Overall, the article characterises these issues in ways in which I do not.”

At the lecture, last September, Mr Lewincamp discussed a range of less sensitive intelligence issues before moving on to Iraq.

He said the Australian intelligence support to the fighting itself was very good, but its support to policy and decision makers was mixed, particularly in predicting the response of the Iraqi leadership.

On WMD, “we have always told a consistent and reasonable story”, he said. “We had said Iraq had a WMD program, but to a large part it represented a latent capability. We said the degree of weaponisation of chemical and biological material in Iraq was unknown.”

Chemical and biological weapons could be produced in a short time, Mr Lewincamp reported, and the prospect of Iraq having weapons could not be discounted.

“We had to prepare the military for the worst-case scenario and the possibility they could be operating in a chemical and biological weapons environment.”

As a student at the seminar, I led a series of questions.

Asked if the intelligence was exaggerated and if Iraq presented a clear and present danger, Mr Lewincamp said: “We were less forward leaning than US agencies.”

Surprised, I asked: “Was the magnitude of the threat enough to justify the invasion of Iraq?”

“No,” was his blunt reply.

“Do you mean before the war?” “Yes,” Mr Lewincamp said, adding: “Some ministers may wish they hadn’t concentrated so strongly on WMD.”

In January 2003, Defence Minister Robert Hill had asked him “why US agencies were more gung-ho”, Mr Lewincamp said. “He now acknowledges we were closer to the truth.”

Questioned about the claim this week, Senator Hill said: “I do not know about the gung-ho, but if I saw difference in assessments about an issue as serious as this one then it would not be unusual for me to be asking for an explanation.”

Mr Lewincamp also revealed, under questioning at the ANU, that his agency identified deficiencies in US intelligence claims, citing US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s plea last February to the UN for it to act against Iraq. “We reported at the time (that) Colin Powell exaggerated in one or two of his statements. He went beyond the available evidence.”

However, Mr Lewincamp told the seminar, “there was pressure brought to bear on us because we were different and standing out more”.

In future the DIO staff should have more faith in their instincts, he said. In the US, the State Department “now believes it should have stood up more and questioned more”.

Mr Lewincamp said the comments he made at the lecture were consistent with evidence, also revealed by The Age last week, to a Senate committee last November 5.

He said then that any weapons Iraq held would be limited in number and “likely to be fragile or degraded and in a relatively poor state” after being left over from the 1990-91 Gulf War.

“There is a range of intelligence information that Iraq was engaged in the destruction of its capabilities,” he said.

The revelations have caused immense discomfort for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU. That an official of Mr Lewincamp’s stature would attend was due to the close links between those running the course and the defence and intelligence community.

The head of the centre, Ross Babbage, and the lecturer of the intelligence course, Ross Thomas, have come from senior positions in the Department of Defence and intelligence agencies.

Senator Hill has already suggested that intelligence officials should no longer deliver such lectures, but he and the intelligence community are likely to face further questioning in the near future.

Last week’s controversy makes an independent judicial inquiry into WMD intelligence essential, the Opposition has claimed, and even a Government-dominated parliamentary committee report is set to recommend a further investigation when it is tabled on March 1.

This report first appeared in Saturday’s Age, distribution of which was severely disrupted by an industrial dispute.

***

Director rejects claims

The Defence Department secretary yesterday issued a response on behalf of the Defence Intelligence Organisation’s director, Frank Lewincamp, to an article entitled “The spy, the reporter and that seminar”, published last Saturday and today.

“The article repeats claims made by Mr Forbes in an earlier article in relation to a presentation given by the director of the DIO, Lewincamp, to a seminar at the Australian National University,” the secretary, Ric Smith, said. “Mr Lewincamp has already given evidence to the Senate Defence Estimates Committee in which he rejected claims made in the original article.

“Following publication of (Saturday’s) article, Mr Lewincamp has again confirmed to me that his statement to the Senate Committee was correct. He has also rejected the new claim in (Saturday’s) article that pressure was brought to bear on DIO over its assessments.”

On Monday, March 22, Mark Latham made the war on Iraq and what it showed about the John Howard�s fitness for lead on national security a front line election issue. (See A rotten lousy disgrace.)

 

His speech seeking to censure Howard for not allowing AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty to tell us the truth about the increased danger we faced from terrorism due to our invasion of Iraq was a triumph. Howard was on the ropes with nowhere to go but down for the count (see Could Howard be gone before we vote?)

Better still for Latham, Bush�s former top counter terrorism adviser Richard Clarke � the man Bush trusted to lead the September 11 reaction team in the White House, was systematically exposing Bush lying over the bodies of his people to persuade them to support a war which helped the terrorists� cause. (See Bush before September 11: the awful truth.)

Perhaps buoyed by strong polls in last Tuesday�s Australian newspaper, Latham told Sydney radio 2UE he wanted our troops home for Christmas. There were lots of ifs and buts:

Mark Latham: We believe we have a responsibility to rebuild [Iraq] and as soon as that responsibility is discharged they should be back here. Hopefully, that will be before the end of the year. Under a Labor government our strategy is to get them back as soon as that responsibility is discharged and you have got a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government.

Mike Carlton: Well, theoretically, there is going to be a hand over in June.

ML: Yes, that is theoretically, but we have to look at the timetable. Things can go wrong and it might be delayed. I am hoping that by the end of the year the Australian troops will be back here for the defence of Australia, having discharged their international responsibilities, and back on Australian soil for the good protection our country.

MC: But how do you decide? You are being a bit wishy-washy there, leaving a lot of room to move. How do you decide when they have discharged their responsibilities and to bring them back?

ML: Well, at the point of a sovereign hand over to a new Iraq government. As you say, there is a timetable – a very tentative timetable – for the middle of the year. Things can go wrong, things can get pushed back a while, but our intention is to ensure that once the responsibility is discharged – and that is at the time of the hand over to the new sovereign government in Iraq – then Australian troops will come back under a Labor government.

MC: And you would hope they would be home by Christmas?

ML: Yes, if that timetable of midyear is adhered to then that would be the case. If a federal election is held this year, say the election was in September and there was a change in government, we would be hoping to have them back by Christmas, certainly. (See A question of timing.)

Howard pounced, beating up the comments to insist that Latham had made a definitive announcement that he�d �cut and run�, not simply stating a goal to work towards.

I reckon Latham made two mistakes. First, he was scheduled to give a major foreign policy speech next week setting out the major differences between the two parties. This is the way to announce national security policy, not a throwaway line on talkback.

Still, his 2UE comments were open ended enough to allow for unforseen circumstances to intervene, like a civil war in Iraq upon the transfer of authority to the Iraqis on June 30. They also allowed a change of heart if � as most of the world wants � the Americans handed control of the transition to democracy to the UN and asked Australia to stay.

The story should have been a one-day wonder, or even turned into a positive for Labor. I mean, when does Howard intend to bring the troops home? When the U.S. says it�s OK, as usual?

But Latham�s got a lot of Keating – another hard-yards Sydney westie – in him. Instead of hosing Howard�s beat up down, he�s led with his chin ever since, giving Howard a rung on his comeback ladder of opportunity.

I don�t know about you, but when I saw Latham say we had to bring our 850 troops home after June 30 �to defend Australia� I was disgusted. Pure populism it was, and I thought Australians would see through it big time, which they have.

It was painful to see Latham�s foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd on Lateline last night having to dodge and weave to avoid stating the obvious � that he did not agree with Latham�s hard and fast timetable for exit. Latham has neutralised Kevin Rudd with this decision, damaging one of his best assets on national security.

Is Latham really saying the danger to Australia is so acute that we need 850 troops to join the 51,0000 troops stationed in Australia? That�s scare mongering at its worst.

As Howard rightly said speaking to his motion in the House of Representatives today that troops should not be withdrawn before the job is done, that would mean hauling back our troops from East Timor and the Solomons too. Stupid.

What�s worse, however, is the fact that Latham�s decision to go in harder when challenged by Howard now makes the American alliance central to the Iraq/national security debate, and that suits Howard, not Latham.

In dangerous times, many Australians want good relations with the U.S. Other Australians are appalled at the Bush administration, but fear the U.S. response to a unilateral pullout. �With us or against us�, remember? And remember 1975, when, according to some, the CIA played a part in ousting Gough Whitlam?

It�s now obvious Howard did the wrong thing by Australia and the West by invading Iraq without the support of the majority of Australians for reasons he would not disclose under cover of Iraq�s alleged WMDs.

But we did invade, and we�re there now trying to secure the peace, a vital task for the West to stop Iraq being over run by al Qaeda and company.

As invaders, Australia also has a legal and moral responsibility to stay the course. We also have a responsibility to add our voice to the growing calls for Bush to abandon his imperialist dream of owning Iraq and looting it and over authority to the UN. That�s powerful, coming from an ally on the ground in Iraq.

I reckon Latham disobeyed Webdiarist Robert Bosler�s good advice for when the shit hits the fan. In An artist’s blueprint for a Latham win he wrote:

What does he do when the mountainous screaming whirlwind is just too much for now? Absolutely, he must say nothing. This crashes against the screaming mass and all hell will break loose. His minders will be screaming at him: “you must speak to the media or they will tear you apart”. He must let the media do just that.

Let’s say that again. He must ignore the exhortations to comment under those circumstances and if the media tears him apart, he must let them.

This is a standout point. It only lives successfully under these conditions: little time to go coupled with uncertainty, which is where we are now before the next election. It works because it creates a vacuum. A vacuum is powerful. It sucks things into it. During times when Mark is uncertain, if he ignores the screaming mass he then gives himself time to centre his spirit and get on top of it again.

Let the media tear him apart – because they will have nothing from him to tear apart. The media will be tearing apart only the substance that the media itself throws at it. Mark is silent. He, then in good time, has regathered within himself, he has created the vacuum, there is greater intensity of interest in what he has to say, and when he speaks again he speaks with incisiveness and strength and fills the vacuum with substance of his own choosing.

The net result: Mark has reset the agenda. He is back on top of it all, and the game plays out under his renewed terms and conditions. This point is crucial to his winning. Failure to do so, by listening to the exhortations to speak under duress, will show only a man not yet ready to lead.

Richard Clarke is in the process of destroying the presidency of George Bush. He�s proving that Bush gave al Qaeda a low priority before S11 despite strong contrary advice, and that after S11 he put invading Iraq above fighting al Qaeda. Again, this was contrary to advice from his most senior experts that there was no connection between Saddam and S11 and that invading Iraq would strengthen, not weaken, the real enemy.

There are questions Howard needs to be asked. What was our intelligence agencies� and foreign affairs advice on whether the invasion would make the world safer or more dangerous? What was our analysis of the real reasons for the invasion? Why did Howard not accept the advice of the head of the Defence Intelligence Organisation Frank Lewincamp that the WMD intelligence on Iraq did not justify an invasion? (See Mark Forbes story below). Why did Howard not tell the Australian people before the war that it risked making a us a bigger terrorist target? Why didn�t Howard tell the Americans that we�d focus on our region, where al Qaeda affiliates are active, and leave a region we had clean hands on to others?

Instead, the focus is on Latham, and it�s hurting. It�s allowing Howard to sound almost convincing when he accuses Latham of �blatant anti-Americanism�.

Latham moved too fast and too recklessly after his triumph early last week. He�s made his first big mistake after beginning to build a compelling case that Howard was a danger to our national security, not the man to trust with it in dangerous times.

A senior member of the press gallery told me early last week that Latham�s honeymoon would end soon, citing an �amateur hour� Latham backroom team running around like headless chooks.

Latham needs to settle down and stay cool. For Australia�s sake.

***

The spy, the reporter and that war seminar

by Mark Forbes

23/02/2004, The Age

A spy chief says he was a source of an Age report. Mark Forbes responds. `Were we led by the nose?” asked Frank Lewincamp. The director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Australia’s top military intelligence agency, was considering the accuracy of intelligence reports in the lead-up to last year’s Iraq war.

Standing before senior students, public servants and military officers from Australia and overseas at an Australian National University lecture in Canberra, the normally discreet intelligence chief answered the question with a series of startling statements, given the political maelstrom brewing over the allies’ failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction.

Mr Lewincamp, speaking under the “Chatham House rule”, clearly believed he would not be reported. The rule states that information from such meetings may be used, but neither the speaker nor the meeting can be identified.

Asked about the use of material aired in this fashion, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer this week said: “They tell you when you go to Chatham House, which is in London, they tell you when you make a speech there that your speech is under Chatham House rules.

“And apparently under Chatham House rules, that means nobody can report who you are by name, or your position. But they can report that a particular opinion was expressed.”

Only after both Mr Lewincamp and the organisers of the lecture had identified it as the primary source of a report in The Age on February 14 – and contested its accuracy – have I confirmed this. In the months since the lecture I have tried to persuade Mr Lewincamp and other intelligence figures to be quoted by name.

With intensifying debate over what the Government was told about Iraq’s WMD and how it used intelligence to justify war, and being told that a parliamentary committee had been unable to get to the bottom of the issue, The Age decided to publish on Saturday the 14th, citing unnamed sources.

In his confession to the Senate last Tuesday night, Mr Lewincamp outed himself as the source and stated he had had four subsequent conversations with me. I can recall five conversations, culminating in a phone call the Friday before The Age published its report. I remain bound to respect the confidentiality of any private conversations with him and those I have had with several other intelligence and Government officials.

“I believe that I am, at least in part, the official to whom Mark Forbes refers in his article,” Mr Lewincamp told his inquisitors, then added: “I have never made, nor would I make, a number of statements attributed to that official.

“I have never said that the Bush Administration’s claims justifying an invasion were exaggerated, nor have I said that the Government was told that Iraqi WMD did not pose an immediate threat. Overall, the article characterises these issues in ways in which I do not.”

At the lecture, last September, Mr Lewincamp discussed a range of less sensitive intelligence issues before moving on to Iraq.

He said the Australian intelligence support to the fighting itself was very good, but its support to policy and decision makers was mixed, particularly in predicting the response of the Iraqi leadership.

On WMD, “we have always told a consistent and reasonable story”, he said. “We had said Iraq had a WMD program, but to a large part it represented a latent capability. We said the degree of weaponisation of chemical and biological material in Iraq was unknown.”

Chemical and biological weapons could be produced in a short time, Mr Lewincamp reported, and the prospect of Iraq having weapons could not be discounted.

“We had to prepare the military for the worst-case scenario and the possibility they could be operating in a chemical and biological weapons environment.”

As a student at the seminar, I led a series of questions.

Asked if the intelligence was exaggerated and if Iraq presented a clear and present danger, Mr Lewincamp said: “We were less forward leaning than US agencies.”

Surprised, I asked: “Was the magnitude of the threat enough to justify the invasion of Iraq?”

“No,” was his blunt reply.

“Do you mean before the war?” “Yes,” Mr Lewincamp said, adding: “Some ministers may wish they hadn’t concentrated so strongly on WMD.”

In January 2003, Defence Minister Robert Hill had asked him “why US agencies were more gung-ho”, Mr Lewincamp said. “He now acknowledges we were closer to the truth.”

Questioned about the claim this week, Senator Hill said: “I do not know about the gung-ho, but if I saw difference in assessments about an issue as serious as this one then it would not be unusual for me to be asking for an explanation.”

Mr Lewincamp also revealed, under questioning at the ANU, that his agency identified deficiencies in US intelligence claims, citing US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s plea last February to the UN for it to act against Iraq. “We reported at the time (that) Colin Powell exaggerated in one or two of his statements. He went beyond the available evidence.”

However, Mr Lewincamp told the seminar, “there was pressure brought to bear on us because we were different and standing out more”.

In future the DIO staff should have more faith in their instincts, he said. In the US, the State Department “now believes it should have stood up more and questioned more”.

Mr Lewincamp said the comments he made at the lecture were consistent with evidence, also revealed by The Age last week, to a Senate committee last November 5.

He said then that any weapons Iraq held would be limited in number and “likely to be fragile or degraded and in a relatively poor state” after being left over from the 1990-91 Gulf War.

“There is a range of intelligence information that Iraq was engaged in the destruction of its capabilities,” he said.

The revelations have caused immense discomfort for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU. That an official of Mr Lewincamp’s stature would attend was due to the close links between those running the course and the defence and intelligence community.

The head of the centre, Ross Babbage, and the lecturer of the intelligence course, Ross Thomas, have come from senior positions in the Department of Defence and intelligence agencies.

Senator Hill has already suggested that intelligence officials should no longer deliver such lectures, but he and the intelligence community are likely to face further questioning in the near future.

Last week’s controversy makes an independent judicial inquiry into WMD intelligence essential, the Opposition has claimed, and even a Government-dominated parliamentary committee report is set to recommend a further investigation when it is tabled on March 1.

This report first appeared in Saturday’s Age, distribution of which was severely disrupted by an industrial dispute.

***

Director rejects claims

The Defence Department secretary yesterday issued a response on behalf of the Defence Intelligence Organisation’s director, Frank Lewincamp, to an article entitled “The spy, the reporter and that seminar”, published last Saturday and today.

“The article repeats claims made by Mr Forbes in an earlier article in relation to a presentation given by the director of the DIO, Lewincamp, to a seminar at the Australian National University,” the secretary, Ric Smith, said. “Mr Lewincamp has already given evidence to the Senate Defence Estimates Committee in which he rejected claims made in the original article.

“Following publication of (Saturday’s) article, Mr Lewincamp has again confirmed to me that his statement to the Senate Committee was correct. He has also rejected the new claim in (Saturday’s) article that pressure was brought to bear on DIO over its assessments.”

Revelations last week by Richard Clarke – Bush’s counter-terrorism guru until just before the Iraq invasion – could destroy the Bush presidency. I asked Webdiarist Kerryn Higgs, a Australian living in New York who’s been glued to live TV coverage of Clarke’s evidence to the Sepetmber 11 inquiry, to report the controversy.

 

Her first report is on what Bush did and didn’t do before September 11. She’s working on a report on Clarke’s revelations of what happened on September 11 and immediately afterwards.

The failure to prevent 9/11: Clarke’s story

by Kerryn Higgs

Richard Clarke, the U.S. counterterror co-ordinator under every administration since Reagan, began his session in front of the 9/11 Commission on Wednesday with the only apology anyone has yet offered to the families of those who died:

“To the loved ones of the victims of 9/11� here in the room� watching on television, your government failed you. Those entrusted with protecting you failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that doesn’t matter, because we failed. And for that failure, I would ask, once all the facts are out, for your understanding and for your forgiveness.”

Though critics of Clarke have charged him with self-serving theatricality, he looked and sounded absolutely sincere to me. Dozens of the family members who sat behind him applauded, and gathered at the end of his testimony to hug him.

***

It�s been quite a week in the USA, as a whole lot more evidence came into focus about the role of Iraq in George W Bush�s agenda. Clarke has raised yet more questions about the failure to prevent the catastrophic events of 9/11 and the push for war on Iraq.

Clarke�s book, Against all Enemies: Inside America�s War on Terror, hit the bookshops on Monday, March 22. The night before, most of 60 Minutes was devoted to Clarke.

On Wednesday afternoon, he appeared before the Commission of inquiry into the September 11 attacks. A dedicated career public servant and a registered Republican who was appointed by Reagan and served all governments up to his resignation last year, Richard Clarke is not easily brushed aside � though there�s been a sustained government effort to undermine his credibility.

Daniel Shaw, commentator for National Public Radio (NPR), was asked at the end of the week whether Bush�s neglect of Al Qaeda had anything to do with a reflexive rejection of Clinton�s foreign policy priorities. Shaw thought maybe more than reflexive, and told this story. When the two Presidents met, as is traditional, just hours before Bush�s inauguration, Clinton gave Bush his five top priorities:1. Israel-Palestine; 2. Terrorist threat from al Qaeda; 3. North Korea; 4. India-Pakistan; 5. Iraq. �I would take the fifth one first,� Bush answered, according to Shaw.

The thrust of Clarke�s criticism of the Bush people is that they were living in the past. He told 60 Minutes:

“I blame the entire Bush leadership for continuing to work on Cold War issues when they got back in power in 2001. It was as though they were preserved in amber from when they left office eight years earlier. They came back. They wanted to work on the same issues right away: Iraq, Star Wars. Not new issues, the new threats that had developed over the preceding eight years.�

When it came to al Qaeda, Clarke was without doubt the most worried of Clinton�s staff and when he was retained by the new administration, soon discovered that his sense of urgency was marginalised:

�On January 24th of 2001, I wrote a memo to Condoleezza Rice asking for, urgently � underlined urgently � a cabinet level meeting to deal with the impending al Qaeda attack and that urgent memo wasn’t acted on.�

Instead he was asked to attend a meeting of the deputies, rather than the chiefs; and even that was put off until April:

�I began saying, ‘We have to deal with bin Laden. We have to deal with al Qaeda.’ Paul Wolfowitz the Deputy Sec’y of Defense said, ‘No, no, no. We don’t have to deal with al Qaeda. Why are we talking about that little guy? We have to talk about Iraqi terrorism against the United States.’ And I said, ‘Paul, there hasn’t been any Iraqi terrorism against the United States in eight years,’ and I turned to the Deputy Director of [the] CIA and said, ‘Isn’t that right?’ and he said, ‘Yeah, that’s right.��

The cabinet meeting on terrorism did not occur until September 4th. Meanwhile, in months of meetings with Wolfowitz and other deputies covering a range of issues related to terrorism, he could find no-one interested in addressing al Qaeda as a specific high-priority threat. In an interview with Terry Gross on National Public Radio program Fresh Air, Clarke said the administration was instead engrossed in a plan to �reshape the Middle East, by knocking off Saddam Hussein, going in and building democracy�.

�They had this sort of messianic view of the US as a great superpower that could just put its hand [in]� and rip out a regime and remould a country and then that would have ripple effects.�

When the policy Rice claims she had spent seven months �developing� was tabled on September 4th, it was virtually identical to the plan Clarke had handed her in January. He sent her a desperate memo on September 4th urging policy-makers to �imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead at home or abroad after a terrorist attack and ask themselves what else they could have done�. The attacks were seven days away.

September 11 Commissioner Roemer asked Clarke whether things could have been different. Clarke replied:

�All of the things we recommended back in January were those things on the table in September�They were done after September 11th. They were all done. I didn’t really understand why they couldn’t have been done in February.�

But like everyone else appearing here, he conceded that doing those things was not likely to have prevented the attacks – Clarke�s plan had to do with obliterating the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, getting the Predator drones armed and ready to strike or going after al Qaeda funding. By February 2001, the 9/11 plot was most likely finalised, and weakening bin Laden or the camps unlikely to affect the outcome.

A more likely avenue of action against the hijackers� plans lay in tightening the flawed domestic security system. This aspect was not really covered by last week�s hearings (there will be more), though Chairman Kean told CBS TV on Wednesday evening, that �a whole number of circumstances, had they been different, might have prevented 9/11� they involve everything from how people got into the country to failures in the intelligence system.�

These failures include demarcation issues between the CIA and the FBI and simple communications failure between and within the agencies. Newsweek of June 10th, 2002 recounted an unhappy series of errors and oversights that allowed two hijackers to function unimpeded.

In January 2000, the CIA tracked Alhazmi and Almihdhar (who flew with Atta on Flight 77) from a Malaysian meeting of terrorism suspects back to California. But the CIA did not pass this on to the FBI � which is solely responsible for security matters at home. The two men lived openly while they went to flight school, had driver�s licences and phone connections under their own names, travelled abroad, got new visas and periodically met up with other plotters.

In August, with the �chatter� spiking, CIA chief Tenet ordered a review of files and the FBI was finally told about them. They were not located, though it�s unclear whether the FBI tried the phone book, which might have done the trick. But it is clear that the suspects� names were not placed on intercept lists at domestic airports. Richard Clarke too, ostensible counterterror chief, was not informed.

Clarke had already told the Commission during many hours of closed testimony that he wished he had known. Asked by Commissioner Roemer what he would have done, he conceded he couldn�t say for sure but hoped he would have launched a manhunt using front-page pictures, World�s Most Wanted, whatever it took, to track them down.

That same summer, two separate FBI agencies tried to pass warnings up the line to their bosses. An agent in Phoenix warned his headquarters in July 2001 that Osama bin Laden’s followers might be studying at flight schools in preparation for terrorist attacks (see New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/auth/login?URI=http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/03/national/03TERR.html – registration required). The FBI didn�t yet know about Almihdhar and Alhazmi doing flight training and the report was shelved.

FBI agents in Minnesota also arrested Zacarias Moussaoui in mid-August 2001. His lack of interest in taking off and landing and a preference for steering big jets in the flight simulator alerted instructors, who were aware that an airliner could be used as a missile. The FBI interviewed an associate, who revealed that Moussaoui was deeply anti-American and had links to extremist groups. One agent described him as the kind of guy who could �fly something into the World Trade Centre�. His colleague, Coleen Rowley, attempted to get search warrants to follow up the lead, but her submissions were rejected by superiors. The Minneapolis office became so frustrated with the obstacles put up by supervisors in Washington that they began to joke that FBI headquarters was in league with bin Laden.

Although these particular clues were buried, top officials did know in the summer of 2001 that something horrific was about to happen. The President�s Daily Brief (PDB) of August 6th was delivered to the Crawford ranch, where Bush was on holidays. Presumably he read it � but he did not interrupt his vacation. He has resisted disclosure of its contents ever since. Only two members of the Commission were finally allowed to see it and make notes � and the notes have been the subject of attempted suppression by Bush. There have, however, been various leaks, starting with the Los Angeles Times back in May 2002, which said the August 6th memo warned that al Qaeda might contemplate hijacking U.S. aircraft and that bin Laden wanted to conduct attacks in the United States, where al Qaeda members had been residing and travelling for years.

According to David Corn in the Nation, quoting House and Senate intelligence committees an intelligence warning in early July 2001, had noted:

“We believe that [bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against the U.S. and/or Israeli interests in coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.”

On July 26, 2001, cbsnews.com reported that John Ashcroft had stopped flying on commercial airlines. A coincidence? He was apparently advised to do so by the FBI, but the American public was not warned of any threat and airport security was not upgraded.

Almost everyone maintains that the attack was expected to occur overseas, though Clarke testified that Tenet did not rule out a strike at home. Condoleezza Rice has denied that the PDB of August 6th was specific, claiming it contained only a general warning about al Qaeda.

As for the July warning, Bush has never allowed the intelligence committees to reveal whether he and Rice saw it, only that �senior government officials� did. Rice said, in May 2002:

“I don’t think anybody could have predicted that those people could have taken an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center . . . that they would try to use an airplane as a missile.”

The Washington Post, however, now writes that Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste has revealed that Rice has been having second thoughts. She apparently wants to revise this 2-year-old statement, confessing that she �misspoke�. So far, she refuses to testify in public on oath and, as the administration�s attack on Clarke proceeds, there is a sense of something akin to panic, with officials contradicting each other on many aspects.

It�s clear that the administration remains anxious to suppress information on what they knew in the lead-up to 9/11. There are numerous signs that they had a lot more information about the nature of the threat than has been openly shared with the public. It was only concerted pressure from the families that forced Bush to convene the independent Commission, which he tried hard to avoid and has hindered whenever he could.

So if vital clues were buried in the system, and the CIA, knowing an attack was imminent, was issuing hair-raising warnings, it�s fair to ask: what could have stirred the system up in time and did the government do it?

Clarke contrasts Clinton�s handling of the spike in intelligence �chatter� of December 1999 in the lead-up to the millenium with how Bush handled the even bigger spike in the summer of 2001. Clinton chaired near-daily meetings with Justice, CIA, FBI, Defence and all relevant principals, including Clarke. Every day, they had to go back to their departments, �shake the trees� and return with whatever they could find.

During December 1999, the FBI shared its intelligence fully � rare for the FBI and something that ceased straight afterwards. Clarke believes that the successful interception of the LA international airport bomber was due in part to the extraordinary level of alert that Clinton put in place through this pressure on his agencies.

In the summer of 2001, when the �spectacular� attack was expected and CIA chief Tenet was described as �running around with his hair on fire�, this kind of process did not occur. Bush met with Tenet most days, but did not chair meetings of all chiefs as Clinton had done � or order Rice to do so.

Clarke also mentions that �there was a hiatus� in August � presumably because that�s when people go on holiday. Bush spent August at the ranch. Clues already existed and Clarke believes that intense pressure like Clinton�s might have brought some of the evidence to light.

It seems possible that the Bush people understood neither the source nor the nature of the threat. On April 30, 2001, CNN reported that the government’s annual terrorism report lacked the extensive coverage of bin Laden seen in previous years. Asked why the Administration had reduced the focus, “a senior Bush State Department official� told CNN the U.S. government made a mistake in focusing so much energy on bin Laden“.

The Detroit News reported that only 2 of about 100 national security meetings had dealt with terrorism in the months before 9/11 � and one of these was that of September 4th, impatiently awaited by Clarke.

Two veteran CIA counter-terrorism experts were so frustrated that summer that they considered resigning and making public the

Revelations last week by Richard Clarke – Bush’s counter-terrorism guru until just before the Iraq invasion – could destroy the Bush presidency. I asked Webdiarist Kerryn Higgs, a Australian living in New York who’s been glued to live TV coverage of Clarke’s evidence to the Sepetmber 11 inquiry, to report the controversy.

 

Her first report is on what Bush did and didn’t do before September 11. She’s working on a report on Clarke’s revelations of what happened on September 11 and immediately afterwards.

The failure to prevent 9/11: Clarke’s story

by Kerryn Higgs

Richard Clarke, the U.S. counterterror co-ordinator under every administration since Reagan, began his session in front of the 9/11 Commission on Wednesday with the only apology anyone has yet offered to the families of those who died:

“To the loved ones of the victims of 9/11� here in the room� watching on television, your government failed you. Those entrusted with protecting you failed you. And I failed you. We tried hard, but that doesn’t matter, because we failed. And for that failure, I would ask, once all the facts are out, for your understanding and for your forgiveness.”

Though critics of Clarke have charged him with self-serving theatricality, he looked and sounded absolutely sincere to me. Dozens of the family members who sat behind him applauded, and gathered at the end of his testimony to hug him.

***

It�s been quite a week in the USA, as a whole lot more evidence came into focus about the role of Iraq in George W Bush�s agenda. Clarke has raised yet more questions about the failure to prevent the catastrophic events of 9/11 and the push for war on Iraq.

Clarke�s book, Against all Enemies: Inside America�s War on Terror, hit the bookshops on Monday, March 22. The night before, most of 60 Minutes was devoted to Clarke.

On Wednesday afternoon, he appeared before the Commission of inquiry into the September 11 attacks. A dedicated career public servant and a registered Republican who was appointed by Reagan and served all governments up to his resignation last year, Richard Clarke is not easily brushed aside � though there�s been a sustained government effort to undermine his credibility.

Daniel Shaw, commentator for National Public Radio (NPR), was asked at the end of the week whether Bush�s neglect of Al Qaeda had anything to do with a reflexive rejection of Clinton�s foreign policy priorities. Shaw thought maybe more than reflexive, and told this story. When the two Presidents met, as is traditional, just hours before Bush�s inauguration, Clinton gave Bush his five top priorities:1. Israel-Palestine; 2. Terrorist threat from al Qaeda; 3. North Korea; 4. India-Pakistan; 5. Iraq. �I would take the fifth one first,� Bush answered, according to Shaw.

The thrust of Clarke�s criticism of the Bush people is that they were living in the past. He told 60 Minutes:

“I blame the entire Bush leadership for continuing to work on Cold War issues when they got back in power in 2001. It was as though they were preserved in amber from when they left office eight years earlier. They came back. They wanted to work on the same issues right away: Iraq, Star Wars. Not new issues, the new threats that had developed over the preceding eight years.�

When it came to al Qaeda, Clarke was without doubt the most worried of Clinton�s staff and when he was retained by the new administration, soon discovered that his sense of urgency was marginalised:

�On January 24th of 2001, I wrote a memo to Condoleezza Rice asking for, urgently � underlined urgently � a cabinet level meeting to deal with the impending al Qaeda attack and that urgent memo wasn’t acted on.�

Instead he was asked to attend a meeting of the deputies, rather than the chiefs; and even that was put off until April:

�I began saying, ‘We have to deal with bin Laden. We have to deal with al Qaeda.’ Paul Wolfowitz the Deputy Sec’y of Defense said, ‘No, no, no. We don’t have to deal with al Qaeda. Why are we talking about that little guy? We have to talk about Iraqi terrorism against the United States.’ And I said, ‘Paul, there hasn’t been any Iraqi terrorism against the United States in eight years,’ and I turned to the Deputy Director of [the] CIA and said, ‘Isn’t that right?’ and he said, ‘Yeah, that’s right.��

The cabinet meeting on terrorism did not occur until September 4th. Meanwhile, in months of meetings with Wolfowitz and other deputies covering a range of issues related to terrorism, he could find no-one interested in addressing al Qaeda as a specific high-priority threat. In an interview with Terry Gross on National Public Radio program Fresh Air, Clarke said the administration was instead engrossed in a plan to �reshape the Middle East, by knocking off Saddam Hussein, going in and building democracy�.

�They had this sort of messianic view of the US as a great superpower that could just put its hand [in]� and rip out a regime and remould a country and then that would have ripple effects.�

When the policy Rice claims she had spent seven months �developing� was tabled on September 4th, it was virtually identical to the plan Clarke had handed her in January. He sent her a desperate memo on September 4th urging policy-makers to �imagine a day after hundreds of Americans lay dead at home or abroad after a terrorist attack and ask themselves what else they could have done�. The attacks were seven days away.

September 11 Commissioner Roemer asked Clarke whether things could have been different. Clarke replied:

�All of the things we recommended back in January were those things on the table in September�They were done after September 11th. They were all done. I didn’t really understand why they couldn’t have been done in February.�

But like everyone else appearing here, he conceded that doing those things was not likely to have prevented the attacks – Clarke�s plan had to do with obliterating the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, getting the Predator drones armed and ready to strike or going after al Qaeda funding. By February 2001, the 9/11 plot was most likely finalised, and weakening bin Laden or the camps unlikely to affect the outcome.

A more likely avenue of action against the hijackers� plans lay in tightening the flawed domestic security system. This aspect was not really covered by last week�s hearings (there will be more), though Chairman Kean told CBS TV on Wednesday evening, that �a whole number of circumstances, had they been different, might have prevented 9/11� they involve everything from how people got into the country to failures in the intelligence system.�

These failures include demarcation issues between the CIA and the FBI and simple communications failure between and within the agencies. Newsweek of June 10th, 2002 recounted an unhappy series of errors and oversights that allowed two hijackers to function unimpeded.

In January 2000, the CIA tracked Alhazmi and Almihdhar (who flew with Atta on Flight 77) from a Malaysian meeting of terrorism suspects back to California. But the CIA did not pass this on to the FBI � which is solely responsible for security matters at home. The two men lived openly while they went to flight school, had driver�s licences and phone connections under their own names, travelled abroad, got new visas and periodically met up with other plotters.

In August, with the �chatter� spiking, CIA chief Tenet ordered a review of files and the FBI was finally told about them. They were not located, though it�s unclear whether the FBI tried the phone book, which might have done the trick. But it is clear that the suspects� names were not placed on intercept lists at domestic airports. Richard Clarke too, ostensible counterterror chief, was not informed.

Clarke had already told the Commission during many hours of closed testimony that he wished he had known. Asked by Commissioner Roemer what he would have done, he conceded he couldn�t say for sure but hoped he would have launched a manhunt using front-page pictures, World�s Most Wanted, whatever it took, to track them down.

That same summer, two separate FBI agencies tried to pass warnings up the line to their bosses. An agent in Phoenix warned his headquarters in July 2001 that Osama bin Laden’s followers might be studying at flight schools in preparation for terrorist attacks (see New York Times at http://www.nytimes.com/auth/login?URI=http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/03/national/03TERR.html – registration required). The FBI didn�t yet know about Almihdhar and Alhazmi doing flight training and the report was shelved.

FBI agents in Minnesota also arrested Zacarias Moussaoui in mid-August 2001. His lack of interest in taking off and landing and a preference for steering big jets in the flight simulator alerted instructors, who were aware that an airliner could be used as a missile. The FBI interviewed an associate, who revealed that Moussaoui was deeply anti-American and had links to extremist groups. One agent described him as the kind of guy who could �fly something into the World Trade Centre�. His colleague, Coleen Rowley, attempted to get search warrants to follow up the lead, but her submissions were rejected by superiors. The Minneapolis office became so frustrated with the obstacles put up by supervisors in Washington that they began to joke that FBI headquarters was in league with bin Laden.

Although these particular clues were buried, top officials did know in the summer of 2001 that something horrific was about to happen. The President�s Daily Brief (PDB) of August 6th was delivered to the Crawford ranch, where Bush was on holidays. Presumably he read it � but he did not interrupt his vacation. He has resisted disclosure of its contents ever since. Only two members of the Commission were finally allowed to see it and make notes � and the notes have been the subject of attempted suppression by Bush. There have, however, been various leaks, starting with the Los Angeles Times back in May 2002, which said the August 6th memo warned that al Qaeda might contemplate hijacking U.S. aircraft and that bin Laden wanted to conduct attacks in the United States, where al Qaeda members had been residing and travelling for years.

According to David Corn in the Nation, quoting House and Senate intelligence committees an intelligence warning in early July 2001, had noted:

“We believe that [bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against the U.S. and/or Israeli interests in coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.”

On July 26, 2001, cbsnews.com reported that John Ashcroft had stopped flying on commercial airlines. A coincidence? He was apparently advised to do so by the FBI, but the American public was not warned of any threat and airport security was not upgraded.

Almost everyone maintains that the attack was expected to occur overseas, though Clarke testified that Tenet did not rule out a strike at home. Condoleezza Rice has denied that the PDB of August 6th was specific, claiming it contained only a general warning about al Qaeda.

As for the July warning, Bush has never allowed the intelligence committees to reveal whether he and Rice saw it, only that �senior government officials� did. Rice said, in May 2002:

“I don’t think anybody could have predicted that those people could have taken an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center . . . that they would try to use an airplane as a missile.”

The Washington Post, however, now writes that Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste has revealed that Rice has been having second thoughts. She apparently wants to revise this 2-year-old statement, confessing that she �misspoke�. So far, she refuses to testify in public on oath and, as the administration�s attack on Clarke proceeds, there is a sense of something akin to panic, with officials contradicting each other on many aspects.

It�s clear that the administration remains anxious to suppress information on what they knew in the lead-up to 9/11. There are numerous signs that they had a lot more information about the nature of the threat than has been openly shared with the public. It was only concerted pressure from the families that forced Bush to convene the independent Commission, which he tried hard to avoid and has hindered whenever he could.

So if vital clues were buried in the system, and the CIA, knowing an attack was imminent, was issuing hair-raising warnings, it�s fair to ask: what could have stirred the system up in time and did the government do it?

Clarke contrasts Clinton�s handling of the spike in intelligence �chatter� of December 1999 in the lead-up to the millenium with how Bush handled the even bigger spike in the summer of 2001. Clinton chaired near-daily meetings with Justice, CIA, FBI, Defence and all relevant principals, including Clarke. Every day, they had to go back to their departments, �shake the trees� and return with whatever they could find.

During December 1999, the FBI shared its intelligence fully � rare for the FBI and something that ceased straight afterwards. Clarke believes that the successful interception of the LA international airport bomber was due in part to the extraordinary level of alert that Clinton put in place through this pressure on his agencies.

In the summer of 2001, when the �spectacular� attack was expected and CIA chief Tenet was described as �running around with his hair on fire�, this kind of process did not occur. Bush met with Tenet most days, but did not chair meetings of all chiefs as Clinton had done � or order Rice to do so.

Clarke also mentions that �there was a hiatus� in August � presumably because that�s when people go on holiday. Bush spent August at the ranch. Clues already existed and Clarke believes that intense pressure like Clinton�s might have brought some of the evidence to light.

It seems possible that the Bush people understood neither the source nor the nature of the threat. On April 30, 2001, CNN reported that the government’s annual terrorism report lacked the extensive coverage of bin Laden seen in previous years. Asked why the Administration had reduced the focus, “a senior Bush State Department official� told CNN the U.S. government made a mistake in focusing so much energy on bin Laden“.

The Detroit News reported that only 2 of about 100 national security meetings had dealt with terrorism in the months before 9/11 � and one of these was that of September 4th, impatiently awaited by Clarke.

Two veteran CIA counter-terrorism experts were so frustrated that summer that they considered resigning and making public their fears about an imminent terrorist strike against US targets. Whether or not determined attention and aggressive �tree-shaking� could have prevented the attacks, we will never know, but it�s pretty clear that Bush and his team were otherwise occupied.

* Transcripts of both days� public hearings plus links to video and audio coverage can be found at the Washington Post.

A shorter version of this column was first published in the Sun Herald today.

 

Call me crazy, but I reckon there’s a chance John Howard could be gone before the election because of Iraq. I think that’s why Howard behaved so badly towards whistleblower Mick Keelty for daring to admit that invading Iraq made us a much bigger target for terrorism.

Defending himself against Mark Latham’s first parliamentary censure debate last Monday, Howard proclaimed, with feeling, that his decision to invade Iraq was one “I will never apologise for and never retreat from”.

That’s because he can’t, of course. Howard has said often enough that he took personal responsibility for the decision. If he admitted it compromised our national security and the security of the West, he’d have to resign.

So if most Australians conclude in the next few months that invading Iraq made the world, and Australia, a more dangerous place, not a safer one – as Howard’s many critics across the political divide warned before the war – he’d have to go to give the Coalition a chance of survival. And if national security then became the major election issue, Peter Costello would have to take over to minimise a rout.

The Madrid bombings, and the Spanish people’s decision to sack a government that lied to them about who did the deed, have focused the world’s attention again on the crucial question: what is the most effective way to minimise al-Qaeda terror?

As part of his assault on Keelty, the Federal Police Commissioner, Howard admitted “Iraq is really irrelevant to the intent and purposes of al-Qaeda”, except that the war gave al-Qaeda a propaganda victory! So why did he back George Bush to the hilt and revel in Bush’s description of him as a “man of steel”? Revelations from former senior Bush officials now pouring out of the US prove that Bush’s war had nothing to do with combating terror and everything to do with grabbing even more economic power.

Pentagon whistleblower and former USAF lieutenant colonel Karen Kwiatkowski said the US invaded for three reasons of pure self-interest. Unless America took Iraq by force, sanctions would soon be lifted against Saddam Hussein and European companies, not US firms, would get lucrative contracts. The US wanted to reverse Saddam’s decision to trade his oil in euros not the $US (one of Bush’s first decisions after Saddam’s statue fell). And Bush wanted to move US Middle East military bases from Saudi Arabia to Iraq.

Even more damning, not only did Bush con his own people about the reasons for war, but he made Iraq a higher priority than the war on terror.

Bush’s former top counter-intelligence man Dick Clarke wrote in a book released last week that Bush was more interested in Iraq than al-Qaeda, even on September 12, 2001, and saw September 11 as cover to get away with invading Iraq.

Bush “launched an unnecessary and costly war in Iraq that strengthened the fundamentalist, radical Islamic terrorist movement worldwide”, Clarke wrote. “Nothing America could have done would have provided al-Qaeda and its new generation of cloned groups [with] a better recruitment device than our unprovoked invasion of an oil-rich Arab country.”

Rand Beers, the bloke who replaced Clarke in the month before the invasion, resigned five days before it for the same reason: “The administration wasn’t matching its deeds to its words. They’re making us less secure, not more.”

Web diarist Phil Kendall wrote:

“The biggest ‘heist’ of all time via an illegal invasion, alienation of half the world’s oil from its rightful owners and the possibility of an everlasting jihad against us – thanks Mr Howard.”

Howard a man of steel? A man of jelly, more likely, with his knee-jerk “yes, sir” to a president who forgot he was supposed to represent the American people, not his big business oil and armaments mates. That’s the line Latham is beginning to run and if Australians feel forced to agree, they’ll want Howard and his compliant MPs out big- time. It would be too late for a leadership challenge, so Howard would need to plead illness or whatever and step down.

Fortunately for Howard, Latham gave him a rung to climb this week by saying he’d have our troops home by Christmas. Like many others, I opposed the war without United Nations approval but once we invade a country we have a legal and moral obligation to secure the peace. We need to try to convince the US to forgo its dream of war booty and transfer control of the transition to democracy to the UN.

This is what new Spanish leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero is hoping to achieve by saying he’ll pull Spanish troops out unless the UN takes control.

Spain did not invade Iraq. We did. We can�t pretend Iraq has nothing to do with us after we helped invade it, and we can�t restore our national pride by following Howard�s capitulation to Bush with a cut and run betrayal of the Iraqi people. The last thing the world needs is for Bush�s lie to become reality by abandoning Iraq to the terrorists who�ve swarmed in since Bush�s war.

***

READER QUOTE OF THE WEEK

Darren Urquhart:�The Spanish threw their government out because (1) 90% were against the Iraq invasion in the first place, (2) the reasons for the invasion turned out to be lies and (3) they were now being attacked by terrorists with no Iraq connection. That is not capitulating to terrorists, it�s punishing an incompetent government. It’s also accepting that they did capitulate to the manipulations of that other dangerous gang, the Bush Administration.�

A shorter version of this column was first published in the Sun Herald today.

 

Call me crazy, but I reckon there’s a chance John Howard could be gone before the election because of Iraq. I think that’s why Howard behaved so badly towards whistleblower Mick Keelty for daring to admit that invading Iraq made us a much bigger target for terrorism.

Defending himself against Mark Latham’s first parliamentary censure debate last Monday, Howard proclaimed, with feeling, that his decision to invade Iraq was one “I will never apologise for and never retreat from”.

That’s because he can’t, of course. Howard has said often enough that he took personal responsibility for the decision. If he admitted it compromised our national security and the security of the West, he’d have to resign.

So if most Australians conclude in the next few months that invading Iraq made the world, and Australia, a more dangerous place, not a safer one – as Howard’s many critics across the political divide warned before the war – he’d have to go to give the Coalition a chance of survival. And if national security then became the major election issue, Peter Costello would have to take over to minimise a rout.

The Madrid bombings, and the Spanish people’s decision to sack a government that lied to them about who did the deed, have focused the world’s attention again on the crucial question: what is the most effective way to minimise al-Qaeda terror?

As part of his assault on Keelty, the Federal Police Commissioner, Howard admitted “Iraq is really irrelevant to the intent and purposes of al-Qaeda”, except that the war gave al-Qaeda a propaganda victory! So why did he back George Bush to the hilt and revel in Bush’s description of him as a “man of steel”? Revelations from former senior Bush officials now pouring out of the US prove that Bush’s war had nothing to do with combating terror and everything to do with grabbing even more economic power.

Pentagon whistleblower and former USAF lieutenant colonel Karen Kwiatkowski said the US invaded for three reasons of pure self-interest. Unless America took Iraq by force, sanctions would soon be lifted against Saddam Hussein and European companies, not US firms, would get lucrative contracts. The US wanted to reverse Saddam’s decision to trade his oil in euros not the $US (one of Bush’s first decisions after Saddam’s statue fell). And Bush wanted to move US Middle East military bases from Saudi Arabia to Iraq.

Even more damning, not only did Bush con his own people about the reasons for war, but he made Iraq a higher priority than the war on terror.

Bush’s former top counter-intelligence man Dick Clarke wrote in a book released last week that Bush was more interested in Iraq than al-Qaeda, even on September 12, 2001, and saw September 11 as cover to get away with invading Iraq.

Bush “launched an unnecessary and costly war in Iraq that strengthened the fundamentalist, radical Islamic terrorist movement worldwide”, Clarke wrote. “Nothing America could have done would have provided al-Qaeda and its new generation of cloned groups [with] a better recruitment device than our unprovoked invasion of an oil-rich Arab country.”

Rand Beers, the bloke who replaced Clarke in the month before the invasion, resigned five days before it for the same reason: “The administration wasn’t matching its deeds to its words. They’re making us less secure, not more.”

Web diarist Phil Kendall wrote:

“The biggest ‘heist’ of all time via an illegal invasion, alienation of half the world’s oil from its rightful owners and the possibility of an everlasting jihad against us – thanks Mr Howard.”

Howard a man of steel? A man of jelly, more likely, with his knee-jerk “yes, sir” to a president who forgot he was supposed to represent the American people, not his big business oil and armaments mates. That’s the line Latham is beginning to run and if Australians feel forced to agree, they’ll want Howard and his compliant MPs out big- time. It would be too late for a leadership challenge, so Howard would need to plead illness or whatever and step down.

Fortunately for Howard, Latham gave him a rung to climb this week by saying he’d have our troops home by Christmas. Like many others, I opposed the war without United Nations approval but once we invade a country we have a legal and moral obligation to secure the peace. We need to try to convince the US to forgo its dream of war booty and transfer control of the transition to democracy to the UN.

This is what new Spanish leader Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero is hoping to achieve by saying he’ll pull Spanish troops out unless the UN takes control.

Spain did not invade Iraq. We did. We can�t pretend Iraq has nothing to do with us after we helped invade it, and we can�t restore our national pride by following Howard�s capitulation to Bush with a cut and run betrayal of the Iraqi people. The last thing the world needs is for Bush�s lie to become reality by abandoning Iraq to the terrorists who�ve swarmed in since Bush�s war.

***

READER QUOTE OF THE WEEK

Darren Urquhart:�The Spanish threw their government out because (1) 90% were against the Iraq invasion in the first place, (2) the reasons for the invasion turned out to be lies and (3) they were now being attacked by terrorists with no Iraq connection. That is not capitulating to terrorists, it�s punishing an incompetent government. It’s also accepting that they did capitulate to the manipulations of that other dangerous gang, the Bush Administration.�

The government�s exclusive advertisement placement company has engaged in deeply unethical behaviour, which shames the government, corrupts our democracy and insults the people of Australia (Whatever it takes: the Howard Government’s cash for comment play).

 

The government�s response? Another insult to Australian voters: no comment. Perhaps I should have offered cash for a comment?

To recap, US multinational Universal McCann is the government�s exclusive contractor for placing advertisements. It works for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet�s �Government Communications Unit�.

A Universal McCann document to the government leaked to ALP communications spokesman Lindsay Tanner detailed a cash for comment deal with regional newspaper groups. If a newspaper published a �telecommunications feature� which ran Communications Department propaganda as an independent report, the government (ie the Australian people) would buy an extra one page advertisement as a �reward� for duping the Australian people.

After Tanner released the document in Question Time yesterday, the communications minister Daryl Williams said the deal �was not going ahead� and refused to answer any questions, including whether the decision was taken before or after the leak.

Today, he would only say, �it�s not going ahead because it�s not normal government practice�. Do you believe him? Why would anyone believe him, since he still won�t answer any other questions? Like:

 Who gave Universal McCann the authority to so compromise the government and betray the people?

 If the government had not authorised such scams, would the Universal McCann contract be reviewed or rescinded?

 Had the government ever done a cash-for-comment deal before?

 When was the decision taken to knock back the deal, and by whom?

These blokes have something to hide, yet again, and their tactic, as usual, is to say nothing and hope it goes away.

How disrespectful to voters can a government get?

Universal McCann did not call me back yesterday after I gave its investment director Lesley Marriot details of the matter and sought comment. So I rang her again today. She said I should speak to Chris Taylor of the �Government Communications Unit�.

So Universal McCann was not prepared to comment on its activities? The only person who could comment was Universal McCann�s managing director Nick Nicholls, she said. I�ve left a message with his personal assistant asking him to call.

You�ll never guess Chris Taylor�s response when I rang. �We�re not prepared to comment�.

Why not? �We don�t comment on government business.�

So why are you called the �Government Communications Unit? �Because we work for the government on their communications.�

I thanked him for his disrespect to Australian voters.

Dear Mr Howard, government is NOT a business, it�s a trustee relationship between the government and the Australian people who elected it to represent THEM, not you.

It is alien to any democratic idea of government that it use the people�s money to deliberately mislead it by disguising propaganda as news. That�s something corporations without ethics do.

There is a long pattern of conduct here. The Howard Government believing it has no obligation to the Australian people to be ethical and accountable in its dealings with the people whose interests it is supposed to represent.

This insidious behaviour has infected the Public Service to the extent that it sees itself as working only for the government of the day, discarding its higher duties to the public it used to serve by ensuring that government dealings are ethical, consistent, and fair.

The last time I encountered such stonewalling on a matter of clear public interest, where the public has a RIGHT to know what�s going on, was when the Australian Electoral Commission refused to say why it excused Tony Abbott from disclosing the donors to his �Honest Politics Trust� (see, for example, AEC claims secret political donations no business of voters.) It is still refusing to do so, although I hope an FOI request I submitted a while ago will provide an answer.

If you would like information as a voter on the government�s cash for comment strategies, contact Daryl Williams, Universal McCann or the Government Communications Unit. I hope you have better luck than I’ve had.

Now we know why the federal government has done nothing to outlaw cash for comment in our media since the John Laws/Alan Jones scandals years ago. The government itself is into the same deceitful practice, using OUR money to con US!

 

Universal McCann is a US multinational with the exclusive contract to act as the federal government�s media placement agency. It does ALL the government�s advertising campaigns.

As part of a $5.5 million advertising campaign in June and July to spruik telecommunications in the regions to convince people to support the privatisation of Telstra, Universal McCann met regional newspaper groups to nut out a blatant cash for comment deal.

With lots of our money in the government�s pocket, it had lots of power to get what it wanted from newspaper owners with no ethics. Here�s what Universal McCann reported to the Government:

�Preliminary discussions with major regional newspaper networks have identified a commitment to implement a �telecommunications feature� in many of the publications. This could take the form of placing one full-page mono advertisement and receive one full page of editorial, supplied predominantly by DCITA (the Department of Communications). Newspapers who take up the incentive will be rewarded with a second full-page mono advertisement. Those who do not take up the feature only receive one full-page mono advertisement. We estimate that there will be a 50% take-up.�

So, the government is deliberately setting out to deceive voters by disguising advertising as news stories written by independent journalists. And at least one newspaper group � we don�t yet know which � is happy to prostitute its news pages and lie to its readers for cash.

This despicable practice, which mocks the role and duty of a free press in a democracy, should have been made illegal years ago, when we learned that John Laws� agent approached the banks to offer positive commentary for big bucks. In that case, Laws pretended his spruiks were �interviews� with bank spokespeople, with no disclosure to listeners of his financial interest and contractual obligations to the banks.

The explosive Universal McCann �media strategy� memo, leaked to Labor�s communications spokesman Lindsay Tanner, begs the question of whether cash-for-comment deals are now standard in this government�s advertising. And remember, Howard is Australia�s biggest media advertising spender.

A spokeswoman for the communications Minister Daryl Williams said: �That proposal came through, but it�s not going ahead�. The spokeswoman refused to say whether the decision to drop it was made before or after the release of the memo. She also had no answer to several other questions, and intimated that Williams would not provide �details� to the Australian people about what was going on. But she did take down my questions to see if Williams would deign to address them. He wouldn�t.

These were my additional questions:

1. By what and upon whose authority did Universal McCann negotiate the cash for comment deal on the government’s behalf?

2. Since McCann was the government�s exclusive advertising placement agency, was cash for comment standard government practice?

3. Had the media strategy been looked at by Howard�s �Ministerial Committee on Government Communications�, which approves all media campaigns?

4. If so, had the committee approved the cash for comment arrangement?

5. Did Williams know about it before today?

6. Why did the government drop it?

I phoned Universal McCann for comment and spoke to the company�s investment director Leslie Marriot. She took my number and said she�d get back to me. She didn’t.

There are two groups which qualify for the Universal McCann description �major regional newspaper networks� � APN and Rural Press.

The managing director of Rural Press, Brian McCarthy, would not comment on the specifics before reading the documents, but did say: �There�s no cash for comment in Rural Press newspapers.�

A spokesman for APN said:

�APN had been approached by McCann but were not aware of the client. APN was happy to look at a pre-printed advertorial feature which was totally separate to the news section and would be clearly marked �advertorial�. If the story was newsworthy it would go through the normal editorial process and there is no guarantee of editorial for advertising.�

Lindsay Tanner said:

�Having the government organising with newspapers to put in government advertising presented as newspaper articles is appalling. Under no circumstances would a Labor government engage in cash for comment. All advertising by a Labor government would be clearly marked as advertising. We will never use the leverage of government advertising to get positive coverage from media groups.�

That�s well and good, but what about the media proprietors? Their conduct is equally scandalous, and equally disrespectful of their readers. I suggest that an honest federal government � when we�re lucky enough to get one � legislate to outlaw the sale of news and feature stories. It�s corrupt behaviour, and debases the free press in our democracy.

The ABC Media Watch program recently exposed other newspaper cash for comment deals, this time by a Sydney suburban group called FPC Courier. It offered candidates for Saturday�s local government election an advertisement written by the candidate and disguised as a news story of the same size as a paid ad, with the implied threat that candidates who did not agree would get no coverage in the paper. (See Candidates pay, or else and The Courier “reviews”.)

FPC Courier’s slogan is ‘Committed to community”.

The newspaper industry waxes lyrical about its right to be free of government regulation to protect free speech. But newspapers have NO right to lie to their readers and pass off advertising as editorial news or comment. The practice is so deeply corrosive of the vital role of a free press in our democracy that it should be stamped out immediately in newspapers and on radio and TV. I�d make cash for comment deals a criminal offence.

If Mark Latham is really serious about cleaning up our democracy, then media corruption must be addressed.